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The current study investigated pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ attitudes 
about social exclusion based on cultural membership, specifically exclusion of 
individuals from Arab descent. Developmental intergroup research on the Arab 
cultural identity is sparse, and given this is a group that is highly associated with 
negative emotionally charged stereotypes in adults, it is important to understand the 
developmental origins of such attitudes. Questions about the role of stereotypes, 
cultural identity, shared interest in activities (e.g., hobbies), exclusive and inclusive 
group norms, and intergroup attributions of emotions in exclusion contexts were 
addressed. To answer these questions non-Arab American 12- and 16-year-olds (N 
=199) evaluated situations in which their own group and an Arab American group of 
peers made decisions about inclusion and exclusion. These decisions were about a 
cultural ingroup target with different interests in activities or a cultural outgroup 
target with the same interests in activities.  
Findings indicated that participants expected the Arab American group would 
make inclusion decisions based on the cultural identity of the target (a preference for 
  
cultural identity over shared interests) in contrast to their own non-Arab American 
group, which they expected would make decisions based on shared interest in 
activities (a preference for shared activities over cultural identity). This finding was 
perpetuated in groups that had exclusive group norms. Sixteen year-olds were less 
inclusive toward an outgroup member than 12-year-olds and participants who 
reported stereotypes about Arabs were also less inclusive toward an outgroup target. 
Different emotions were attributed to an Arab American group that excluded a target 
compared with an American group, evidencing more empathic attributions to 
participants’ ingroup (American group). Findings from this study inform intergroup 
developmental research on the role of stereotypes, and the interplay of cognition and 
emotions in pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ social decision-making in cross-
cultural interactions. Results of this study have implications for developing 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Rationale 
Introduction 
Social exclusion in childhood is complex and research has been focused on 
understanding its origins, sources, and developmental trajectories (Killen & Rutland, 
2011).  Researchers have investigated an array of manifestations of exclusion such as 
peer rejection, focusing on individual traits that contribute to an individual being 
excluded (e.g., wariness or fearfulness; see Rubin et al., 2006), as well as intergroup 
attitudes, which have revealed how stereotypic expectations about other ethnic groups 
can contribute to social exclusion (Brenick, Henning, Killen, O'Connor, & Collins, 
2007).  At times, when children exclude someone who happens to be shy, their reason 
for excluding may not be related to the individual’s shyness but related to their 
cultural identity (Killen, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2012).  For children who are members of a 
cultural minority, and who may already feel like outsiders, exclusion may impede 
healthy adjustment to school environments.  The current study examined how 
intergroup attitudes, particularly regarding cultural identity, group norms, and 
stereotypic expectations, are related to exclusion of cultural minority children, 
specifically children of Arab descent living in the United States.   
Arab as a cultural outgroup category is important to consider given that Arabs 
have been stigmatized because of associations with terrorism and negative portrayals 
in the media and due to the fact that it is an understudied outgroup in developmental 
research. While researchers have studied exclusion in groups based on gender, race 
and ethnicity over the past decade (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Killen, 2007), less child 




nationality, cultural heritage and religion (Hitti, Mulvey, & Killen, 2011).  Children’s 
intergroup attitudes regarding nationality, cultural heritage and religion in the United 
States are not well understood, and studies with adults indicate that these identities 
can be and often are confounded with each other in the public arena (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh & Qasmiyeh, 2010; Guenther, Pendaz, & Makene, 2011). Given that 
cultural minority groups are associated with multiple intersecting categories, this 
makes them prone to being associated with stereotypes linked to each category.   
Investigating attitudes held by those who are not of Arab descent about their 
Arab American peers presents a unique opportunity to explore the intersecting and 
often overlapping categories of culture, religion, and nationality.  This is due, in part, 
to confusions that exist in a majority of the American population who are unfamiliar 
with Arab culture, regarding whether Arabs are identified by their religion, cultural 
heritage or nation of origin (Ibish, 2003; Naber, 2000).  While Christian Arab families 
migrated to the United States beginning in the late 1880s, more recently, both 
Christian and Muslim Arab families have embarked on this migration trek.  Post 9/11 
created a new set of concerns for Arab Americans due to the frequently voiced 
negative stereotypes portrayed by the media and politicians in association with 
terrorism (Shaheen, 2003; Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010).  Contrary to pervasive 
conceptions in the United States, Arab Americans are a highly diverse group in terms 
of nationality and religion, with ancestry in many Arabic-speaking countries, and 
religions varying from Muslim, Christian and Druze, among other religious 




With the influx of Arabs fleeing conflict in the Middle East and migrating to 
Western countries, more Americans are coming in contact with people of Arab 
descent.  Thus, many children in schools are meeting children of Arab descent for the 
first time without much information about where they came from.  Non-Arab children 
who encounter peers of Arab descent are required to coordinate information about 
cultural identities, cultural expectations, and stereotypes associated with Arab people.  
An understanding of culture identity in this context may be related to knowledge 
about customs and traditions regarding dress, food and music, or cultural practices 
related to parental upbringing practices (e.g., how to interact with friends or adults). 
This study was not designed to measure values and beliefs that children may live by 
due to their cultural surroundings (e.g., psychological factors that determine 
individualistic and collectivistic orientations or the value they assign to adhering to or 
challenging social or cultural norms), but rather to capture preliminary data of what 
knowledge children had about people of Arab backgrounds. It was not known what 
information American children had about their peers of Arab descent. In addition 
whether non-Arab children conceive of their Arab peers as culturally different and 
expect them to behave in different ways is an open question. To a large extent, the 
focus of this study was on how children and adolescents evaluate exclusion of a 
cultural group that has experienced stigmatization and exclusion. 
Recent research has shown that children and individuals of Arab descent are at 
times treated differently and are associated with negative traits.  Research has 
documented examples of misconceptions and stereotypes about Arab Americans as 




Syvertsen, Gill, Gallay, & Cumsille, 2009; Ibish, 2001, 2003).  It has also been found 
that among adults, stereotypes about Arab groups are emotionally charged due to 
their association with the 9/11 attacks (Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 
2009).  What has not been examined is how children and adolescents coordinate what 
they know about these groups into their social decision-making and whether their 
social experiences, in the form of contact with Arabs, inform these decisions.  
Evaluating these dimensions in the context of peer exclusion scenarios provides an 
opportunity to assess children’s and adolescents’ moral considerations regarding the 
welfare of those being excluded and the fairness involved in being inclusive. 
Group Norms and Stereotypes 
One way to developmentally investigate intergroup attitudes toward cultural 
minority groups is to explore the role of group norms in children’s and adolescents’ 
exclusion or inclusion decisions.  When making the decision to include others into 
one’s own cultural group, several factors may be at play, three of which are 
noteworthy in cross-cultural intergroup contexts.  One factor would be children’s 
developing knowledge of how groups work (i.e., group dynamics).  Understanding 
group dynamics reflects an effort to enhance one’s own group by ensuring group 
goals are met and group functioning is maintained (Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 
2005).  If a cultural minority group is associated with negative stereotypes, including 
a member of this group into one’s own group might deflect from the goal of positive 
ingroup identity and ingroup cohesion.  In addition, stereotypic expectations about the 
norms of a cultural outgroup (e.g., “that group doesn’t like foreigners”) may deter 




Given the pervasiveness of homophily in children’s friendship choices (Rubin, 
Fredstrom, & Bowker, 2008), the second factor is the extent to which members of a 
cultural minority are viewed as similar to members of the majority group.  Thus, the 
choice of friendship or inclusion of peers into one’s social group may be based on 
similar cultural identity or based on shared interests, values, and beliefs (Rubin, 
Bukowski, & Parker, 2006).  How children define “similarity” in a cross-cultural 
context is an open question, especially when variables other than cultural identity, 
such as similar interests in activities, are made salient.  Stereotypic associations made 
about an outgroup culture may interfere with the extent to which a member of the 
host society might view individuals from that outgroup as similar.  In addition, 
cultural expectations about conforming to group norms to establish common grounds 
for interaction can either help or hinder cross-cultural friendships.  If a cultural 
minority is viewed as non-conforming to a cultural majority’s conventions, such as 
dress codes or activity-based interests, he or she might be seen as too different. 
A third factor influencing children’s inclusion choices within a cross-cultural 
context has to do with prescriptive norms of how to treat others (Killen & Brenick, 
2011).  If cultural majority peers celebrate diversity, mutual respect and fair treatment 
of others, they would be more inclined to include someone from a different culture 
into their group.  Alternatively, majority children who expect their own cultural group 
to be prejudiced or treat a cultural minority unfairly, may not be inclusive out of 
concern for the minority peer’s welfare.  Therefore, children must coordinate between 
their moral understanding about how to treat others and conventional norms that serve 




study would be to test which factors are given priority in a cultural majority/minority 
intergroup peer encounter.   
Investigating non-Arab children’s and adolescents’ attitudes towards Arab 
Americans, a group associated with negative stereotypes in the United States can 
illuminate the extent to which stereotypic expectations interfere with the emergence 
of social decision-making within an intergroup context.  A developmental perspective 
provides a unique window into the acquisition of these concepts.  This is particularly 
the case at this point in cultural history, given that negative expectations about 
individuals of Arab descent have recently increased within the past decade (Ibish, 
2008).  Thus, studying this phenomenon provides a contrast to race (which has the 
history of slavery in the United States for 200 years) and recent immigrants such as 
Latinos (which is highly charged due to immigration policies and the dramatic 
increase in the proportional representation in regions of the United States such as the 
Southwest and West Coast).  Including Arab Americans as the focus of a 
developmental intergroup study provides a unique opportunity to study the emergence 
of the role of stereotypes and social experience on judgments and evaluations in an 
exclusionary context.  Measures of emotional attributions in an intergroup 
exclusionary context that is clouded with emotionally charged stereotypic 
associations, furthers an understanding of the interplay between emotions and 
judgments (Turiel & Killen, 2010) in intergroup relations.  In the current study, 
children’s judgments about group norms endorsing inclusion and exclusion of others, 
and their criteria for inclusion reflecting common interests in activities, as well as 




Arab American peer groups.  Judgments about group members who deviate from 
group norms and challenge norms related to inclusivity and exclusivity were also 
assessed to provide further insight into developing knowledge of group processes and 
morality. 
Theoretical Framework 
To carry out the present investigation, a social reasoning theoretical 
perspective was adopted (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). This perspective reflects 
an integration of a developmental theory about children’s social-cognitive 
development, Social Domain theory (Turiel, 1983) and a theory predominantly used 
to guide intergroup relations research in adulthood, Social Identity theory (SIT: Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). These two theories coupled with developmental offshoots of SIT 
(Social Identity Developmental theory (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) and Developmental 
Subjective Group Dynamics (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003)) were used to 
inform expectations related to group norms and group identity, but also expectations 
about children’s moral and social-conventional reasoning about social judgments in 
an intergroup context. 
Social Domain theory.  Extensive research has shown that children reason 
about their social interactions using three domains of social knowledge.  These 
domains include: (a) the moral domain, which pertains to issues related to a 
prescriptive understanding of fair and just inter-individual treatment; (b) the societal 
domain, which reflects issues related to authority dependent conventions, customs 
and rules that can be altered; and (c) the psychological domain, which reflect personal 




2006; Turiel, 1983).  Children are able to differentiate between these domains by 
considering rules and norms associated with them and judging how generalizable and 
alterable they are and how punishable violations of such rules are.  For example, 
morally relevant rules or norms tend to be viewed as universal, unalterable, and 
violations are considered punishable; but, societal rules or norms are not considered 
to be generalizable to other cultures and countries, but can be altered by authorities 
and violations and are less punishable than violations of moral rules.   
Intergroup exclusion is considered to be a multifaceted interaction to the 
extent that children consider both moral and social-conventional norms when making 
such decisions (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006).  Deciding to exclude someone from a 
peer group involves many conflicting concerns.  On the one hand, excluding a person 
can cause that person harm and reflect a violation of one’s (or a group’s) moral code 
to be inclusive, yet, on the other hand, including someone who affiliates with a 
cultural minority might be disruptive to group functioning and to maintaining a 
positive group identity.  How children resolve this conflict or expect their peer groups 
to resolve this conflict is central to understanding their attitudes toward Arab peers 
and other cultural minorities in the United States.  One way to explore children’s 
conflict resolution approaches in an intergroup context is to adopt methods used by 
Social Domain theorists and acquire children’s justification for judgments about 
inclusion or exclusion.  
Intergroup research from a Social Domain theory approach has shown that 
children and adolescents often reject race-based exclusion because of moral concerns 




exclusion to be acceptable. The reasons they cite for the acceptability of exclusion 
reflect concerns for group functioning; concerns for maintaining group identity; 
stereotypes about racial outgroups; and personal preferences. Social Identity theory 
can be useful in further explaining why an individual’s social identity (e.g., racial, 
ethnic, cultural membership) might be perceived to hinder group functioning, or is 
used to make personal preference judgments that lead to exclusion.  
Social Identity theory.  SIT contends that individuals seek to enhance their 
ingroup’s positivity and, to this end, carry out social comparisons with other groups 
thus increasing distinctions between their ingroup and an outgroup.  In adults, this 
often leads to prejudice toward outgroup members.  Developmental perspectives of 
Social Identity theory (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) 
build on the theory by identifying the conditions under which children’s ingroup 
preference and outgroup negativity develop.  Research from a Social Identity 
Developmental theory (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) perspective has shown that 
prejudice along ethnic lines develops under conditions of heightened levels of group 
identification, perceived outgroup threat and the existence of an ingroup norm to be 
exclusive.  While young children (between 5 and 7 years) do exhibit preferences for 
racial and ethnic ingroup members, with age, children begin to incorporate 
combinations of the latter factors into their judgments about outgroup members, 
whereas younger children might make judgments relying on only one (Nesdale, 
Durkin, Maass, & Griffiths, 2005; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, 




Researchers working from a Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics 
approach (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003) assert that when making judgments 
about both ingroup and outgroup members, group norms as well as group 
membership are taken into consideration.  Children coordinate their knowledge about 
ingroup norms with what they know about outgroup norms and make both intragroup 
and intergroup decisions based on this knowledge, with the goal to enhance ingroup 
identity.  Research from this perspective found that with age and growing knowledge 
about groups, children focus heavily on group norms and are not favorable to ingroup 
members who violate them, but are more accepting of outgroup members who 
support their ingroup norms.  Thus, as children get older, judgments are made based 
on group norms more so than group identity.  This signifies the sophisticated social 
cognitive processes that children undergo in their social decision-making, as they 
incorporate information about group identity, group norms and group dynamics.  
However, little is known about the priority children and adolescents give to different 
types of group norms (for exception see Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 
2012).  In an intergroup context, are prescriptive norms related to fair treatment of 
others and inclusivity (moral norms), more important than group norms related to 
optimal group functioning (social-conventional norms)? 
Overview of the Rationale for the Study 
The general goal of this project was to examine how children and adolescents 
evaluated inclusion and exclusion in peer groups.  The focus was on how children 
internally negotiated and reasoned about including or excluding a peer representing 




when making such decisions? When thinking about including an Arab cultural 
minority that is associated with negative stereotypes, did they focus on stereotypic 
associations, their understanding about group processes, or a moral inclination to treat 
others fairly? 
To answer these questions, participants were asked to evaluate same-gender 
peer groups that differ along two dimensions: (a) cultural identity (Arab American 
and non-Arab American); (b) group norms (inclusive and exclusive); and were 
making decisions to include or exclude a target of inclusion who’s characteristics 
varied based on group identity and an interest in activities.  The target was either a 
cultural outgroup target who shared the group’s interest in activity, or a cultural 
ingroup target with different interests in activity.  It is important to disentangle shared 
group identity from other group conventions related to group practices (e.g., having 
similar interests in activities), as it provides an understanding of the underlying 
reasons behind prejudicial judgments.   
Often children may choose to exclude a racial minority from a racial majority 
group on the bases of making the group work well (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & 
Stangor, 2002).  What is not known from a child’s perspective is whether groups 
work well based on maintaining common group identity or maintaining other 
common group conventions. Which commonalities or similarities are given more 
weight, and whether there are developmental differences in how children and 
adolescents think about ‘similarity’ when using it to justify efficient group 
functioning was investigated in the current study.  While both maintaining common 




group functioning, the former can be a proxy for negative outgroup biases that are 
based on stereotypic assumptions (Killen & Brenick, 2011).  Focusing on a highly 
stereotypic cultural minority, such as Arab Americans, helps identify the situations in 
which children give priority to cultural identity or shared interest. Imposing group 
norms of inclusivity (e.g., “We invite kids who are different from us.”) and 
exclusivity (e.g., “We only invite kids who are similar to us.”) serves to identify 
children’s understanding of similarities or differences when it comes to cross-cultural 
encounters.  The current study incorporated both group norms and a cultural identity 
associated with emotionally charged negative stereotypes to disentangle shared group 
practices (e.g., reasons to maintain group functioning) from cultural group identity. 
Thus when children choose to prioritize shared interests in activities over cultural 
group identity they exhibit cross-cultural inclusivity, but when they choose to focus 
on cultural identity at the cost of shared interests in activities this reflects cross-
cultural exclusivity (see Figure 1). Those who held stereotypes about Arab people 
were expected to rely on cultural membership to make inclusion decisions, especially 
when their own group had an exclusive norm. 
Developmental intergroup research yielded findings addressing the significant 
yet nuanced role that group norms play in children’s and adolescents’ intergroup 
attitudes.  For example, research by Nesdale and colleagues (Nesdale, 2008) has 
shown that group norms of being inclusive or exclusive influence how favorable 
children (7- and 10-year-olds) are toward an ethnic outgroup member (i.e., if your 
group has an exclusion norm you would favor an outgroup member less).  These 




when peer groups have exclusive group norms, children are required to identify the 
characteristics that would best define the criterion used for entry into a group, in the 
current study these are either cultural identity or interests in activities. 
Older children are also attuned to group norms when evaluating ingroup 
members who violate them.  In contexts where an ingroup member displays 
disloyalty to a group by cheering for an opposing soccer team, specifically an English 
child cheering for a German team, Abrams and Rutland (Abrams & Rutland, 2008) 
found that in a sample of 6- to 9-year-olds, older children favored a loyal outgroup 
member (German child) over a disloyal ingroup member (English child).  Therefore, 
in this context, the defining characteristic for inclusion would be loyalty to the 
ingroup’s soccer team rather than nationality of a child.   
In other contexts, the determining characteristics for inclusion were more 
nuanced and had to do with whether a group member espoused positive generic 
norms (e.g., norms not specific to a group but are endorsed by the wider society) as 
opposed to gender identity and group-specific norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  
In this study, Killen and colleagues investigated both moral (i.e., equal distribution of 
resources) and conventional (i.e., wearing a club shirt) group norms and found that 9- 
and 13-year-olds differentiated between different types of norms.  For example, using 
gender-based groups, both children and adolescents preferred members of the 
opposite gender who supported an ingroup’s norm of distributing money equally (or 
wearing the club shirt) over ingroup members who advocated for more money for 
their own group (or did not wear the club shirt).  In addition, both children and 




distribution of resources than when they advocated for not wearing the club shirt, 
suggesting group norms that violate prescriptive norms of fairness are more salient 
than norms that violate group traditions related clothing customs.  These findings 
show that violations of moral norms by an ingroup member are viewed more 
negatively than violations of conventional norms, which bears on the current study.  
The stereotypes that are associated with an Arab social category are related to 
aggression and terrorism (Shaheen, 2003); therefore, the salience and moral relevance 
of such stereotypes may sway children into using cultural identity as a determining 
feature for inclusion as opposed to shared interests in activities.  For this reason, 
group identity (Arab versus non-Arab) in the current study may play a bigger role, 
even though in the previous study described gender identity did not.   
However, evidence from another study, which assessed cross-race 
interactions, showed that shared interest in a sport activity played a more central role 
in a context where racial stereotypes have the potential of impacting children’s 
friendship judgments.  McGlothlin and colleagues (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005; 
McGlothlin, Killen, & Edmonds, 2005) investigated the role of shared interest in 
children’s evaluations of cross-race friendships, showing that for children from 
heterogeneous schools, race played a secondary role in their evaluations of potential 
friendships between the dyads presented.  Shared interest in sport was more salient 
than racial membership when making judgments about friendships.  But, the findings 
were different for children from homogeneous environments.  In this case, 
participants’ underlying biases or conceptions about different racial groups may have 




interests in activities is a form of convention that makes groups work well (i.e., we all 
like the same activity, so we will all get along), while having the same social identity 
as members of a peer group can also enhance the group, as social identity establishes 
common ground in traditions, customs and history (i.e., we are all American so we all 
celebrate the Fourth of July).   
The former studies demonstrated that differentiating between racial identity 
and shared interest depends on children’s social experiences (heterogeneous versus 
homogenous environments).  Social experience and contact with outgroup members 
can influence stereotypic knowledge about that outgroup.  While these studies did not 
directly disentangle the effects of stereotypes on participants’ evaluations of 
friendships based on racial identity, the current study directly assessed this 
relationship in a cross-cultural context by capturing participants’ stereotypic 
knowledge through direct measurement as well as by asking them to justify their 
inclusion choices. 
Given that stereotypes associated with Arabs are emotionally charged 
(Dasgupta et al., 2009), it is also important to test the role of emotional attributions in 
an Arab/non-Arab American exclusion encounter.  Most research exploring the role 
of emotions on intergroup attitudes is conducted with adults (Amodio & Mendoza, 
2010; Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).  Research that 
addresses the question of how emotions are used in intergroup encounters throughout 
development is sparse (Turiel & Killen, 2010).  One recent study directly investigated 
emotional evaluations and attributions within a cultural minority/majority intergroup 




minority pre-adolescents and adolescents (Serbian) attributed more positive emotions 
(e.g., higher ratings of feeling good) to Swiss (majority) individuals who exclude 
Serbian peers, and both Swiss and Serbian participants attributed pride to excluders 
when the target of the exclusion was Serbian.  Therefore, pre-adolescents and 
adolescents attribute different emotions to an excluder depending on the status of the 
excluder’s social group.  How these findings might translate into an Arab versus non-
Arab American peer scenario, which has the potential to be clouded with emotionally 
charged negative stereotypes, is not known.  In addition, how group norms related to 
inclusion and exclusion might impact children’s attributions of emotions in an 
intergroup context has not yet been empirically tested.  The current study embarked 
on both these investigations to inform the intergroup literature on the developing 
relationship between emotions and reasoning in cross-cultural encounters. 
Current Study Design 
Of the research studies described above, none have provided a contrast 
between inclusive and exclusive group norms and how they impact children’s criteria 
for inclusion of other peers into their groups.  The peer characteristics examined in 
this study were those related to a highly stereotyped cultural identity, and to interests 
in activity in the context of Arab and non-Arab American peer encounters.  
Therefore, the current study aimed to address these gaps and answer questions related 
to the emergence of prejudice and use of stereotypes in peer group exclusion 
situations where the Arab culture was the focus.   
Two age groups were used to test for age-related differences in children’s and 




developmental social identity research investigated the development of intergroup 
attitudes in children ages 6 through 10 (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Nesdale, 2008).  In 
these samples, it was found that older children were more attuned to group norms 
than younger children.  In order to capture developmental trends and extend previous 
findings in group dynamics, the younger age group in the current study was a sample 
of pre-adolescents (11- and 12-year-olds, or 6th graders).  Through extensive pilot 
testing, we were also able to conclude that non-Arab American pre-adolescents have 
variable knowledge about the Arab culture and thus sampling this age group helps 
capture emergence of stereotypic associations made with Arab groups.  However, it is 
during adolescence that group identity becomes salient (Horn, 2003; Verkuyten & 
Brug, 2001).  For this reason, middle adolescents (15- and 16-year-olds, or 10th 
graders) were sampled for the older age group in the study.  Concerns for optimal 
group functioning and stereotype awareness becomes more salient in adolescence and 
play less of a role in younger children; therefore, a comparison of these two age 
groups would capture developmental differences in the role of group identity and 
stereotypes in intergroup judgments.  Fifteen- and 16-year-olds would also have had 
ample experience with groups and a more complex knowledge about group processes 
than 11- and 12-year-olds, and therefore more nuanced effects of group norms could 
be captured with an adolescent sample. 
Design.  To test the effect of inclusive and exclusive group norms, pre-
adolescents and adolescents were introduced to two peer groups, one Arab American 
and one non-Arab American, that adhere to one of these norms (see Figure 2 for the 




(Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005) the norms for each group 
were established describing one group as usually inviting others who are similar to 
them (exclusive) and the other group as usually inviting others who are different from 
them (inclusive).  There were two versions of the survey such that, in one version, the 
Arab American group had a norm to be exclusive and the American group had a norm 
to be inclusive, while in the other version, the norms were reversed.  To explore 
whether more weight is given to cultural identity or shared interest in activity, similar 
to research conducted on cross-race friendships (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), the 
targets of inclusion had characteristics that either matched the group’s cultural 
identity but differed in interest, or did not match the group’s identity but had similar 
interests.   
For the purposes of simplifying descriptions of the targets’ characteristics, 
targets who match the group identity but have different interests in activity were 
called the ingroup target; different interest, while targets who do not match the 
group’s identity but have similar interests in activities were called outgroup target; 
similar interests, see Figure 2.  Therefore, participants read two stories, one in which 
an Arab American group of peers made decisions about an Arab American target that 
has different interests in activity than the group (ingroup target; different interest) 
and an American target who has similar interests in activities to the group (outgroup 
target; similar interests), who both would like to join the group.  In contrast, the 
second story included an American group of peers who made decisions about an 




interest) and an Arab American target with similar interests in activity (outgroup 
target; similar interests), who both would like to join the group.   
Based on these stories participants responded to several assessments that 
captured their intergroup inclusion attitudes, intragroup judgments, emotional 
attributions and social cognitive reasoning which represented outcomes that reflect 
children social decision making in an inter-cultural context.  Following these 
assessments, participants filled out a Cultural Knowledge Task, completed a Contact 
with Individuals of Arab Descent measure, and demographic information related to 
ethnicity, race, religion and ethnic composition of friendships. The latter served as 
possible predictors of children’s attitudes, judgments, and emotional attributions. 
Measures.  There were 8 measures of group dynamics and inclusion attitudes, 
2 measures of group emotional attribution, 3 measures of cultural knowledge, 5 
measures of contact with Arab peers and 5 demographic measures.  All together they 
made up the Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey (Appendix C). 
Group dynamics and inclusion attitudes.  The following assessments reflect 
intergroup as well intragroup evaluations.  The assessments can be grouped as 
reflecting evaluations of inclusion of a target from a group or individual perspective 
(and reasoning), evaluations of a deviant act by a group member, and forced choice 
inclusion from a group perspective (and reasoning), as described below. 
Group and Individual Inclusion.  A Group Inclusion assessment measured 
participants’ perceptions of the likelihood that a group would include the target into 
their group.  This was a novel approach to measuring inclusion judgments as previous 




excluding someone from a group (e.g., How okay or not okay is it to exclude X?) 
(Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007), as opposed to the current assessment that provides a 
measure of whether children expect inclusive or exclusive group behaviors.  While 
previous research addressed the evaluative moral dimension of exclusion, the current 
measure required that children make predictions about the likelihood that a group 
would include (or exclude if the likelihood is low) a target, thus it addressed the 
group processes dimension of exclusion.  In addition, it provided a measure of 
intergroup attitudes that reflects children’s expectations about how peer groups would 
act in intergroup contexts.  Participants were also asked to justify their judgments 
about group inclusion, in line with methods used to analyze social cognitive 
reasoning from a Social Domain theory perspective (Smetana, 2006).   
To provide a conceptually important contrast to the group inclusion 
assessments, participants were asked to make their own Individual Inclusion 
predictions.  It was of theoretical interest to know a participant’s own individual 
opinion about including the target in contrast to what they expect the group would do.  
Research has shown that as children get older and acquire more experience with 
groups, they are able to better differentiate their own opinions and preferences from 
the groups that they belong to, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of 
certain dynamics to make groups work well (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 
2009; Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  The individual inclusion assessment allowed for 
a comparison between what the participants are likely to do versus what the group 




Evaluation of the Deviant Act and Reasoning.  In stories where the group was 
inclusive, participants were introduced to a member of the group who expressed 
exclusive desires (e.g., likes kids who are only similar to him/her and does not want 
to invite X) toward each target.  In stories where the group was exclusive, participants 
were introduced to an inclusive member who expressed the desire to invite the target.  
Using an Evaluation of the Deviant Act assessment, which asks participants to judge 
the acceptability of each deviant member’s opinion (e.g., How okay or not okay was 
it for Y to tell the group they should invite/not invite X?), further differentiated 
evaluations of inclusive and exclusive group norms.  This provided a measure of the 
cost associated with having inclusive or exclusive beliefs that go against a group’s 
norm.  Reasoning was also assessed to determine whether participants use moral, 
social-conventional, or psychological (e.g., autonomy) reasons to justify their 
evaluations.   
Forced-choice Group Inclusion.  Participants’ predictions about the likelihood 
of group and individual inclusion provided a measure of expectations for inclusion for 
each target (ingroup target; different interest and outgroup target; similar interest).  
However, a Forced-choice Group Inclusion assessment forced participants to make a 
choice between one target and the other.  By providing participants with information 
about logistical constraints (e.g., there’s only room for one person), this item 
represented a measure of active social decision-making as opposed to expectations 
about inclusion.  This assessment was adopted from several studies on social 
exclusion and has been found to be very informative in extracting information about 




studies have also shown that a Forced-choice Group Inclusion Reasoning assessment 
provides further clarification as to why children make these forced-choice inclusion 
decisions.  Given that context in which group norms of inclusion and exclusion are 
imposed on norms about cultural group identity and shared interest, it is especially 
important to learn the reasons behind children’s inclusion choices.  This is because, if 
a child chooses to include an American peer with different interests from his/her own 
group of American peers who are inclusive (like people who are different), they could 
be making that decision based on ingroup biases or based on the premise that the 
group likes others who are different.  Children’s justifications for their forced-choice 
responses clarified this.   
Attributions of Emotions.  To assess whether participants attribute differential 
emotions to Arab American groups versus American groups and whether that differed 
based on the group’s norm, they were asked to respond to an Attributions of Group 
Emotions assessment.  This assessment asked children to attribute emotions to the 
groups of peers in each story after they have hypothetically excluded each of the 
targets (ingroup target; different interest and outgroup target; similar interest).  Four 
positive, one neutral and four negative emotions were drawn from the attribution of 
emotions research, specifically those dealing with intergroup exclusion (Malti et al., 
2012).  This assessment served to inform how emotional attributions take form in an 
intergroup context where moral and conventional norms are pitted against one 
another.  Relating this assessment to participants’ stereotypic knowledge about Arab 
people provided insight into the role of stereotypes on children emotional evaluations.  




(Turiel & Killen, 2010), knowing whether children focus on inclusive or exclusive 
group norms, cultural identity or shared interest when attributing emotions to a group 
informs intergroup research on the salient factors driving emotional information in 
such contexts.  Therefore, an Attributions of Group Emotions Reasoning assessment 
was given to capture that information.   
Cultural Knowledge Task.  The Cultural Knowledge Task was adopted from 
assessments used to identify stereotype knowledge in research with Israeli and Arab 
preschool children (Cole et al., 2003).  After carrying out age-appropriate word 
modifications and extensive pilot testing, the task was reduced to three measures.  
Participants were asked to provide information about their knowledge of Arab people 
on three measures: (a) Knowledge about Arab People; (b) Trait and Characteristic 
Associations with Arab People; and (c) Arab/Muslim confound.  The first two 
measures were answered in an open-ended format.  The third measure was included 
in this task to assess the phenomenon, found in adults, of confounding Muslims with 
Arabs.  Through the three measures, this task was used to gauge participants’ 
knowledge and awareness about Arab culture, and provided opportunity to capture 
any spontaneous references to stereotypic expectations made in association with Arab 
people.  It helped provide predictions for the role of stereotypes in children’s 
inclusion judgments and attributions of emotions. 
Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent.  Given that social experiences and 
contact with outgroup peers has been shown to play a role in how children judge 
cross-race friendships and intergroup relations (McGlothlin & Killen, 2010; Tropp & 




included.  Modified from a previous measure assessing cross-race contact 
(McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), this assessment was used to gauge participants 
exposure to peers of Arab descent and as a possible predictor of participants inclusion 
judgments.  The five measures include varying levels of contact with Arab peers: (a) 
Neighborhood; (b) Friends; (c) Conversations; (d) Time Spent, and (e) Attendance of 
Arab Cultural Events. 
Demographics.  Demographic information about participants’ Age, Gender, 
Ethnicity/race, Religion, and Ethnic Composition of Friendship Groups were also 
collected.  Hypotheses only pertain to age-related differences; however, gender was 
included to control for any differences that might arise from this demographic 
variable.  All other variables were used to describe the study sample to learn more 
about who was in our sample.  No information about socioeconomic status was 
collected since sampling focused on public schools in low middle to middle-income 
districts.   
Hypotheses.  The main thesis of this study was that pre-adolescents and 
adolescents would judge and evaluate scenarios involving Arab American peers 
differently than scenarios that involve American peers (see Figure 1 for conceptual 
map).  The level of stereotypic knowledge about people of Arab descent and the level 
of contact they have had with Arab peers would inform their judgments. 
 Several broad hypotheses are described here and more specific hypotheses 
pertaining to each measure and relevant to culturally based expectations can be found 
in Table 1.  The first hypothesis is based on SIT’s assertion that individuals seek to 




it was expected that participants would view their own group (non-Arab American) as 
more inclusive than an Arab American group.  Inclusive and exclusive group norms 
would prime participants to be either inclusive or exclusive (Nesdale, Maass, et al., 
2005) when it comes to evaluating their own ingroup but they may expect the 
outgroup to exhibit bias based on cultural identity irrespective of the group’s norms 
(see Figure 1). It was also expected that participants would differentiate between their 
expectations about how inclusive the group would be and their own individual 
inclusion judgments (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  In addition those who have had 
high levels of contact with peers of Arab descent would be more positive about 
intergroup interactions (i.e., inclusion of an outgroup target) than those with little 
contact (Tropp & Prenovost, 2008). 
The second hypothesis represents age-related expectations.  Research has 
shown that group identity based on categories such as shared interests (Horn, 2003) 
and cultural membership (Verkuyten & Brug, 2001) become salient in adolescence.  
Research on the simultaneous consideration of group membership and norms showed 
that these considerations become differentiated during early adolescence, and remain 
challenging for children when outgroup threat is high (Abrams et al., 2009; Nesdale, 
Maass, et al., 2005; Rutland et al., 2010).  Therefore, it was unclear whether 
adolescents would focus on cultural identity or shared interest when making inclusion 
decisions, but would heavily be influenced by group norms.  Based on research on 
perceptions of similarities between cross-race dyads (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), in 
which elementary school aged participants placed a heavy emphasis on shared 




shared interests (without disentangling these factors).  It was expected that this focus 
on shared interest in younger children would bear on inclusion decisions.   
The third hypothesis was related to expectations that are relevant to 
stereotypes about Arabs.  Due to adolescent use of media as a socialization tool 
(Arnett, 1995) and the primary role of media, specifically those coming out of 
Hollywood, in reinforcing stereotypes about Arabs (Shaheen, 2003), it was expected 
that adolescents would have higher levels of stereotypes than younger participants 
and these would interfere with adolescents’ judgments.  Thus, those with high levels 
of stereotypes would focus more on cultural identity than on shared interest (Cole et 
al., 2003).   
A fourth hypothesis was relevant for evaluations of deviant group members.  
Based on previous findings in the literature about evaluations of members who 
deviate from group norms, it was expected that a deviant member who challenges a 
group norm of inclusivity by being exclusive would be judged more negatively than a 
deviant who goes against a group by being inclusive (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  
In addition, deviance from one’s ingroup would be evaluated differently than 
deviance from an outgroup (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). 
The fifth hypothesis pertains to participants’ social reasoning about inclusion 
or exclusion within the cross-cultural encounters.  When it comes to reasoning about 
social judgments in an intergroup context, researchers working from the Social 
Domain perspective found that references to group functioning and dynamics increase 
with age (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).  Therefore it was expected that references to 




autonomy during adolescence (Daddis, 2011) it was expected that adolescents would 
reason about their inclusion judgments using references to autonomy and personal 
preferences more so than younger participants.  Participants’ reasoning will also 
differ based on their inclusion judgments (Killen & Stangor, 2001). 
Finally, the sixth hypothesis regarded predictions about participants’ 
attributions of emotions.  Based on findings from research on emotional attributions 
in an intergroup exclusion context, differential emotions will be attributed depending 
on the cultural identity of the group and the target of exclusion (Malti et al., 2012).  
Thus, previous research would predict that higher proportions of positive emotions 
are expected for exclusion of an outgroup target than for exclusion of an ingroup 
target.  Although not tested prior to the current study, it was expected that a group 
with a norm of inclusion will be attributed with more negative emotions for excluding 
either target than a group with an exclusive norm.  This is due to the fact that a group 
that espouses inclusivity and excludes someone is violating its own norm, and 
therefore, it will feel bad about doing so.  In addition, although not tested before in 
exclusion contexts, when attributing positive emotions to a group that excludes, 
children will reason about them referencing the group’s concerns for group 
conventions and functioning, while those who attribute negative emotions to the 
group after excluding a target will reference moral reasoning.  This is assuming that 
positive emotions are attributed to a group that children think is likely to exclude the 
target, while negative emotions are attributed to a group that children think is likely to 




Expected Contributions to the Field 
In this era of globalization, exposure to people from diverse backgrounds has 
increased, and children’s experiences in schools have changed dramatically over the 
past two decades due to heterogeneous learning environments.  Students, teachers, 
parents, and educators are learning how to navigate through social interactions in the 
context of diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds (Qingwen, 2007; 
Stephan, 1999).  This has proved to be a challenging task, given that prejudice and 
discrimination towards individuals from different cultural, national and religious 
groups is pervasive throughout society.  Studying social exclusion from peer groups 
during childhood and adolescence in school contexts provides a vehicle for 
understanding developmental origins of group processes that often promote 
intergroup prejudice and tension in adulthood (Hitti et al., 2011; Killen, Richardson, 
& Kelly, 2010 ).   
Altogether, the findings acquired from this research shed light on children’s 
cognitive and affective understanding of group dynamics with respect to an 
understudied group in the United States that has experienced discrimination.  This 
contributes to the existing developmental intergroup attitudes literature by providing 
data on the interplay between children’s reasoning and emotions when assessing 
exclusion or inclusion of a group highly associated with negative stereotypes.  In 
addition, findings provide a deeper understanding of how children resolve conflicting 
concerns about moral and social-conventional norms—specifically, cultural identity, 
shared interest and exclusive group norms.  Age-related differences on the 




development in cross-cultural intergroup contexts.  The stereotype awareness and 
intergroup contact components of the study can help inform the design of school-
based intervention projects, geared to increasing tolerance and reducing prejudice.  
Findings will have a broader impact on fostering positive social relationships and 
intergroup attitudes in childhood and school environments, which will inevitably help 





















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This literature review will focus on the theoretical framework driving the 
design of the current study to clarify the complexities of studying attitudes toward a 
highly stereotyped group like Arab Americans.  First, some necessary key concepts 
for investigating intergroup attitudes by means of exclusion from peer groups will be 
reviewed.  This will be followed by an analysis of the Arab American condition and 
how children of Arab descent living in America are affected by this experience.  
Then, an overview of the theories that have been used to study exclusion and 
prejudice in children will be presented.  This will entail a review of the research on 
children’s reasoning about exclusion from a Social Domain theory perspective 
(Smetana, 2006) and a review of  the developmental prejudice research stemming 
from Social Identity theory (SIT), which includes both Social Identity Development 
theory (SIDT) and Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD) theoretical 
perspectives (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Nesdale, 1999; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).  A discussion of the benefits of an integrated theoretical approach will 
follow with a review of research that has assessed the factors that may influence 
children’s evaluations of exclusion, such as perceived outgroup threat, the role of 
stereotypes, and the ability to attribute emotions to others involved in a transgression.  
This review of current research will be discussed from the vantage point of how the 
theories and methodologies could be applied to the topic of children’s and 




Key Concepts and Terminology 
Social psychologists have studied intergroup attitudes for over half a century, 
investigating the role of stereotypes in perpetuating prejudice and documenting how it 
might manifest in discrimination against others (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 
2001).  From this body of research, key terms can be gleaned to frame the current 
discourse.  Prejudice is defined as negative attitudes or affective expressions, which 
are based on faulty generalizations and are directed toward a whole group or 
members of a group.  These erroneous generalizations are often stereotypes.  
Stereotypes are labels attributed to groups without recognition of intragroup variation 
(Stangor, 2009).  Discrimination is a form of acting out prejudice by excluding a 
group or its members from partaking in certain social privileges (e.g., employment, 
residence in a certain area, quality education).  For children and adolescents, 
discrimination may come in the form of exclusion from peer groups (Killen, Lee-
Kim, et al., 2002).     
In their review of the social psychology literature on social exclusion, Abrams 
et al.  (2005) identified two types of exclusion that are also relevant to developmental 
investigations of social exclusion: intergroup and intragroup.  More recently, these 
forms have been studied in childhood (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).  Intergroup 
exclusion is exclusion from a peer group based solely on group memberships (e.g., a 
girl being excluded from a boys group solely because she is a girl) or as a result of the 
boundaries between groups defined by social categories such as gender, ethnicity, 
nationality, religion, or race.  Intragroup exclusion is exclusion that occurs from 




markers and norms with which the group identifies.  Therefore, in the current study, 
when children are making inclusion judgments about an outgroup target, they are 
evaluating intergroup exclusion, whereas when they are making judgments about an 
ingroup target, then they are judging intragroup exclusion. 
Exclusion from peer groups may occur when two conditions are met: 1) the 
members of a group perceive their group’s boundaries as rigid and inflexible and 2) 
they perceive that a target of exclusion is challenging these boundaries (Leets & 
Sunwolf, 2005; Sunwolf & Leets, 2004).  These boundaries could be physical 
biological markers (e.g., skin color, gender), outward appearances (e.g., clothing 
choices), established beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs), customs or norms (e.g., 
celebrating specific holidays, eating certain foods) and expressed ideologies (e.g., 
liberal or conservative viewpoints) that play a role in defining a group.  Other 
boundaries could be psychological and based on stereotypic assumptions made about 
an outgroup member’s beliefs, norms, and personality traits.  For example, assuming 
that girls will not enjoy playing with trucks as much as boys or that African 
Americans desire to play basketball more than European Americans, both reflect 
psychological barriers that rely on stereotypes.  Examining the developmental origins 
of prejudice and how stereotypes bear on children’s prejudicial attitudes toward Arab 
Americans in a peer group exclusion context can shed some light on the salience and 
meaning of group boundaries to individuals and groups.   
 Nationality (nation of origin), cultural heritage or religion, are social 
categories that individuals incorporate into their identities at different levels of 




clarify those boundaries that come into play when faced with an individual who is 
Arab American, who may be simultaneously perceived as similar to the majority 
group on some dimensions (e.g., Christian faith if they are Arab American Christian 
or similar interest in activities) but different on others (e.g., cultural customs such as 
food and language).  Giving priority to one identity or the other or a combination of 
each also depends on the context of a particular intergroup situation.  Thus, when 
non-Arab American children make decisions about Arab American peers, he or she 
weighs information about their own identities and norms against information about 
their Arab American peers.  Disentangling what dimensions of group membership 
children use to make these judgments will help researchers understand group 
processes and exclusion in a peer group context. 
Arab American Experiences in the United States 
According to the 2000 U.S.  Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003, 2005) 
approximately 46% of those who identified themselves as Arab were born in the 
United States.  They are an affluent group with the median Arab family income 
reported in 1999 as $52,300, which was higher than the national median, and about 
40% had a bachelor’s degree or more, which was also higher than the 24% reported 
by the entire American population.  In addition, the 2000 Census reported that a 
quarter of Arab Americans were under the age of 18.  According to Naber (2000), 
who extensively discussed the paradoxes of the Arab American identity, the first 
wave of Arab immigrants in the late 1800s was of Christian faith and had an easy 
time assimilating into the ‘White’ Christian American majority.  More recent Arab 




religiously conflict with mainstream ‘American’ culture.  Given these religious 
distinctions between early and more recent immigrants, some Arab Americans can be 
viewed as members of the American ingroup while others can be viewed as belonging 
to an outgroup.   
 In her review of the plight of Arabs in America, Naber (2000) discussed the 
social and political exclusion experienced by Arab American adults in the context of 
the United States alliance with Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which led to 
the political, social, and cultural marginalization of Arabs.  Discrimination against 
Arab Americans, ranged from physical and psychological attacks to denial of services 
pre-September 11, while post-September 11 reports documented increases in 
discriminatory immigration policies, profiling of airline passengers and other civil 
liberty concerns (Ibish, 2001, 2003).  Arab as a social category elicits many 
stereotypes.  An examination of 900 Hollywood films found that the main stereotypes 
associated with Arabs are aggression and religious fanaticism (Shaheen, 2003).  In a 
study on hiring discrimination, respondents from both the United States and the 
Netherlands were less likely to choose resume’s of candidates with an Arab name or 
affiliations to Arab professional societies than they were of those with ‘White’ or 
European names (Derous, Nguyen, & Ryan, 2009).  In one study, 25% of Arab 
American adult respondents (N=1,016) reported that either a household member or 
themselves experienced abuse or discrimination related to their race, ethnicity, or 
religion post-September 11 (Padela & Heisler, 2010).  Of those who perceived 
experiencing discrimination, more were Muslims than Christians.  In addition, 




respondents.  Thus, among those who have experienced direct or indirect 
discrimination, levels of psychological distress were high and levels of reported 
happiness were low. 
Children have not been left unaffected by this climate.  Bullying, threats 
against Arab American children, in addition to textbook and teacher biases, have also 
been reported by Arab American parents (Ibish, 2001, 2003).  A study by DeRosier 
(2004) of ethnic differences in peer relations after 9/11 showed negative effects for 
children of Middle Eastern backgrounds.  Peer reports were acquired from 11-year-
olds attending public schools in a mid-Atlantic State in October 2001 and in April 
2002.  Participants were ethnically diverse with 64% being European American, and 
the remaining 36% were ethnic minorities, which included those of Middle-Eastern 
and Southeast Asian backgrounds (3% of the total sample).  Findings showed a 
significant drop in likability of peers from Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian 
backgrounds and a rise in reported victimization (e.g., getting picked on or being 
called names a lot) of these peers.  One limitation to this study was that it grouped 
children from Middle Eastern backgrounds with children from Southeast Asian 
backgrounds into one category, thus not allowing for differentiations by cultural 
heritage or religion.  However, decreases in favorability and increases in observed 
victimization of these peers is indicative of the prejudices that might exist in young 
children based on their perceptions of who can be categorized into these groups. 
 Arab American adolescents have also been affected by the anti-Arab climate, 
as documented by their reported experiences with discrimination in a study conducted 




awareness, experience with prejudice, parental admonitions about prejudice and 
belief in the tenets of the American promise were collected from African, Latino, 
Arab and European Americans 11- to 18-year-olds.  One notable finding from this 
study was that when asked to report about experiences with prejudice and the basis 
for the prejudicial message, Arab Americans reported language and religion as 
reasons for experiencing prejudice more often than all the other groups.  In fact, 
European Americans were the only other group that reported religion as a basis for 
discrimination (1.2% of European Americans reported religion as a reason for the 
prejudicial message versus 7.3% of Arab Americans).  Although not a large 
percentage, these findings indicate the importance of language and religion in the 
Arab American intergroup experience relative to other groups.   
Other findings from Flanagan et al. (2009) showed that greater ethnic 
awareness was related to greater reports of experiences with prejudice in African and 
Arab Americans.  Arab and European American adolescents reported less parental 
discussions about prejudice related to their own ethnic identity than did African and 
Latino Americans.  In general, those who reported more instances of prejudice 
believed less in the American promise of equal opportunity.  No differences between 
ethnic groups were reported in adolescents’ willingness to serve the country and help 
society (patriotism).  European Americans (who had low ethnic awareness) were less 
likely than the other groups (who had higher ethnic awareness scores), however, to 
support equal rights for ethnic groups and intergroup tolerance.   
This study was unique in that it captured relations between ethnic awareness 




Specifically, it acquired an Arab American sample from a densely populated 
Midwestern community, thus providing data on ethnic awareness and experiences 
with prejudice for this group.  This study was, however, conducted prior to September 
11, 2001; and given the malleability of ethnic identity and awareness as a function of 
experiences, today’s Arab American and majority adolescents might respond 
differently to the measures assessed.   
Although no studies that we know of, systematically investigated sources of 
perceived discrimination by Arab American children and adolescents post 9/11, what 
is clear is the detrimental effect that perceived discrimination has on Arab American 
adolescents’ well-being.  This was also shown in a study conducted with Arab 
American 13- to 18-year-olds, investigating the relation between sociocultural 
adversity and psychological distress (Ahmed, Kia-Keating, & Tsai, 2011).  Strong 
significant positive correlations were found between adolescents’ perceived racism 
and depression, anxiety, internalizing, and externalizing behavior.  While we know 
that Arab American youth are experiencing some forms of discrimination, it still 
remains to be understood, given the pervasiveness of negative images of Arabs and 
Muslims in the media, how non-Arab American adolescents have processed these 
images and applied them to their social interactions with peers they might perceive as 
either Arab or Muslim. 
In summary, these studies indicated that children and adolescents from Arab 
or Middle Eastern backgrounds experience prejudice and discrimination.  Religion 
and language in addition to race, and group stereotypes are salient factors associated 




variables in the context of social exclusion from peer groups to understand better 
children’s and adolescents’ judgments and reasoning about Arab American peers. 
Whether an Arab American is viewed as an ingroup or an outgroup member 
has not been systematically investigated.  If a peer group has a member who dresses 
like them, speaks the same way as they do and has the same interests, but is Arab 
American, does having an Arab cultural identity warrant differential treatment? 
Whether it does or not may depend on the extent to which the decision-makers 
perceive the target’s Arab identity as a challenge to their ingroup identity.  It may also 
depend on which dimensions of their ingroup identity are most salient to them, such 
as group norms and conventions, or social category.  Therefore, given that adherence 
to group norms might impact how majority children perceive their peers (e.g., as 
similar to and belonging to the ingroup or not), it is important at this point to discuss 
what is meant by group identity and group norms and how they have been measured 
in research assessing children’s prejudices and ideas about exclusion. 
Group Identity and Group Norms in Exclusion Research 
The concept of one’s group identity, the extent to which children identify with 
a group, plays a pivotal role in understanding intergroup and intragroup exclusion.  
Research has shown that individuals define aspects of their personal identity in terms 
of affiliation with a group, and groups can be based on gender, race, ethnicity, 
religion, and culture as well as other categories (Bennett & Sani, 2011).  These 
affiliations are multiple and can coexist at any point in time but the psychological 
salience of each social category varies depending on the context (Phinney, 2008).  For 




gender affiliation for the on girl member in the study group, as well as the boy 
members.   
Children as young as 5 years old have been found to identify with novel and 
minimal groups (Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; 
Nesdale, 2008).  At such a young age, they are able to express minimal forms of 
identification, simulated by a  “minimal group paradigm” (MGP with adolescents: 
Tajfel, 1970) in which children are arbitrarily assigned to a group with which they 
have had no prior experiences.  This minimal level of identification with an arbitrary 
group has been found to influence children’s expression of ingroup favorability and 
outgroup prejudice (Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; Bigler et al., 2001; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).  Specifically, higher identification with an 
assigned ingroup results in higher levels of ingroup favorability and lower levels of 
outgroup favorability.   
While minimal affiliations with an arbitrary or a novel group have produced 
robust findings on differential evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members, this 
method lacks context.  When addressing prejudice related to cultural, national or 
religious identity, many factors might be at play, including status hierarchies within a 
society, history of conflict or tension, cultural norms, and beliefs.  For this reason, a 
variation of the minimal group paradigm, which assigns children to a novel group 
with a cultural identity (e.g., a group of non-Arab ‘American’ peers), was used in the 
current study.  This allowed children to affiliate with the peer groups presented in the 
study as well as to provide an ‘American’ identity versus ‘Arab American’ identity 




In late childhood and early adolescence, it has been found that children begin 
to internalize group identity in terms of beliefs, status and stereotypic expectations 
associated with the social category they belong to (Sani & Bennett, 2004).  Therefore, 
an important aspect of group identification is ascribing to group norms, customs, and 
traditions and taking them on as one’s own norms and behaviors.  For Arab 
Americans who have lived among majority American peers, identifying with 
American culture might mean the extent to which one begins adopting ideas such the 
American social commitment to equal opportunity or even appearance and activity 
norms, such as similar styles (e.g., fashion), food preferences, or extracurricular 
interests (e.g., going to a baseball game).  If non-Arab Americans view these norms 
as salient markers for group identification, then they may perceive an Arab American 
who ascribes to them as a member of their ingroup, placing less emphasis on cultural 
background. 
It is also important to distinguish between the types of norms to which people 
ascribe because some are viewed as universal crossing cultural boundaries, while 
others are viewed as culture specific.  According to Social Domain theory (Smetana, 
2006; Turiel, 1983), children can organize their knowledge about their social world 
into multiple domains.  Thus, children are able to think about social interactions in 
moral terms related to the welfare, justice, and rights of others (i.e., universal norms); 
in societal terms related to socially contextual and conventional norms and traditions 
put in place by authorities and societies to organize social interactions (i.e., culture 
specific); and in personal terms related to their own individual preferences.  Based on 




relevant norm when representing inclusion of others from a different culture, race, 
ethnicity, religion, or nationality.  In contrast, a group norm of being exclusive can be 
perceived as a societal norm when it defines criteria for exclusion that maintain 
optimal group functioning, or it may be viewed as morally relevant if exclusion 
criteria are based solely of social categories and labels.   
 The priority children give to different types of norms might change from one 
context to the next.  In a complex social interaction such as exclusion, children might 
use their knowledge about social-conventional norms to justify exclusion from a 
group or may give priority to a moral norm that considers the welfare of the excluded 
and speaks out against it (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).  Children as young as 2! 
years old have developed concepts of fairness and equality ( Smetana, 1985) and can 
attribute negative emotions to a victim of a transgression (Eisenberg, 2000).  
However, little is known about how children incorporate these concepts into their 
reasoning about group processes (between- and within- group interactions), and more 
specifically how they do so about groups with different national, cultural, and 
religious identities.  To understand how children weigh their moral and emotional 
understandings against their knowledge about Arab Americans, research from a 
Social Identity theory perspective and a Social Domain theory was used to inform this 
investigation. 
Theoretical Framework for Studying Exclusion 
Social Domain theory and exclusion from peer groups.  Decisions about 
social exclusion or inclusion demand that children rely on their social knowledge. 




identified a domain-specific model to assess how children think about their social 
world.  Within this model three main distinct domains of social knowledge were 
found to coexist in children as young as 3 and 4 (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006).  As 
briefly addressed in the previous chapter, these domains reflect the concerns and rules 
that children tend to use when reasoning about judgments they make regarding social 
interactions.  Children reason either using moral, social-conventional or personal 
concerns and sometimes use them simultaneously, depending on the social context.  
Rules or norms that fall in the moral domain are acts that are considered to be 
generalizable to other people, cultures, and countries, cannot be changed and do not 
rely on authority sanctioning for validity.  These rules have to do with welfare, 
justice, and fairness for others.  While social-conventional rules are contextually 
relative and can be changed and are contingent on authority sanctioning (e.g., eating 
with your hands), personal rules pertain to personal autonomy over issues related to 
one’s own body, privacy, and individual preferences in social activities.   
Not all events and interactions can be categorized into just one domain; some 
events are multifaceted in that they reflect issues of morality, social conventions, and 
personal domain, simultaneously.  It has been proposed that social exclusion is 
multifaceted because empirical research has shown that children can draw on all three 
domains when thinking about exclusion in different contexts.  In order to understand 
how children evaluate social exclusion and which issues they focus on, researchers 
have adopted the use of hypothetical scenarios in which children must weigh 




Developmental scientists working from a Social Domain theory (SDT: Killen 
et al., 2006; Smetana, 2006) perspective have focused on methods that measure 
children’s reasoning about exclusion scenarios.  This approach has been helpful in 
distinguishing which concerns children attend to when presented with a situation in 
which exclusion occurs.  Exclusion from a peer group could raise concerns about 
moral issues (e.g., fairness and empathy toward excluded), social-conventional issues 
(e.g., traditions and social norms set by institutions and groups to make them function 
well) and personal issues (e.g., autonomy, individual preferences related to 
friendships), and these can coexist, depending on the context in which the exclusion 
occurs.  In intergroup as well as intragroup contexts, children need to draw on 
knowledge and attitudes related to their own social identities, other social categories, 
the social norms associated with these categories as well as moral norms to make 
judgments about social exclusion.   
 Stereotypic expectations.  In some instances, children can challenge 
stereotypic expectations but, in others, they do not.  Killen and colleagues have 
documented this when assessing children’s judgments and multifaceted reasoning 
about inclusion and exclusion situations (Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 
2001; Killen et al., 2007; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001).  One study, Killen and 
Stangor (2001), asked 7-, 10-, and 13-year-old European American participants to 
judge gender-stereotypic activity-based exclusion scenarios (e.g., boy excluded from 
joining a ballet class and girl excluded from joining a baseball team) as well as, race-
stereotypic activity-based exclusion scenarios (e.g., White student joining a basketball 




adolescents based their judgments more on concerns for justice and fairness and 
rejected exclusion of non-stereotypic targets from these groups.   
However, when new information was provided about the target’s ability and 
participants were told that the stereotype-consistent child was more qualified at 
participating in the activity (e.g., “The girl is better at ballet than the boy is.”), 
findings indicated that both 1st and 7th graders favored inclusion of the stereotypical 
child, but 4th graders did not.  Adolescents in this study justified their responses using 
concerns for group functioning more than moral reasoning and did so more than any 
other age group.  What was noteworthy was that participants’ judgments did not 
change based on whether the target of exclusion was a member of their gender or 
racial ingroup.  This is contrary to what has been found in previous research on 
intergroup prejudice, where children have reported ingroup favoritism (Aboud, 1988).  
In addition, despite the fact that the scenarios were highly stereotypic, participants did 
not rely on stereotypes to make their decisions, although their reliance on concerns 
for maintaining social conventions did increase with age.   
Based on these findings, one might speculate that excluding an Arab 
American peer from a peer group might be viewed as unacceptable by children of all 
ages.  However, the more the target is viewed as disruptive to group functioning, the 
more likely older children might be willing to justify exclusion, and therefore 
exclusion of an Arab American peer who is viewed as not conforming to cultural 
norms might be perceived as legitimate.  Stereotypes associated with Arab Americans 
may play a role more so with older children because they are more likely to be aware 




Arab American peer as wrong and unfair.  While the study by Killen and Stangor 
(2001) did not capture participants’ reliance on stereotypes to make exclusion 
judgments, another study with adolescents by Horn (2003) documented explicit 
stereotypes about social cliques. 
Using ambiguous scenarios that reflected excluding someone based on 
membership in a social reference group (e.g., cheerleaders, jocks, Goths, preppies), 
Horn (2003) found that in the absence of information beyond group membership, 
adolescents resorted to stereotypes associated with social reference groups.  In this 
study, 15- and 17-year-old European Americans made decisions about scenarios 
involving exclusion and distributions of resources that provided only information 
about group membership.  In these scenarios, participants either mostly relied on 
moral concerns about fairness and justice to justify their responses or on stereotypic 
associations about the social reference group the target belonged to.  These 
ambiguous scenarios (i.e., no information about the target was given except their 
group membership) were contrasted with scenarios where information about 
individual merit was given in which less stereotypic justifications were used.  
Findings showed that ambiguous scenarios force adolescents to rely on whatever 
information they have to make judgments; thus, in such situations stereotypes serve 
as a source of information.   
The research reviewed thus far showed that although the majority of children 
evaluated straightforward exclusion based on group identity as wrong using moral 
reasons, other reasons such as group conventions and stereotypes were brought to 




between including and excluding another peer, conventional considerations were 
frequently used to justify including someone who fits the stereotypic expectations of 
the group, and this was driven more so by adolescents than by younger children 
(Killen & Stangor, 2001).  When given an ambiguous scenario that provided only 
information about group membership, adolescents based their decisions on existing 
generalizations associated with the group identity in focus, thus relying on stereotypes 
as justifications (Horn, 2003).  Children might also find reasons for exclusion of peers 
who do not fit stereotypic expectations.  Thus, individuals exhibiting behaviors and 
traits that deviate from or are non-conforming to expectations related to their group 
identity might be more prone to exclusion than peers who conform to identity 
expectations as indicated in findings from a study by Horn (2007). 
In an economically and ethnically diverse sample of 10th and 12th graders (~ 
16- and ~18-year-olds), Horn (2007) showed that conformity to gender norms is an 
important concern for middle- and late-adolescents.  Differences were found in how 
adolescents evaluated the acceptability of same-sex peers identified as either 
heterosexual or homosexual, and either gender conforming or gender non-conforming 
based on appearance and activity.  Although older adolescents were in general more 
accepting of all targets presented in each scenario, overall participants rated a 
homosexual peer who was gender conforming (e.g., a boy played basketball) as more 
acceptable than a heterosexual peer who was gender non-conforming (e.g., a boy 
practiced ballet).   
These findings highlight the importance of conforming to gender-based 




study did not directly assess acceptability of exclusion of someone who is gender 
conforming or gender non-conforming, it emphasized the importance of conformity 
to a specific identity as described by norms and appearance in adolescents judgments 
about these individuals.  Thus, non-Arab American adolescents may view cultural 
non-conformity of an Arab American as unacceptable.  Likewise they may view an 
ingroup American peer who does not share the same interests in activities as an 
unlikely candidate for inclusion.  Along the same lines, if asking Arab Americans to 
judge another Arab American peer who is conforming to American culture, such 
conformity might be viewed as a deviance from the Arab identity.  Although this is an 
interesting question to pursue in the future, it is beyond the scope of this review 
because the current focus is on non-Arab American’s reactions to exclusion of Arab 
Americans. 
 Culture, individual traits, and context.  Personality and individual traits also 
can be interpreted as unacceptable and provide a basis for exclusion.  These variables 
were investigated in a series of two studies that assessed how children and 
adolescents evaluated exclusion across different cultures (Killen, Crystal, & 
Watanabe, 2002; Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003).  Killen, Crystal, and 
Watanabe (2002) and Park, Killen, Crystal & Watanabe (2003) surveyed 10-, 13- and 
15-year-old participants who were American, Japanese, and Korean, about 
hypothetical scenarios in which exclusion occurred based on six specific traits: 
aggressiveness, unconventional appearance, poor athleticism, cross-gender identity, 
sad personality, and social disruptiveness.  Measures included participants’ evaluation 




to fit the group?”) and self-perceived differences (e.g., “How similar or different are 
you from the excluded member?”).  Findings showed that culture as defined by 
participants’ nationality was not a strong predictor of participants’ judgments; 
however, type of trait (i.e., context) and gender did influence participants’ responses 
to a greater extent.  
Contrary to expectations that cultural differences between Japanese and 
American participants would influence participants’ evaluations of exclusion, on the 
bases that Japanese are collectivistic and Americans are individualistic, the majority 
of all children evaluated exclusion as wrong (Killen, Crystal, et al., 2002).  Both 
Japanese and American adolescents were more likely to exclude an aggressive child 
and a slow runner, citing concerns about group functioning, while most Korean 
students found the disruptive behavior of acting like a clown just as concerning as 
acting aggressively (Park et al., 2003).  In addition, Japanese and American 
participants showed a similar gender pattern: females were less accepting of 
exclusion and were less willing to conform than males.  This gender difference, 
however, was greater for Americans.  No gender differences were found among 
Korean participants.  Koreans, overall, had higher ratings of conformity than Japanese 
and American participants.  Conformity ratings for all participants decreased with 
age, emphasizing importance of autonomy judgments in adolescents across the 
cultures and nationalities represented in this sample. 
These studies showed that although culture and nationality does predict to 
some extent children’s and adolescents’ evaluations about exclusion, conformity, and 




interesting to see whether gender differences might emerge in children’s judgments 
about Arab American peers who may be viewed as culturally non-conforming, but 
share the same interests in activities as an American group.  For example, two 
questions are: Would boys find exclusion of an Arab American peer more acceptable 
than girls? To what extent do stereotypes about Arab Americans bear on these 
judgments? 
Context was also shown to play a role in exclusion based on gender and race 
in a study by Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, and Stangor (2002) with an ethnically 
diverse American sample of 10-, 13-, and 16-year-olds (4th , 7th and 10th graders).  
Participants were asked to judge whether they thought exclusion of a female or 
African American peer from a friendship context (e.g., new neighbor), peer group 
context (e.g., music club that traded records), and an institution context (e.g., school), 
was acceptable.  A test of external influence was also conducted by suggesting to 
participants that either a social consensus (friends and peers) existed judging 
exclusion differently then the participants, or that authority figures such as parents or 
governments had a differing view point from the participant.   
Participants found it less legitimate to exclude someone from a school than to 
exclude someone from a friendship or a peer group.  They also found exclusion of a 
girl from a friendship or a peer group context as more acceptable than exclusion of an 
African American peer.  Exclusion from a peer group was found to be more 
acceptable by older participants (7th and 10th graders).  This could be due to older 
children’s more extensive experience with groups and clubs.  Older participants also 




choice to justify exclusion, particularly in the case of excluding a girl from a 
friendship with a boy or from an all-boys peer group.   
Authority influences such as parents and government were less likely to 
influence participants’ judgments than friends and peers.  Social consensus tended to 
have a positive influence, such that those who originally judged exclusion as 
acceptable, changed their judgments when faced with differing opinions from peers.  
Authority influence played a role in the peer group context when the target was a girl; 
thus, participants became more inclusive to girls when they heard parents wanted 
them to be more inclusive.  Authority influence had a stronger effect for the African 
American target of exclusion, with participants changing their judgments positively in 
all three contexts when faced with the information that parents or governments 
suggested more inclusion.   
Given that gender- or race-based exclusion in friendship and peer group 
contexts was rated more variably by children and adolescents than exclusion in a 
school context, it would be expected that exclusion of an Arab American in these 
contexts would also be rated variably.  Therefore, some children and adolescents 
might find exclusion of an Arab American from a friendship or peer group as 
legitimate based on disruptions to group functioning and personal preferences.  This 
may be more the case among adolescents than younger children.  Furthermore, this 
study suggests that peer consensus about either inclusion or exclusion of an Arab 
American in a peer group context would influence children’s and adolescents’ 
decisions, with more participants conforming to a social consensus or possibly a 




adolescents react to such norms if they perceive an outgroup member as similar to 
them based on other dimensions such as shared interest or clothing styles? 
Perceptions of similarity.  McGlothlin and colleagues (Margie, Killen, Sinno, 
& McGlothlin, 2005; McGlothlin et al., 2005) assessed the role of perceptual cues 
(e.g., skin color) as well as shared interests (e.g., both like to play soccer) on 
perceptions of intergroup and intragroup similarities and intergroup attitudes.  In 
these studies, both minority and majority 1st and 4th graders were administered an 
interracial ambiguous situation task in which a White or Black child was depicted as a 
potential transgressor.  Participants’ interpretation of the cross race interaction served 
as a measure for their implicit intergroup biases.  A perception of similarity task was 
also administered, which not only varied the race of the pairs of peers represented but 
also the shared interest (e.g., they either like the same sport activity or not).  
McGlothlin et al.  (2005) reported that European Americans did hold intergroup 
biases when it came to judgments about cross-race friendships, but not when 
interpreting the ambiguous behavior represented in the task administered.  In 
addition, when rating similarity between same-race and different-race dyads, both 
shared interest and race influenced children’s similarity judgments.  When cross-race 
dyads with shared interest were compared with those with different interests, those 
with shared interest were perceived as more similar than those with different interests.  
However, cross-race dyads with shared interests in activities were rated as less similar 
than same-race dyads with shared interests in activities.  Participants evaluated a 
Black peer dyad that did not have similar interests as more similar than a White peer 




different interests were larger than cross- versus same-race peer dyads, the findings 
show support for the outgroup homogeneity effect, suggesting individuals view 
outgroup members as being similar to one another but ingroup members being more 
heterogeneous (Ryan, Judd, & Park, 1996).  Overall, race played a secondary role in 
their evaluations of potential friendships between the pairs of children presented.  
Shared interest in sport was more salient when making judgments about friendships.   
Minority children’s responses to the same measures differed slightly.  Margie 
et al.  (2005) reported that minority children showed slight bias in attributing negative 
intentions to White protagonists in the ambiguous situation task but showed no biases 
in making judgments about potential friendships.  In addition, no evidence was found 
for the outgroup homogeneity effect in this sample of minority children.  Similar to 
the European American sample in the previous study, minority children focused on 
shared interest more so than on race or other physical cues when judging both 
similarity and potential for friendship between different-race and similar-race dyads. 
In a separate analysis (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), looking at children’s 
social experience as a function of whether they attended a racially homogenous or 
heterogeneous school, results reflected that when making judgments about friendships 
social experiences mattered.  Thus, European American children from homogeneous 
schools were less likely to see potential for friendships between different-race dyads 
than same-race dyads, while children who attended heterogeneous schools saw 
similar potentials for friendships between both cross-race and same-race dyads.  What 
these studies highlight is the importance of shared interest in making judgment about 




of prejudice and intergroup biases and the complex ways in which children think 
about their social group interactions.   
Findings from a Social Domain theory perspective show that children are 
sensitive to the context of exclusion and pay attention to different variables when 
judging or evaluating exclusion.  These variables include social categories, the 
stereotypes associated with them, children’s qualifications as defined by prior 
experience with an activity, personality, and behavioral traits that might be disruptive 
for group functioning, conformity to conventions as defined by group identity or 
social consensus and shared interest.  In the absence of information, stereotypes can 
be used to justify exclusion of a member of an outgroup.  One’s personality traits and 
whether he/she conforms to socially accepted behaviors related to identity also 
provide further criteria for social acceptance and inclusion by peers.  As children get 
older, they become more attuned to issues of group functioning and conventions and 
weigh them in congruence with issues of fairness and morality.  Children’s social 
experiences in terms of contact with Arab Americans would be relevant to their 
friendship choices or inclusion judgments.  In addition, their perceptions of similarity 
can be influenced by both cultural identity and shared interest, although shared 
interests should outweigh cultural identity.  How that plays out in a situation in which 
a group has a norm of being exclusive or inclusive based on similarities or differences 
has not yet been investigated.  How concepts of similarities affect pre-adolescents and 
adolescents also remains to be explored.  Other social cognitive abilities such as the 
ability to attribute emotions have also not been assessed within these contexts 




inform why children and adolescents may attend to group functioning or personal 
preferences when justifying exclusion based on group membership. 
Social Identity theory and children’s prejudice.  Research guided by Social 
Identity Developmental theory (SIDT: Nesdale, 1999) and Developmental Subjective 
Group Dynamics theory (DSGD: Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003) has adopted 
experimental manipulations of group identity, group norms, and outgroup threat to 
measure children’s prejudice toward members of other groups.  Working from 
assumptions outlined by social psychologists in Social Identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), both developmental theories place an emphasis on the salience of 
group identity for children and the notion that children seek to maintain or enhance a 
positive social identity in comparison to other groups.  Both lines of research use 
developmentally appropriate variants of the minimal group paradigm, where children 
are assigned to novel groups (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Nesdale, 2008).  While 
Nesdale and colleagues (SIDT) have focused more on the circumstances under which 
prejudice to outgroups emerges, Abrams, Rutland and colleagues have worked from 
the developmental subjective group dynamics approach, focusing on group norms and 
how intragroup processes (how your group works) might inform intergroup attitudes.  
Both these models have mainly measured evaluative judgments about members of an 
outgroup in relation to judgments about ingroup members, but little has been done to 
assess children’s reasoning behind their favorability judgments in specific situations.   
Social Identity Developmental Theory and children’s intergroup prejudice.  
 Nesdale (1999, 2004) proposed SIDT, based on SIT and Self-categorization Theory 




according to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), in their need to maintain a positive self-
concept, individuals seek to identify with groups of superior status and groups that are 
associated with positive traits.  To maintain ingroup positivity, people partake in 
social comparisons with other groups, thus developing prejudice toward members of 
the outgroup.  SCT (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) extends this 
concept of social identification on the basis of cognitive grouping.  Thus, people 
place themselves in a group that they view most similar to themselves based on some 
classification label, which is cognitively contrasted with another classification.  Such 
self-categorization emphasizes positive similarities between individuals of the 
ingroup, thus promoting ingroup bias, while also focusing on the negative differences 
of the outgroup, which may lead to outgroup prejudice.   
In an attempt to identify how and when children acquire outgroup prejudice, 
Nesdale outlined four phases that children sequentially go through that creates ethnic 
prejudice: undifferentiated, ethnic awareness, ethnic preference, and, finally, ethnic 
prejudice.  Focusing on the transition from ethnic preference to ethnic prejudice 
(Nesdale, 2008), SIDT proposes that the development of outgroup derogation is 
dependent on several factors.  These factors are the level of identification that a child 
has with her or his ingroup, the extent to which prejudice is an ingroup norm and the 
extent to which the ingroup members perceive the members of the outgroup as a 
threat.  These variables have been manipulated and tested in a series of experiments 
that use a variant of the minimal group paradigm in which children are placed in 




 In one study, Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, and Griffiths (2005) examined the 
effects of exclusive group norms on children’s outgroup attitudes.  To investigate this, 
7- to 9-year-old Anglo-Australian children were assigned to groups said to have either 
a norm of being exclusive or a norm of being inclusive (e.g., “Children in this group 
like/don’t like to play with children from other groups”).  Outgroup threat was 
manipulated by informing some of the participants that the members of the outgroup 
questioned the art competition judges’ decision, thus threatening the ingroup’s status 
as better drawers.  Outgroup ethnicity was varied to be either Anglo-Australian or 
Pacific Islander.   
The study showed that what drove ingroup biases or outgroup prejudice was 
the type of group norm and the level of outgroup threat but not the outgroup’s ethnic 
identity.  Children did, however, factor in ethnic identity in decisions to leave their 
own group and join the outgroup.  Low favorability of an outgroup member was 
associated with conditions in which outgroup threat was high and the ingroup had a 
norm of exclusion.  Interestingly the age-related differences that were found showed, 
7-year-olds’ attitudes were influence by high outgroup threat while 9-year-olds’ 
attitudes were influenced by both high outgroup threat and an ingroup norm of 
exclusion.  This indicates that older children in this sample were becoming more 
attuned to group norms and were weighing them into their evaluations of outgroup 
members.   
Given that children may associate Arab Americans with the ‘war on 
terrorism,’ and are depicted as such through the media, they may be perceived as a 




threat can be viewed in terms of a tendency for being aggressive, or being affiliated 
with a group perceived to have immoral norms of aggression because of its 
association with the 9/11 attacks.  While, on the one hand, children might not express 
negative attitudes toward Arab Americans’ peers solely based on cultural differences, 
they may do so based on the threat perceived to be associated with members of this 
group.  Recent findings with 4- to 7-year-olds from an SIDT perspective provide 
evidence that threatening representations of outgroups through the media instigates 
negative attitudes towards the outgroup irrespective of ethnic background (Durkin, 
Nesdale, Dempsey, & McLean, 2012).  Older children, on the other hand, might be 
more favorable to an outgroup (Arab American) who conforms to their own culture 
(American) norms than younger children, because younger children focus more on 
outgroup threat and less on group norms.  Yet, how older children prioritize their 
concerns when weighing information about an ingroup norm of exclusion with 
stereotypic information about Arab Americans and knowledge that an Arab American 
peer adheres to an American group’s norm about activities by sharing their interests, 
needs further investigation. 
In another study, Nesdale and Lawson (2011) assessed if a larger school norm 
of inclusivity can moderately effect exclusive group norms on children’s intergroup 
attitudes.  In this study, group membership was not based on ethnicity but rather on 
school (e.g., participants’ school versus another school).  Children (7- and 10-year-
olds) were placed in groups described as being inclusive, exclusive, and exclusive 
plus aggressive (e.g., being mean and actively leaving them out of games and 




positively influenced children’s ratings of the outgroup and not the ingroup.  In 
addition what was especially noteworthy in this study was that 10-year-olds in both 
exclusive group norm conditions (exclusive and exclusive plus aggressive), rated 
their ingroup less positively than the outgroup.  This was not found in 7-year-olds, as 
the younger participants consistently rated the ingroup more positively than the 
outgroup across all conditions.  Thus, it may be the case that 10-year-olds are paying 
closer attention to whether group norms are in accordance with their own individual 
beliefs and values, suggesting that distinguishing between one’s own beliefs and 
ingroup beliefs emerges at around this age.   
Most SIDT research has been conducted with children ranging from 6 to 12 
years old (Nesdale, 2008; Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, & Griffiths, 2004).  Limiting 
SIDT research to elementary school aged children provides little insight into the 
development of prejudice in adolescents.  Given that SIDT attributes prejudice 
acquisition to variables such as social identification, ingroup norms, and outgroup 
threat, which are salient to adolescents (Baumeister, 1995), it is important to explore 
such variations in older children.  In addition, the important findings from this line of 
research that show a nuanced role for peer group norms and larger societal norms that 
changes with age, means that a more in-depth investigation is necessary to understand 
the underlying reasons for these differences.  One way to do this is by gaining 
insights into children’s reasoning about their evaluations in such intergroup contexts.  
Another way to gauge how important group norms are for maintaining positive group 
identity is to understand how children think about a group member who might 




Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD) is a theoretical model that tries to answer that 
question. 
Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics and children’s intragroup 
prejudice.  Focusing on intragroup attitudes and contrasting them against intergroup 
attitudes is the approach taken by researchers working from a DSGD perspective.  
DSGD contends that with age children begin to make judgments about ingroup 
members in relation to what they know about other groups (i.e., in comparison to 
identities and norms other than their own).  Thus, they coordinate their preferences 
for an ingroup and outgroup with what they know about the individuals in either 
group.  This has been shown in several studies conducted by Abrams, Rutland, and 
colleagues (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007; Abrams et al., 2008; 
Abrams et al., 2009).   
In a recent study, Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, and Pelletier (2008) used a 
minimal group paradigm to explain intragroup and intergroup attitudes in two age 
groups of English children (5- to 6-year-olds and 10- to 11-year-olds).  In previous 
research in which they used actual groups defined by nationality and summer school 
groups, they found that, with age, children favor an outgroup member who follows 
their ingroup’s norms more than an ingroup member who deviates from group norms 
(Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams et al., 2007).  Abrams et al. (2008) 
replicated these findings using a minimal group paradigm and measured participants’ 
attitudes toward ingroup and outgroup members who had varying morally relevant 
behaviors.  To measure intragroup and intergroup attitudes, four peer members were 




and immoral outgroup members).  Participants were asked to evaluate how they felt 
about each member, how they thought each group felt about each of the members, 
and were then asked to allocate rewards to their ingroup and outgroup as well as to 
each of the four peers.   
 Findings showed that when judging ingroup and outgroup members based on 
their levels of moral behavior, participants focused more on the moral nature of the 
behavior rather than group membership.  Even though exclusion was not directly 
assessed, this finding might suggest that, on the one hand, if children were aware of 
Arab stereotypes (e.g., the association with immoral behaviors related to aggression 
and terrorism), they might be more inclined to justify exclusion, or have negative 
evaluations of an Arab American peer.  While, on the other hand, if children’s 
ingroup had a moral inclusive norm, this might moderate the effects of stereotypic 
information about Arab Americans.  Therefore, it would be informative to acquire 
children’s reasoning in these multifaceted contexts, given that conflicting 
considerations need to be assessed to make decisions about exclusion and group 
processes.   
Abrams et al. (2008) also found that within this minimal group context 
children continue to demonstrate intergroup bias, favoring their own ingroup over the 
outgroup.  They also showed group-based bias; thus, participants reported that groups 
would evaluate members of their ingroup more favorably than members of their 
outgroup.  No age- or gender-related differences were found.  Even though 10- and 
11-year-olds might have more experiences with groups than 5- and 6-year-olds, their 




In another study, Abrams et al. (2009) directly assessed children’s awareness 
of how groups work and how that bears on their evaluations of intergroup and 
intragroup behaviors.  To do this, they measured 5- to 11-year-old English children’s 
social perspective taking skills (ToSM: Theory of Social Mind), their understanding 
of group norms (i.e., how they think other groups would evaluate deviance from a 
group norm), children’s real-life experience with other groups (i.e., the number of 
groups children reported they belonged to), as well as their multiple classification 
skills.  This study defined ToSM as the ability to understand another person’s 
perspective and emotions in a social interaction.   
 Children responded to hypothetical scenarios about different ingroups and 
outgroups, either defined by nationality (e.g., soccer fans) or by the color of the team 
(e.g., red or green).  They were asked to evaluate how much they liked each group 
(intergroup bias), how much they individually would like a group member who 
expressed loyalty or deviance from a group by either ascribing to or deviating from a 
conventional group norm (e.g., expression of loyalty to group goals) and how much 
they thought the group would like a loyal or deviant group member.  Findings showed 
that higher social perspective taking ability (ToSM) meant that children showed 
greater distinction between deviant versus loyal members and justified their responses 
using more references to group characteristics and group loyalty than those who did 
not evaluate the two members distinctly.  In addition having greater multiple 
classification skills was related to decreased intergroup bias.  Children who had 
greater exposure to groups (i.e., reported a larger number of groups they have been 




Multiple classification skills and ToSM abilities increased with age.  
Therefore, even though older children had a greater understanding of how groups 
work and were more positively attuned to peers that adhere to group norms, they 
showed less intergroup bias.  Although exclusion was not assessed directly in this 
study, these findings suggest that further work should be done to evaluate how 
understanding of group functioning impacts exclusion decisions, particularly with 
age.  In addition, the method of contrasting an individual’s own opinion about 
ingroup and outgroup members with how he or she thinks a group would behave can 
provide insight into the age-related differences in children’s and adolescents’ 
understanding of group processes.  Measuring children’s developing social cognitive 
reasoning in these contexts would also provide a more in-depth assessment of how 
these social cognitive abilities are developing.  Social Domain theory offers a 
taxonomy that children use when reasoning about intergroup encounters.  Neither 
SIDT research nor DSGD research investigate children’s evaluations of Muslim- or 
Arab- loyal or deviant peers, but they do highlight the importance of social cognitive 
abilities (e.g., understanding of group norms), group identity, type of group norms 
and outgroup threat in both an intergroup and intragroup context.  While morally 
relevant norms (e.g., inclusion and moral behavior) were examined from both 
perspectives, indicating that they do matter in children’s assessments about group 
members, what is not known is how they are weighed in actual social group decisions 
about inclusion and exclusion.  Social Domain theory research on social exclusion 
can shed some more light on these considerations, thus an integration of these 




An Integrative Social Reasoning Perspective 
Recent research has revealed new ways of examining prejudice in childhood, 
focusing on a combination of group norms, group identity, and morality (Rutland, 
Killen, & Abrams, 2010).  This model attempts to parse out children’s judgments 
about group relations by manipulating group norms and group identity in 
experimental vignettes and focusing on children’s reasoning about intergroup and 
intragroup behaviors based on these group dimensions.  This integrative model has 
not yet been applied to groups defined by nationality, cultural heritage, or religion.  It 
is a fitting framework for research with these groups, given that they are often 
stigmatized for their customs and norms.  For example, if individuals carry the label 
of being Arab and are associated with negative stereotypes, members of their host 
country might perceive them as a threat to maintaining group conventions.  In 
addition, how members of majority host societies perceive differences and similarities 
between minority groups based on nationality, cultural heritage, and religion, and 
themselves has not yet been investigated.  How these perceptions play out in an 
intragroup context has also not been assessed.  Specifically, this new framework will 
help us understand how children and adolescents judge the exclusion of someone who 
conforms to their ingroup norms, such as having the same interests in activities, but 
does not have the same national, cultural, or religious identity.   
Rutland, Killen, and Abrams (2010) have proposed this new social reasoning 
perspective, which integrates the findings from the three lines of research outlined 
above, recognizing children’s sensitivity to contextual information when making 




theory complements findings from an SIT perspective as it provides insight into how 
children reason and rationalize about group processes in moral, social-conventional 
and personal terms.  In addition, SIT approaches such as SIDT and DSGD, contribute 
to our understandings of the role of group identity and how children weigh concerns 
about maintaining positive group identities in their evaluations of both inter- and 
intragroup relations.  The new social reasoning perspective proposed by Rutland et al.  
(2010) contends that under specific conditions and in various contexts children may 
give different levels of priority to either group identity, morality, or social 
conventions.  The authors proposed that the factors that would influence children’s 
judgments include whether a group has a norm to be exclusive, whether there has 
been opportunity for quality intergroup contact (i.e., interaction with or exposure to 
members of the another social group), and whether the ingroup perceives an outgroup 
as a threat.   
A recent study by Killen, Abrams, Rutland, Mulvey, and Hitti (2012)  has, in 
fact, shown that children and adolescents do give priority to group norms when 
making decisions about excluding an ingroup member who deviates from a group 
norm, or including an outgroup member who conforms to another group’s norms.  
This study also shows that when responding to exclusion scenarios, the type of norm 
that members are deviating from or conforming to (e.g., moral or social-conventional 
norms), was more a more salient factor than group identity (based on gender).  For 
instance, overall participants thought it was more acceptable to exclude deviant group 
members who wanted to distribute money unequally between their own group and 




wanting to distribute money equally among all groups.  The present study is an 
extension of the Killen et al.  (2012) study but contrasts Arab American identity with 
non-Arab American identity and evaluates deviance from exclusive and inclusive 
group norms, as opposed to those relevant to resource distributions.   
 Based on some of the research reviewed, a focus on specific individual 
psychological constructs is necessary.  These would include an awareness of 
stereotypes associated with specific groups and the ability to attribute emotions to 
actors within a social interaction such as exclusion, given that this ability can 
influence how children make judgments about moral or conventional transgressions 
(Arsenio & Ford, 1985).  These individual level differences might bear on children’s 
judgments about intergroup and intragroup exclusion.   
Stereotype Awareness 
Children’s awareness about gender and racial categories begins at a very early 
age.  Gender stereotype knowledge emerges at around three years of age (Ruble & 
Martin, 1998) but spontaneous referencing to racial stereotyping has been found in 
children as young as six and this increases with age (McKown & Weinstein, 2003).  
McKown and Weinstein (2003) also found that children from stigmatized groups are 
more aware of racial stereotypes than children from non-stigmatized groups.   
Assigning a trait to members of a social category represents a stereotypic 
assumption about that group.  Much research on intergroup bias in racial and national 
contexts relied on trait assignments for ingroups and outgroups and measured 
intergroup bias based on effects of asymmetry in how children attributed positive and 




et al., 2004; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Rutland et al., 2007).  Some of the traits that were 
used in these assessments included: ‘clean,’ ‘dirty,’ ‘happy,’ ‘sad,’ ‘peaceful,’ 
‘aggressive,’ ‘clever,’ ‘stupid,’ ‘hardworking,’ ‘lazy,’ ‘friendly,’ ‘unfriendly,’ ‘good,’ 
‘bad,’ ‘nice,’ and ‘not nice,’ and were for the most part based on children’s 
spontaneous descriptions of the social categories (Barrett et al., 2003).  These studies 
have shown that in general children (as young as 4 years and as old as 12 years) 
assign more positive traits to their ingroup than they do an outgroup, but that the 
difference between positive and negative traits assigned which favors the ingroup and 
is unfavorable to the outgroup peaks at around 7 years of age and then drops in pre-
adolescence.  The social categories used in these studies were related to race and 
European national identities. 
Less is known about developmental patterns in children’s awareness about 
stereotypes related to Arabs and Muslims or trait assignments to these social 
categories.  The ability to categorize individuals into social groups and knowledge 
about stereotypes that are associated with these categories are constructs that develop 
simultaneously, with each construct informing the other (Brown & Bigler, 2005).  
Once aware of stereotypes, children and adolescents do resort to them, using them as 
possible sources of information in certain contexts to make judgment about exclusion 
(Mulvey, Hitti, & Killen, 2010).  While Arabs and Muslims are portrayed negatively 
in movies, the news, and popular culture (Shaheen, 2000, 2003), it is not known how 
non-Arab or non-Muslim children and adolescents interpret these social cues.   
There is evidence that children as young as 4 years old who live in intractable 




to be mainly from television, and reliance on mass media for stereotypic information 
persists through pre-adolescence (Coutant, Worchel, Bar-Tal, & van Raalten, 2011).  
However, by early and late adolescence, youth assert their own autonomy and report 
the source of their stereotypic information was their own personal impressions of 
outgroup members they met.  In the former study, the stereotypes being made were by 
Israeli youth about Arab people, and their context is unique from non-Arab 
Americans in that they are constantly reminded of their conflict with an Arab 
outgroup.  However, given the pervasiveness of negative representation of Arabs and 
Muslims in American media, it is possible that non-Arab American children and 
adolescents have formed negative stereotypes about the Arab identity.  Do these 
negative images help children become more apt at identifying Arab or Muslim peers? 
To what extent will children and adolescents use these social cues to make judgments 
about exclusion? 
 Evidence from a study with White young adults in Australia showed that 
participants’ negative stereotype rating predicted negative attitudes toward Arab 
Australians (Islam & Jahjah, 2001).  In this study, the best predictor of attitudes 
toward Arabs was perceived threat, followed by stereotype ratings and last negative 
affect, suggesting that perceived threat and stereotypes play a more prominent role in 
influencing attitudes toward Arabs than affect does.  However, another study with 
adults found that negative emotions of anger exacerbates implicit biases against 
Arabs because they are associated with stereotypes related to Arab people (e.g., 
aggression and religious fanaticism) (Dasgupta et al., 2009).  Thus, it would be 




stereotypic information related to Arabs, would report more negative attitudes toward 
Arab Americans, and might find exclusion of an Arab American peer as more 
acceptable than those who are not aware of the stereotypes.  Whether stereotype 
awareness would interfere with children’s ability to attribute emotions to those 
involved in an exclusion scenario is also an area that has not been investigated and 
yet is very relevant to the study of judgments about Arab American peers. 
Attributions of Emotions and Exclusion  
Awareness of the stereotypes associated with Arabs may bring about negative 
feelings of fear or anxiety when interacting with an unfamiliar individual of Arab 
heritage.  As found in the study with White Australian adults, these emotions to some 
extent do predict negative attitudes toward Arabs (Islam & Jahjah, 2001).  Prejudice 
research with adults assessing the dehumanization (or infrahumanization) of an 
outgroup has shown that adults make differential emotional attributions between 
ingroups and outgroups.  In particular, they attribute ingroup members would feel 
uniquely human emotions (e.g., pride, hope, remorse, shame) more than outgroup 
members, while outgroup members are attributed to feel more non-uniquely human 
emotions such as excitement and fear than ingroup members (Paladino et al., 2002; 
Vaes, Castelli, Paladino, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003).  Recently, a study was 
conducted with a very small sample of 9-year-olds that shows a similar trend in the 
infrahumanization of an immigrant outgroup (Vezzali, Capozza, Stathi, & 
Giovannini, 2012). 
 Research with children, however, has found that children express feelings of 




Spinard, & Sadovsky, 2006).  Within intergroup exclusion contexts, children and 
adolescents who reject exclusion sometimes justify their responses by referencing the 
psychological harm it causes the individual being excluded (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 
2002).  Therefore, there is evidence that the emotions of an excluded individual can 
be used as an evaluative appraisal in children’s judgments about an exclusion 
scenario (Turiel & Killen, 2010).  How children attribute emotions to all characters in 
an exclusion scenario based on national identity was recently investigated by Malti, 
Killen, and Gasser (2012). 
 In this study 12 and 15-year-old Swiss and non-Swiss participants responded 
to hypothetical exclusion scenarios in which a Serbian peer was excluded from 
attending an activity with a group of Swiss peers.  Serbians are recent same-race 
immigrants to Switzerland and have experienced tense relations with the Swiss 
majority.  Participants were asked to judge the acceptability of exclusion and to 
attribute emotions to both the excluder and the excluded.  Findings showed that non-
Swiss minority participants attributed more positive emotions to the excluder (i.e., 
Swiss) than Swiss majority participants (i.e., the Swiss excluder felt positively about 
excluding a non-Swiss peer).  Differences between the type of emotion attributed to 
the excluder and excluded also emerged, revealing that overall participants attributed 
feelings of pride, happiness, guilt, shame, and empathy to the excluder, but attributed 
feelings of sadness and anger to the excluded.  Moreover, positive correlations were 
found between participants’ judgments about exclusion and attribution of emotions.  
This showed that positive evaluations of exclusion were related to positive emotion 




children attribute emotions to the characters in the exclusion context are associated 
with how they evaluate exclusion.  No age-related differences were reported. 
 Although no measure of perspective-taking ability was assessed in this study 
to better understand the association between individuals’ ability to attribute certain 
emotions and their evaluations of exclusion, this study had several strengths.  It was 
the first of its kind to use measures of attribution of emotions in a peer exclusion 
context and specifically between groups that differ by nationality and immigrant 
status.  These findings showed that status (e.g., Swiss majority versus non-Swiss 
minority) influences how children attribute emotions to the target of exclusion or the 
excluders, which in turn bears on their judgments about exclusion.  To what extent do 
stereotypes interfere with children and adolescents’ ability to attribute certain 
emotions to an excluder and excluded is not known.  It is expected that because the 
stereotypes associated with Arabs paint them as villains, that children might attribute 
more positive emotions to both a non-Arab American group that excludes an Arab 
American, and Arab American group that excludes a non-Arab American.  On the 
other hand, adolescents’ more extensive experience with groups and their ability to 
take the perspective of other individuals as well as groups might come into conflict 
with their stereotypic knowledge about Arabs.  What issues (e.g., stereotypes, 
emotions of the excluded, fairness, or group functioning) they focus on could be 
acquired by assessing their reasoning about such exclusion scenarios.   
Present Study 
A social reasoning perspective about researching children’s and adolescents’ 




better understanding of the role of group norms, stereotypes, and emotional 
attributions in children’s intergroup decision-making.  This is especially true for 
attitudes about Arab Americans, given that much confusion about religious 
affiliations and norms are associated with this group.  Understanding how these 
confusions and negative stereotypes associated with Arab Americans play out in 
children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about exclusion, offers researchers and 
educators insight into children’s social cognition about group processes.  How 
stereotypes might interfere with children’s ability to attribute specific emotions to the 
actors involved in an exclusion scenario is an area that has not been explored and 
worth pursuing.   
Another gap in the literature that has been highlighted throughout this review 
is the lack of developmental research conducted about Arab groups.  Given the 
heterogeneity of Arab immigrants around the world and the tensions that have 
developed due to the negative information that exist in mass media form, it is 
important to understand the effects of these media practices on children’s interactions 
with Arab peers.  This research will in turn inform interventions on tolerance and 
stereotype reduction.  Such interventions will help children navigate the complexities 
of their social world, in the hopes of reducing prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory 









Chapter 3: Methodology 
Participants 
Participants included 199 non-Arab American 6th and 10th graders who 
attended public middle and high schools in a school district serving a low middle- to 
middle-income population. The sample represented 6th and 10th grade students in the 
Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C. The student population of the schools 
recruited for the study was on average 60% European American, which reflected the 
demographics of the school district.  Parental consent forms were distributed with an 
average of 65% return rate and all students who had consent participated. The sample 
consisted of two age groups evenly divided by gender: 102 pre-adolescent 12-year-
olds (52% female, M = 12.08 years, SD =0.49) and 97 adolescents 16-year-olds (53% 
female, M = 16.16, SD = 0.82).  The sample was ethnically diverse and included 48% 
European Americans, 17% African Americans, 8% Asian Americans, 7 % Latin 
American, 15% biracial; and 5% other races or ethnicities.  Participants were also 
asked to report their religion and 63% reported being Christian, 12% were Jewish, 2% 
were Muslim, and 23% reported other religions and beliefs (e.g., Agnostic, Atheist, 
Hindu).  Two 6th graders and one 10th grader reported being of Arab descent, given 
the design of the study, these participants were removed from the sample for analyses 
(i.e., not included in the 199 used for analyses). 
Procedure 
Approval from the schools to administer the survey was first attained, and 
then copies of parental consent forms and a letter describing the study were sent to 




teachers and school administrators), a brief introduction about the study was given to 
students who had returned the signed, parental consent form.  The verbal introduction 
given to participants did not include mention of culture as a focus of the study, so as 
not to prime students about cultural identity beyond the information presented in the 
consent forms.  The topics of inclusion and exclusion from peer groups were 
described in broad terms.  The survey took 30-40 minutes to complete. 
Design 
The survey was designed to measure intergroup inclusion judgments based on 
three factors, each with two levels: (a) group cultural identity (Arab American and 
American), (b) group norm (exclusive and inclusive), and (c) target of inclusion 
(outgroup target with similar interests, ingroup target with different interests).  Age 
(12-year-olds and 16-year-olds), gender (female and male), and stereotypic 
associations (stereotypes versus no stereotypes) were also included as independent 
variables of interest.  Due to participants’ very low levels of contact with Arab peers 
(on average 80% reported low contact), information about level of contact with Arab 
peers was included as descriptive data but not included in analyses. Similarly 
participants’ ethnic minority/majority status was analyzed as an independent factor 
but findings were not conclusive due to the small sample size of each ethnic/racial 
group represented.  
 Two versions of the survey were randomly administered (for the full design, 
see Figure 2).  Version 1 included a story about an exclusive Arab American group 
and an inclusive American group, while the group norms were reversed in version 2 




gender).  Female participants received stories about female characters, and male 
participants responded to stories about male characters. 
All participants assessed two hypothetical stories; each about a group of 
friends, roughly the same age as the participant, depicted visually using professional 
illustrations.  One group was identified as a group of Arab American friends and the 
other group was identified as the participant’s ingroup, a group of American friends 
(non-Arab).  Depending on the version of the survey, each group was described as 
either having a norm of being exclusive (e.g., ‘they like only those who were similar 
to them’), or inclusive (e.g., ‘they like those who were different from them.’).   
 For each story, there were three conditions: 1) Ingroup target, different 
interests: social decision made about a target who was of the same cultural identity as 
the group but with interests in activities that were different from the group; 2) 
Outgroup target, similar interests: social decision made about a target who had a 
different cultural identity from the group but had similar interests in activities as the 
group; and 3) Forced-choice: a condition that included both targets together and 
participants were required to respond to a situation in which the group (one with 
participants’ ingroup and one with the outgroup) had to decide to include either one 
or the other target.  Two additional tasks included a Cultural Knowledge Task, and a 
Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent assessment.  Using a repeated measures 
design, each task was administered to all participants.  The data were used as 
individual level participant variables for cultural awareness, stereotypic associations, 
and level of intergroup contact.  Participant’s age, gender, ethnicity/race, religion, and 




 Pilot testing (N = 72) was conducted to assess the clarity, readability, and 
appropriateness of the measures.  Items were removed or revised, based on feedback 
through pilot testing, to ensure that the scenarios were ecologically valid and relevant 
to the participants and to ensure that all items were effectively presented.  The final 
research survey protocol is titled the Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion 
Survey (see Appendix C for full version of the survey). 
Participants first provided some initial demographic information related to 
age, gender, and school.  A warm-up measure was administered to familiarize 
participants with the 6-point Likert scale used for different questions (1 = very bad, 6 
= very good).  This was followed by an introduction to the two hypothetical peer 
groups (“These are groups of friends that hang out after school.”), in the form of 
professional illustrations of groups of children.   
As an introduction to the stories, participants completed a Group 
Identification Task in which they were told that they belonged to an American group 
of peers (“This is your group:”) in the form of an illustration of four same gendered 
peers with non-Arab American names (for survey protocol see Appendix C).  The 
Group Identification Task was modified from Nesdale and Flesser (2001).  
Participants were asked to give their group a name, choose an end-of-year activity 
they would like the group to do, and pick a symbol for the group.  This was done to 
create an identification with the American peer group (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001).  
This method has been previously validated in developmental intergroup research, 




attitudes (Dunham et al., 2011).  In the form of three illustrations, participants were 
introduced to three types of activities that their group liked to do.   
Next, the Arab American group of friends was introduced (“This is the other 
group:”), through an illustration of four same-gendered ‘Arab’ peers.  To identify the 
Arab American group as Arab, each member of the group was given an Arabic name 
written phonetically using the English alphabet, and was depicted to have darker 
features such as hair and eyes, but had varying skin tones.  The depiction of the Arab 
American group of friends was intended to represent ingroup heterogeneity as Arab 
Americans can come from numerous regions around the world.  The group of Arab 
American peers was depicted as having similar clothing styles as the American group, 
so as not to have clothing customs impact children’s judgments about each group.  A 
statement written in Arabic, which translates to “Arab group of friends”, was shown 
above the picture of the group.  The three activities that the Arab American group 
liked to do were also indicated through depiction.  On the following page, the 
participants read about the norm of each group.  Depending on the version the 
participant received (see Figure 2), one group would have an exclusive norm and the 
other group would have an inclusive norm.  The norms were established as follows: 
Exclusive group condition: 
“In the past when your/this group of American/Arab American friends, who are 
your age, invited others into their group, they would invite only those who were 
similar to them.”  




 “In the past when your/this group of American/Arab American friends, who are 
your age, invited others into their group, they would invite those who were 
different from them.” 
After the norms were identified, participants read the stories about each group 
and answered the questions asked about each target.  Each story was set up such that 
participants were reminded about the norm of the group in the story and were 
introduced to either an outgroup peer with similar interests or an ingroup peer with 
different interests, each seeking entry into the group.  In order to standardize the 
survey, the outgroup story (i.e., Arab American group) was always presented first.  In 
addition, a set order for presenting the targets was established to avoid sample sizes 
beyond those necessary for the main variables under investigation, (see Figure 2). 
Measures 
 For each target presented, participants responded to six measures reflecting 
their Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes, and two measures representing an 
Attribution of Emotions in an exclusion context assessment.   
Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes measure.  This assessment had 6 
items: (1) Group Inclusion (“The group has to decide what to do.  How likely would 
it be that the group decides to invite Zeina/Julie to join the group?”.  Likert; 1=Really 
not likely, to 6 = Really likely); (2) Group Inclusion Reasoning (“Why”); (3) 
Individual Inclusion (“In your own opinion, how likely would it be that you would 
invite Zeina/Julie to the group?” Likert; 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely); (4) 
Individual Inclusion Reasoning (“Why?”); (5) Evaluation of the Deviant (“How okay 




Likert; 1=Really not okay to 6 = Really okay); and (6) Evaluation of the Deviant 
Reasoning (“Why?”).  Prior to the latter two measures, participants read a short 
description of an ingroup member (relevant to the group they were reading about) 
who went against the norm of the group and told the group to either invite or not 
invite the target.  For example, if the group has an inclusive norm the deviant member 
is described as follows: 
“Ayah is a member of this group, but she is the one member of this group who 
likes kids who are similar to her and because of this she tells the group they 
should not invite Zeina/Julie to the group.”  
Attributions of Emotions measure.  This assessment required participants to 
respond to a probe about the emotions a group would feel after excluding a target and 
was administered along with the Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes.  The 
survey stated: “Let’s say the group decides not to invite X because he/she is different.  
How do you think the group would feel about excluding X?” The choice of feelings 
were derived from previous research on emotional attribution (Malti et al., 2012) and 
adjusted after pilot testing.  The two items were: (1) Attribution of Group Emotions 
(“How do you think the group would feel about not inviting Zeina/Julie? Please check 
all that apply.” proud, glad, sad, angry, anxious, guilty, feelings not changed, 
ashamed, and caring, 1 = checked, 0 = unchecked); and (2) Attribution of Group 
Emotions Reasoning (“Why?”). 
Analyses were conducted using the emotions that were attributed by at least 
10% of the sample.  Given this criterion, analyses for attributions that the group was 




frequently and analyzed were pride, gladness, sadness, anger, guilt, apathy (lack of 
emotions), and shame.   
Force-choice condition.  After responding to the Group Inclusion, Individual 
Inclusion, Evaluations of Deviant Act, and Attribution of Emotions measures for each 
of the target conditions (ingroup, different interests and outgroup, similar interests), 
participants were introduced to the forced-choice condition, which described a 
situation in which the group had to decide between choosing one of the two targets to 
join the group. 
“This/your group of Arab American/American friends is going to a music 
concert/the movies, and they have room for one more person to invite.  
Remember that this/your group likes to have kids who are different 
from/similar to them join the group.” 
The items were: (a) Forced-choice Group Inclusion (“If both Zeina and Julie like to 
go to music concerts/movies, who do you think the group will invite? Choose only 
one.” 1= ingroup target with different interests, 0 = outgroup target with similar 
interests); (b) Forced-choice Group Inclusion Reasoning (“Why?”). 
Cultural Knowledge Task.  This task, administered at the end of the session, 
included two open-ended questions and one 3-point categorical measure: (1) 
Knowledge about Arab People (“Please define who is an Arab.”); (2) Trait and 
Characteristic Associations with Arab People  (“What characteristics if any, do you 
think of when you think of an Arab?”); and 3) Arab/Muslim Confound, (“Are all 
Arabs Muslim?”;  “yes,” “no,” or “not sure”).  The former two measures were coded 




Based on the responses generated by the participants, three broad categories 
emerged with subcategories for further differentiation (see Table 2 for definitions and 
example of categories coded): (1) Knowledge level, which included codeable 
responses that represented factual knowledge, general imprecise knowledge, non-
factual knowledge, no knowledge; (2) Stereotypic associations, which included 
generalizations about physical markers, cultural customs, religion, negative 
associations, geography and language, as well as claims about general differences 
compared to American culture; and (3) Positive and neutral descriptions, which 
included positive adjectives, claims to similarities to others, and ambiguous unclear 
responses.  Responses for the Knowledge about Arab People assessment could have a 
maximum of two codes (11% of the sample used two codes); thus, responses were 
coded as 1 = full use of the category, .5 = partial use, 0 = no use of the category.  
Responses for the Trait and Characteristic Associations with Arab People assessment 
could have a maximum of three codes (23% of the sample used two codes, 4% used 
three codes); thus, responses were coded as 1 = full use of the category, .5 = partial 
use with two codes, .33 = partial use with three codes, 0 = no use of the category.  
Because participants could use all, partial, or none of the cultural knowledge codes, 
concerns about the interdependence of the data were not an issue (the data were 
independent for coding purposes).  Three coders conducted the coding.  On the basis 
of 25% of the interviews (n = 50), at least 88% agreement was achieved for coding 
responses into the categories identified, with Cohen’ s !  =  .86 for interrater 
reliability.   




Knowledge about Arab People assessment, which divided the sample into those who 
had factual knowledge about Arab people and those who did not (i.e., all other 
response categories)  (1 = Factual Knowledge, 0 = Non-Factual Knowledge).  A 
stereotypic associations variable was created from participants’ coded responses to 
the Trait and Characteristic Associations with Arab People assessment.  This variable 
was a dichotomous variable and represents presence or absence (1 = presence, 0 = 
absence) of stereotypic associations (generalizations about physical markers, cultural 
customs, religion, negative associations, geography and language, general 
differences) made in response to the question “What characteristics, if any, do you 
think of when you think of an Arab?”.  In addition, high values on the Arab/Muslim 
Confound represented a confounding of the two identities, while low values 
represented no such confound (1 = yes response, 0.5 = not sure responses, 0 = no 
responses). 
Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent measure.  Participant's’ level of 
contact with peers of Arab descent was measured using the Contact with Individual of 
Arab Descent assessment.  This included five items reflecting varying levels of 
contact, these were: (a) Neighborhood  (“How many kids in your neighborhood are 
Arab?” Likert; 1 = None, 2 = A few, 3= Half, 4 = Most, and 5 = All); (b) Friends 
(”How many friends do you have who are Arab?” Likert; 1 = None, 2 = A few, 3= 
Half, 4 = Most, and 5 = All); (c) Conversations (“How often do you have 
conversations with Arab kids?” Likert; 1 = Never, 2 = A little, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = 
Often, 5 = Always) (d) Time Spent (“How often do you hang out with people who are 




(e) Attendance of Arab Cultural Events (“How often do you attend social events or 
cultural specific events that are sponsored by Arab groups?” Likert; 1 = Never, 2 = A 
little, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Always).  Factor analysis was conducted on all 
five items, showing that they load on one factor explaining 50.1% of variance in all 
five variables.  This factor was used as a covariate in analyses of variance. 
Demographics.  Additionally, participant demographics were collected at the 
end of the survey.  These included: (a) Ethnicity (“What is your race/ethnicity?” 1 = 
African American, 2 = Arab American, 3 = Asian American, 4 = Hispanic/Latino, 5 = 
Jewish American, 6 = European American (White), 7 = Biracial/Mixed race, 8 = 
other and specify); (b) Religion (“What is your religion?” 1 = Christian, 2 = Jewish, 3 
= Muslim, 4 = other and specify); and (c) Ethnic/racial Composition of Friendships 
(“How many of your friends are the same ethnicity/race as you?” Likert; 1 = None, 2 
= A few, 3 = Half, 4 = Most, and 5 = All).   
A new variable was created out of the Ethnicity item to capture ethnic 
majority and minority status differences.  To create this new Status variable, Jewish 
Americans were collapsed into the European American ethnic category and were 
assigned to the “ethnic majority” category, and all other ethnicities, including 
“biracial” and “other,” were assigned to the “ethnic minority” category.  In addition, a 
new Friendship Composition variable was created to assess differences on the 
Cultural Knowledge Task between those who had more than half their friends of the 
same ethnicity or race (responses on the Ethnic/racial Composition of Friendships 
assessment = 4 or 5) and those who had half or less friends of the same ethnicity or 




3).  The split, made to create the Friendship Composition variable, was based on the 
median value of 3 for responses on the Ethnic/racial Composition of Friendships 
assessment. 
Reasoning and Coding Reliability 
Participants’ justifications were coded using a coding system comprised of 
categories drawn from the Social Domain theory (Smetana, 2006), as well as based 
on the results of pilot testing.  The coding system comprised of nine subcategories 
that fall under three general codes: Moral, Social-Conventional and Psychological 
(see Table 3).  The moral codes were (a) Social Justice/Inclusivity (e.g., “You should 
not be prejudiced” or “They did not invite him just because of his race”), (b) 
Psychological Harm/Empathy (e.g., “It will hurt his feelings” or “Friends should be 
nice to one another”); the social-conventional codes were (c) Group Functioning (e.g., 
“He won’t fit in because he’s different” or “It doesn’t affect the group”), (d) Activity 
Preferences (e.g., “She likes to do different activities” or “He likes tennis just like 
them”), (e) Cultural Identity (e.g., “He’s American which is different from them” or 
“She’s Arab American, they would like her”), (f) Stereotypes (e.g., “Arabs will be 
uncomfortable, because Henry does not meet their racial preferences” or “They might 
not speak the same language”), (g) Group Diversity (e.g., “Its good to have different 
opinions” or “She could teach the group new things”; the psychological codes were 
(h) Autonomy (e.g., “He said his opinion” or “She can say what she wants, its up to 
her”), and (i) Personal Preference/Personality (e.g., “I like tennis so I would like 
Julie” or “I would see what his personality is like first”).   




Individual Inclusion, Forced-choice Group Inclusion, and Evaluation of the Deviant 
Act) and the Attributions of Emotions assessment, analyses were conducted using the 
three most frequently used justifications, which were all used by more than 10% of 
the sample.  Justification responses for the inclusion assessments could have a 
maximum of two codes, thus responses were coded as 1 = full use of the category, .5 
= partial use, 0 = no use of the category.  Given that in excluding a target some 
groups were violating their group norm it was theoretically important to differentiate 
between use of moral reasoning and use of social-conventional/group dynamics 
reasoning when reasoning about the emotions that a group would feel.  For this 
reason the subcategory justifications of the Attribution of Emotions assessment were 
collapsed into their broader moral categories and social-conventional/group dynamics 
category.  Thus, moral subcategories were collapsed into one ‘moral’ code and social-
conventional subcategories were collapsed into one ‘social-conventional/group 
dynamics’ code.  A maximum of three codes (subcategories) were possible for these 
responses, 1 = full use of the category, .5 = partial use with two codes, .33 = partial 
use with three codes, 0 = no use of the category (3.5 % of sample used three codes).  
On the basis of 25% of the interviews (n = 50), at least 89% agreement was achieved 
with Cohen’ s !  =  .88 for inter-rater reliability.  The least-reported percent 
agreement among the three coders for double versus singles codes was 90%, and a 







Plan of Analyses 
 Descriptive analyses regarding participants’ responses to the Cultural 
Knowledge Task and the Contact with Individual of Arab Descent assessment were 
first conducted using Age, Gender, Status (ethnic minority or majority), Religion and 
Ethnic Composition of Friendships as independent factors in order to gain a better 
understanding of the study samples’ awareness and knowledge about Arab cultural 
identity and their levels of contact with Arab peers.  Level of Contact was used as a 
covariate in ANCOVA analyses, however, since contact was low in the sample, it 
showed low correlations with the dependent measures and significant findings based 
on the factors of interest Group Cultural Identity, Group Norm, Target of Inclusion, 
Age and Gender existed above and beyond Level of Contact, it was therefore removed 
as a covariate from final analyses. In addition, given that 52% of the participants were 
racial/ethnic minorities, and research has shown that racial/ethnic minority children 
have differential responses to exclusion than majority status children (Margie et al., 
2005), analyses were also conducted with Status as a factor. Findings were, however, 
sparse showing small effect sizes and no consistent patterns, thus no generalizing 
conclusions about minority status could be drawn. In particular, because of the 
diversity of the minority sample with each ethnicity having a small sample size no 
specific conclusions could be made, therefore to preserve statistical power this factor 
was removed from final analyses. 
Hypotheses were tested using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), correlational 
analysis, independent- and paired-sample t-tests, and Chi-squared tests.  Planned 




Bonferroni comparisons were conducted as follow-up tests on the ANOVA to control 
for Type I errors.  The primary variables of interest for this study were Group 
Cultural Identity (Arab American, American), Group Norm (inclusive, exclusive) and 
the Target of Inclusion (outgroup with similar interests, ingroup with different 
interests) as independent factors, while Age, and Stereotypic Associations were 
predictor variables.  Although no hypotheses were proposed for gender, Gender was 
included as a factor for analyses of variance tests. Given that past research has shown 
differential judgments based on gender (Killen & Stangor, 2001) due to social status 
differences, Gender was maintained in the analyses to address the issue of status (e.g., 
females are a lower status group than males).  Dependent measures were Group 
Inclusion, Individual Inclusion, Forced-choice Group Inclusion, Evaluation of the 
Deviant Act, and Attributions of Emotions.   
 Differences between the proportions of the top three types of reasoning used 
for each measure were assessed by Group Cultural Identity, Group Norm, Target of 
Inclusion, Age, Gender, Evaluations, and Judgments using repeated measures 
ANOVA.  ANOVAs were used to analyze proportions due to repeated measures 
designs, which are not appropriate for logistic regressions (see footnote 4 in Wainryb, 









Chapter 4: Results 
First descriptive statistics regarding participants’ responses to the Cultural 
Knowledge Task and the Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent assessment are 
presented to gain a better understanding of the study sample’s awareness of Arab 
cultural identity and their experiences with people of Arab backgrounds.  Second, 
results focus on testing hypotheses related to the Group Inclusion judgment, 
reasoning, and the effects of stereotypic associations on participants’ Group Inclusion 
judgments.  Then, analyses and results for participants’ Individual Inclusion 
judgments compared with their own Group’s Inclusion judgments (American group 
story only) are presented followed by reports of the effects of stereotypic associations 
and findings for the reasoning used to justify one’s own inclusion judgments.  This is 
followed by results of participants’ Forced-choice Group Inclusion decision and 
reasoning. Results for participants’ Evaluations of the Deviant Act and their reasoning 
about their evaluations are then presented.  Finally, tests of hypotheses and findings 
related to participants’ responses to the Attribution of Group Emotions and reasoning 
about it are presented.  Please note that all mentions of the “American group”, refer to 
a non-Arab American cultural identity and all mentions of the “Arab American 
group” refer to a cultural identity of Arab descent. 
When reasoning data was assessed, the top three categories of reasoning used 
by participants were analyzed for each inclusion judgment, forced-choice, and 
evaluation of the deviant group member.  Although it was expected that participants 
would use stereotypes to justify their responses for exclusive expectations, 




this type of reasoning was not included in any reasoning analyses.  Similarly, it was 
expected that social justice and inclusivity reasoning would be used to justify 
participants’ group inclusion and individual inclusion judgments. Although 
participants used social justice reasoning more to justify individual inclusion than 
group inclusion, the frequency of use was not greater than 8%.  Therefore, references 
to group functioning, activity preferences, and cultural identity were used to analyze 
reasoning for group inclusion and forced-choice assessments.  Group functioning, 
activity preferences, and personal preferences/personality were used to analyze 
individual inclusion judgments.  When analyzing reasoning for evaluations of the 
deviant group member social justice/inclusivity, group functioning, and autonomy 
reasoning were used.  When analyzing reasoning about attributions of emotions, 
subcategories in the moral domain were collapsed to represent moral forms of 
reasoning and reasoning using subcategories in the societal domain were collapsed to 
represent reasoning in terms of group dynamics.  Analyses of reasoning for inclusion 
judgments and evaluation of the deviant act were conducted with two goals in mind; 
(1) to test hypotheses related to reasoning used as a function of judgments (likely to 
include and not likely to include) and evaluation (okay and not okay); and (2) to gain 
in-depth understanding of patterns found in Likert inclusion judgments and 
evaluations. 
Cultural Knowledge Task 
Knowledge about who Arabs are.  Thirty-three percent of the participants (n 
= 64) who responded to the assessment “Please define who is an Arab,” reported 




speak Arabic and are from an Arab country”), while 51% reported imprecise, non-
factual, or no knowledge about Arab people (n = 99), 10% used stereotypic 
associations (n = 20), and 6% responded with ambiguities and references to 
similarities with other people (n = 11).  Further analyses were conducted using a 
dichotomous variable that represents those with factual knowledge (33%, Knowledge 
= 1) and those without (67%, No Knowledge = 0).  A large effect size for age was 
found showing older participants had more knowledge about Arab people than 
younger participants, t(168) = -5.89, p < .001, Cohen's d = -0.86.  Knowledge did not 
vary by Gender, participant’s Ethnic Majority/Minority Status, Religion, and Ethnic 
Composition of Friendships (see Table 4). 
Stereotypic associations made about Arab people.  Forty-seven percent (n 
= 88) of participants did not report stereotypic associations with Arab people, while 
53% did (n = 99).  Older participants reported more stereotypic associations than 
younger participants, revealing a moderate effect size, t(185) = -4.90, p < .001, 
Cohen's d = -0.73.  Similar to Knowledge about Arab People, stereotypic associations 
did not vary by Gender, participant’s Ethnic Majority/Minority Status, Religion, and 
Ethnic Composition of Friendships (see Table 4).  Participants’ stereotypic 
associations did not significantly differ based on their knowledge of Arab people, 
although those with knowledge were trending toward making more stereotypic 
associations (MNo Knowledge = 0.48, SD No Knowledge = 0.50; MKnowledge = 0.62, SDKnowledge = 
0.49).   
Confounding Arab and Muslim identities.  Seven percent (n = 13) of 




not sure (n = 83).  Correlational analyses were used to test the association between the 
Arab/Muslim Confound and Age, Gender, participant’s Ethnic Majority/Minority 
Status, Religion, and Ethnic Composition of Friendships.  Age was significantly 
negatively correlated with the Arab/Muslim Confound (r = -.205, p < .01), such that 
older participants were less likely to confound the two identities than were younger 
participants.   
To test whether responses to this measure were related to participants’ 
Knowledge about Arab People and Stereotypic Associations with Arab People, 
univariate ANOVAs were conducted with Knowledge about Arab People and 
Stereotypic Associations with Arab People as dependent variables and the 
Arab/Muslim Confound as a fixed factor.  Findings showed a significant effect for the 
Arab/Muslim Confound for both knowledge (F(2, 188) = 9.69, p < .001, "p
2 = 0.09) 
and stereotypic association (F(2, 182) = 4.37, p < 0.05, "p
2  = 0.04).  Pair-wise 
comparisons showed that participants who did not confound Arabs with Muslims had 
more knowledge about Arab people than those who were not sure (p < .001) or 
confounded the two identities (p < .05).  In addition those who did not confound 
Arabs with Muslims made statistically significantly less stereotypic associations 
about Arab people (p < .05) than those who were not sure (see Table 5).   
In sum a majority of participants did not have factual knowledge about Arab 
people and half of the sample readily made stereotypic associations with people of 
Arab descent.  This varied as a function of age, such that older participants had more 
factual knowledge about Arab people but made more stereotypic associations than 




identity with Muslim identity.  Those who were not sure whether all Arabs were 
Muslim however, were more likely to make stereotypic associations than those who 
did not confound the two identities. 
Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent 
Contact with individuals of Arab decent was low for this sample.  A majority 
of participants reported having few or no Arabs in their neighborhoods (97%), few or 
no Arab friends (96%), little or no conversation with Arab peers (58%), rarely or 
never hung out with Arab peers (67%), and rarely or never attended events sponsored 
by Arab groups (84%).  Thus an average score for all five measures which all range 
from 1 = no contact, to 5 = a lot of contact, had M = 1.88, and SD = 0.58.  Given that 
contact was very low, ANCOVA analyses with Level of Contact as a covariate and 
the Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes measures as dependent variables showed 
similar effects as ANOVA analyses without contact as covariate. Therefore, 
subsequent analyses of dependent inclusion measures and attribution of emotions 
measures do not include Level of Contact as a covariate or a predictor.  As for contact 
with peers not of the same ethnic or racial background, 40% reported having more 
than half their friends of a similar race, thus the majority of participants had 
ethnically or racially diverse friendships. 
Judgments and Reasoning about Group Inclusion 
Group inclusion judgments.  To test the expectation that participants would 
view their own American group to be more inclusive than the Arab American group, 
two separate 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, 




American) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the 
Group Inclusion measures for an outgroup target with similar interests and for an 
ingroup target with different interests.  Expectations were confirmed for an outgroup 
target.  Findings showed that participants perceived their own group to be more 
inclusive toward an Arab American (outgroup target) with similar interests (MAmerican 
Group = 4.36, SDAmerican Group = 1.52) than an Arab American group would be toward an 
American with similar interests as the group (MArab American Group = 3.68, SDArab American 
Group = 1.53); F(1,188) = 14.64, p < .001, "p
2 = .07.  However, when it came to 
judging inclusivity toward an ingroup target with different interests, no differences 
were found based on the cultural identity of the group, both groups were viewed to be 
inclusive toward a cultural ingroup target with different interests (American Group: 
MAmerican Group = 4.24, SDAmerican Group = 1.58; Arab American Group: MArab American Group 
= 4.37, SDArab American Group = 1.35). 
 A Group Cultural Identity " Group Norm interaction effect was found for 
both targets; an outgroup with similar interests, F(1,188) = 6.19, p < .04, "p
2 = .03, 
and an ingroup with different interests: F(1,188) = 51.97, p < .001, "p
2 = .21.  These 
effects indicated that perceptions of similarity varied by cultural group, specifically 
when the group had an exclusive norm (“we like kids who are similar”). In the 
exclusive norm condition, the Arab American group was viewed to be less inclusive 
toward someone with a different cultural identity, whereas the American group was 
viewed to be less inclusive toward someone with different interests in activities (see 
Figure 3).  Pairwise comparisons showed that, for judgments about groups with 




American (outgroup target) with similar interests than an American group was toward 
an Arab American with similar interests, p < .001, and more inclusive towards an 
Arab American (ingroup target) with different interests than the American group was 
toward an American ingroup member with different interests, p < .01 (see Figure 3).  
However, when the groups had inclusive norms (“we like kids who are different”), 
statistically significant differences between each cultural group were only found for 
inclusion of an ingroup target but not an outgroup target.  Thus, the American group 
was judged to be more inclusive than the Arab American group toward a cultural 
ingroup target, p < .05.  These findings suggest that the Arab American group was 
viewed to judge similarity based on cultural identity, while the American group was 
viewed to judge similarity based on shared interests in activities. 
 One-sample t-tests were conducted to assess whether participants’ inclusion 
judgments in each condition differed from the 3.5 midpoint (neutral rating), which 
indicated a 50-50 likelihood of including the target into the group.  Significant 
differences from a 50% likelihood of including the target were found for all 
conditions at p < .001, except for two.  These included the conditions for the 
likelihood that an exclusive Arab American group would include an outgroup target 
with similar interests, and the likelihood that an exclusive American group would 
include an ingroup target with similar interests.  Thus, in all other conditions 
participants expected groups to be significantly inclusive with more than 50% 
likelihood of inclusion (see Figure 3 for test statistics). 
 Age and gender differences. When participants were judging inclusion of an 





2 = .02, was found showing that older participants perceived both cultural groups to 
be less inclusive toward an outgroup target than younger participants (12-year-olds: 
M = 4.16, SD  = 0.87; 16-year-olds: M = 3.89, SD  = 0.87).  A Gender " Age 
interaction effect, F(1,188) = 7.50, p < .01, "p
2 = .03, indicated that this age difference 
was driven by older males (see Figure 4).  Pairwise comparisons showed that older 
males perceived both groups to be significantly less inclusive toward an outgroup 
target than younger males, p < .001.  Younger males were also more inclusive than 
younger females, p < .05.  No interaction effects were found with Age and Group 
Norm, thus disconfirming expectations that older participants will perceive an 
exclusive group to be less inclusive than younger participants.  In fact both older and 
younger participants viewed exclusive groups to be less inclusive than inclusive 
groups, except when judging the inclusion of an outgroup target by their own group 
(pairwise comparisons between an exclusive group and an inclusive group: Arab 
American group including outgroup target, p < .001, Arab American group including 
ingroup target, p < .01, American group including ingroup target, p < .001, see Figure 
3).  Thus, participants viewed their own group would be likely to include an Arab 
American, irrespective of their group’s norm. 
Differences by target of inclusion.  Given that children focus on shared 
interests (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), it was expected that participants would judge 
groups to be more inclusive towards an outgroup member with similar interests than 
an ingroup member with different interest, except in the case when the group had an 
inclusive norm.  To test this hypothesis, two separate 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 




of Inclusion: outgroup member with similar interests, ingroup member with different 
interests) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the 
Group Inclusion judgments about the Arab American group and the American Group.   
 Findings for the Arab American group disconfirmed expectations that 
participants would view the group to give priority to shared interests and be more 
inclusive toward an outgroup target who shares the same interests as the group.  In 
fact, a main effect for Target of Inclusion, F(1,187) = 18.38, p < .001, "p
2= .09, was 
found indicating the opposite in the case of an Arab American group.  Participants 
perceived that the Arab American group would be less inclusive toward an American 
target than an Arab American target (Outgroup, similar interests: M = 3.67, SD  = 
1.53; Ingroup, different interests: M = 4.36, SD  = 1.33).   
 One-sample t-tests were conducted to test whether inclusion judgments 
differed from 3.5 midpoint likelihood rating.  Results showed that participants 
expected the Arab American group to be inclusive toward another Arab American 
ingroup target, t(197) = 9.05, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.65, but were uncertain about the 
group inviting an American target, showing no significant difference from the 
midpoint judgment of 3.5.  A main effect for Group Norm was also found indicating 
that, irrespective of the target’s identity, inclusion judgments matched the group’s 
norm, F(1,187) = 30.97, p < .001, "p
2 = .14 (Exclusive Norm: M = 3.68, SD  = 0.86; 
Inclusive Norm: M = 4.36, SD  = 0.86).  One-sample t-tests investigating whether 
inclusion judgments for the group in each norm condition differed from the 3.5 




(Exclusive Norm: t(96) = 2.12, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .21; Inclusive Norm: t(98) = 
9.58, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.31).  
 In contrast to expectations about the Arab American group, findings for the 
American group did not show a main effect for Target of Inclusion but showed a 
Target of Inclusion " Group Norm interaction effect, F(1,189) = 18.27, p < .001, "p
2 
= .08.  This interaction effect is evidence of participants’ sensitivity to their own 
group’s norms, but only when including an ingroup target with different interests in 
activity, p < .001 (Exclusive Norm: M = 3.51, SD  = 1.56; Inclusive Norm: M = 4.95, 
SD  = 1.27).  No statistical significance was found when judging inclusion of an 
outgroup target with similar interests (Exclusive Norm: M = 4.32, SD  = 1.53; 
Inclusive Norm: M = 4.37, SD  = 1.54).  Participants expected their own group to be 
more inclusive toward an outgroup target when the group had an exclusive norm than 
it was to an ingroup target, p = .001, thus confirming the hypothesis that they would 
focus on shared interest in activities.   
Age and gender differences specific to the American group.  A Target of 
Inclusion " Age " Gender interaction effect was found for the American group only, 
F(1,189) = 4.82, p < .05, "p
2 = .02, showing that Age and Gender effects were present 
when judging inclusion of an outgroup target and not when judging inclusion of an 
ingroup target.  Thus, when judging the likelihood that their own group would include 
an Arab American with similar interests 16-year-old males were the least inclusive.  
They were less inclusive than 12-year-old males, p = .001, and less inclusive than 16-
year-olds females, p < .01 (12-year-old males: M = 4.75, SD  = 1.39; 16-year-old 




females: M = 4.59, SD  = 1.41).  A main effect for Group Norm was also found for the 
American group showing an exclusive group norm influenced participants overall 
inclusion judgments, F(1,189) = 33.43, p < .001, "p
2
 = .15 (Exclusive Norm: M = 
3.91, SD  = 0.91; Inclusive Norm: M = 4.66, SD  = 0.91). 
Reasoning about group inclusion.  Analyses of reasoning were conducted to 
accomplish two goals.  The first was to explain the pattern found in group inclusion 
judgments, whereby exclusivity or similarity was judged based on cultural identity for 
the Arab American group but judged based on shared interest in activities for the 
American group.  The second goal was to investigate the reasoning used by 
participants who judged a group to be exclusive compared with those who judged the 
group to be inclusive.  The top three categories of reasoning used for group inclusion 
judgments were group functioning, activity preferences, and cultural identity. 
 Explaining group inclusion when groups have exclusive norms.  To 
accomplish the first goal, two separate 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 
(Gender: female, male) " 2 (Group Cultural Identity:  Arab American, American) " 3 
(Reasoning: group functioning, activity preferences, cultural identity) ANOVAs with 
repeated measures on the last factor were conducted using proportion of reasoning for 
inclusion of an outgroup target (first ANOVA) and inclusion of an ingroup target 
(second ANOVA).  Only the conditions in which both groups had an exclusive group 
norm (e.g., “we invite kids who are similar”) were analyzed.  When judging the 
inclusion of an outgroup target with similar interests into a group with an exclusive 
norm a main effect for the type of reasoning used was found, F(2,378) = 4.76, p < 
.05, "p




regarding inclusion of an outgroup target who has the same interests in activities 
using references to activity preferences more so than references to cultural identity, p 
<.01 (Group functioning : M = .32, SD  = .44; Activity Preferences: M = .36, SD  = .41; 
Cultural Identity : M = .21, SD  = .35).  A Reasoning " Group Cultural Identity 
interaction effect was also found, F(2,378) = 4.05, p < .05, "p
2 = .02, showing that 
participants used more references to cultural identity when judging likelihood of 
inclusion by the Arab American group than when judging likelihood of inclusion by 
the American group, p < .01 (see Figure 5).  In addition, only when judging their own 
American group’s decision to include an outgroup target did participants use more 
group functioning and activity preference reasoning than cultural identity, ps < .001.  
Thus, when making inclusion judgments about an outgroup target with similar 
interests participants attended to cultural identity when thinking about the Arab 
American group and attended to group functioning and activity preferences when 
thinking about their own group. 
When the group had an exclusive norm, reasoning about decisions to include 
an ingroup target with different interests also differed based on the cultural identity of 
the group.  A Reasoning " Group Cultural Identity interaction effect was found, 
F(2,374) = 8.89, p < .001, "p
2 = .04, providing evidence that ‘similarity’ for an Arab 
American group is perceived to be based on cultural identity while for an American 
group it is based on concerns for group functioning and a shared interest in activities.  
Thus, participants reasoned based on group functioning and activity preferences more 
so than cultural identity when judging inclusion of an ingroup target into their own 




more than group functioning when reasoning about inclusion of an Arab American 
target into the Arab American group, p < .01.  Significantly more references for group 
functioning, p < .01, but less references to cultural identity, p < .001, were made 
when reasoning about inclusion into an American group compared to reasoning about 
inclusion into an Arab American group (see Figure 5).   
In addition, a Reasoning " Age " Gender effect, F(2,374) = 5.53, p < .01, "p
2 
= .03, was found, which partially confirmed expectations that older participants 
focused on cultural identity while younger participants focused on shared interests in 
activities.  An unexpected gender difference was found, showing that this hypothesis 
only held for the male sample (not the female sample).  The interaction effect showed 
that when reasoning about inclusion of an ingroup target with different interests, 
young females referenced cultural identity more than young males, p < .001, and 
more than older females, p = .001, but older males used cultural identity in their 
reasoning more than younger males, p < .05 (12-year-olds females: M = .43, SD  = 
.44; 16-year-old females: M = .18, SD  = .33; 12-year-old males : M = .14, SD  = .32; 
16-year-old males: M = .32, SD  = .43).  Younger males were also more likely to 
reference activity preferences than older males, p < .05 (12-year-old males: M = .42, 
SD  = .46; 16-year-old males: M = .24, SD  = .40). 
 These findings provide further supporting evidence that participants perceive 
the Arab American group to be more concerned with similarities based on cultural 
identity than those based on shared interests.  The opposite is the case for the 
American group, which is perceived to be more likely to make inclusion decisions 




addition, the age by gender findings provided insight into how reasoning using 
cultural identity in exclusion contexts may develop from pre-adolescence to 
adolescence with younger females and older males finding this category salient for 
making decision about including ingroup targets with different interests in activities. 
Reasoning about exclusive and inclusive expectations.  The second goal of 
analyses for reasoning about group inclusion, which sought to identify the reasoning 
used to justify exclusive versus inclusive judgments about the group, was achieved by 
conducting four 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, 
exclusive) " 2 (Gender: female, male) " 2 (Judgment: exclusive, inclusive) " 3 
(Reasoning: group functioning, activity preferences, cultural identity) ANOVAs with 
repeated measures on the last factor.  These were conducted as a function of whether 
participants rated the group as likely to include the target (inclusive) or not likely to 
include the target (exclusive).  Inclusive or exclusive judgments were based on a 
midpoint split of 3.5 for responses to a Likert scale ranging from 1 = really not likely 
to 6 = really likely.  Post-hoc pairwise comparisons for each significant reasoning by 
judgment interaction effect were also conducted.   
 The four ANOVAs represented the following conditions: (a) Arab American 
group including an outgroup target with similar interests; (b) American group 
including an outgroup target with similar interests; (c) Arab American group 
including an ingroup target with different interests; and (d) American group including 
an ingroup target with different interests.  It was expected that, in the case of the 
outgroup target with similar interests, participants who expected the group to include 




who expected the group to exclude the target would focus on cultural identity.  
Reverse patterns were expected for reasoning about inclusion and exclusion of an 
ingroup target with different interests.  Only effects for judgments by reasoning will 
be reported, as this was the main theoretical concern for this study.     
 A Reasoning " Judgment interaction effect was found for the all conditions 
except for the American group including an ingroup target (Arab American Group, 
Outgroup Target: F(2,358) = 5.49, p < .01, "p
2 = .03, American Group, Outgroup 
Target: F(2,360) = 4.90, p < .01, "p
2 = .02, Arab American Group Ingroup Target: 
F(2,356) = 11.25, p < .01, "p
2 = .05, American Group Ingroup Target: Not 
significant).  As expected, participants who judged the Arab American group likely to 
include an American with similar interests referenced activity preferences 
significantly more than those who judged the group to exclude an American peer, p < 
.01 (see Table 6). While those who thought the group was more likely to exclude this 
target reasoned about it by referencing the differences in cultural identity between the 
group and target more so than those who thought the group would include an 
outgroup target, p < .05.  In addition, those who made inclusive judgments reasoned 
about them based on group functioning and activity preferences more so than cultural 
identity, p < .05 and p < .001, respectively.   
 Similarly, when reasoning about their own American group, participants who 
thought his or her own group was likely to include an Arab American (with similar 
interests in activities) referenced activity preferences more so than those who thought 
the group would exclude an Arab American, p < .01.  Participants who perceived their 




cultural identity, ps < .001 (see Table 6).  It was noteworthy, however, that those who 
perceived their own group to exclude an Arab American with similar interests 
reasoned using group functioning (e.g., “He won’t fit in,” or “She’s different”) more 
than activity preferences and cultural identity, p < .05 and p = .001, respectively.  
Variability in participants’ reasoning about their own group’s decision to include or 
exclude an Arab American target with similar interests indicates that exclusion 
decisions based on reasons that have to do with how groups work could in this case 
have been based on implicit rather than explicit stereotypic expectations. 
 Those who thought an Arab American group was likely to include an ingroup 
target with different interest did so based on similarities in identity as opposed to 
activity preferences, p < .01, but they used group functioning as the main reason to 
include someone of the same identity, more so than activity preferences and cultural 
identity, p < .001 and p < .01, respectively (see Table 6).  Cultural identity was used 
to justify inclusive judgments of an ingroup target with different interests into an 
Arab American group more so than to justify exclusive judgments, p < .01.  However, 
those who justified exclusive judgments did so using more references to group 
functioning and differences in activity preferences than they did using cultural 
identity, p < .01 and p < .001, respectively. 
 In summary, participants used group functioning reasoning, alluding to lack of 
fit between a target and a group, or lack of similarities, or lack of differences in the 
case the group had an inclusive group norm, when justifying why they thought a 
group would exclude a target.  References to cultural identity were only prevalent 




was used to justify the group’s exclusion of an American target because they are not 
the same cultural identity but also to justify inclusion of an Arab American target 
because they are of the same culture.  Preferences for similar activities were used to 
justify inclusion of an outgroup member with similar interests for both groups, thus 
providing further evidence that shared interests continue to serve as a salient factor 
which pre-adolescents and adolescents think of when making inclusion decisions. 
Stereotypes and Group Inclusion 
 To test hypotheses related to stereotypes and judgments about group inclusion 
the Stereotypic Associations variable was used as a fixed factor in repeated measures 
ANOVAs, along with Age and Group Norm.  Gender was not included in these 
analyses because there were no hypotheses pertaining to gender and stereotypic 
associations and the number of stereotypic associations made did not differ by 
gender.  Only effects related to stereotypic associations will be reported in this 
section.  The first expectation was that participants who reported stereotypic 
associations with Arab people would judge a group to be less inclusive toward 
outgroup targets than those who do not report stereotypic associations, specifically, 
participants with higher levels of stereotypes would be less inclusive toward an Arab 
American target joining an American group.   
 A 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 
2 (Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) " 2 (Group Cultural Identity:  Arab 
American and American) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted, with planned comparison for Stereotypic Association " Group Cultural 




American.  A main effect for Stereotypic Associations was found F(1,177)=9.48, p < 
.01, "p
2 =.05, confirming the hypothesis that those who reported stereotypic 
associations  judged groups to be less inclusive toward an outgroup member 
(MStereotypes = 3.82, SDStereotypes  = 0.91; MNo Stereotypes = 4.24, SDNo Stereotypes  = 0.93).  In 
addition, planned comparison findings indicated less inclusivity toward an outgroup 
target on behalf of the American group between those who reported stereotypic 
associations and those who did not, F(1,177) = 4.68, p < .05, "p
2 =.02 (MStereotypes = 
4.09, SDStereotypes  = 1.66 ; MNo Stereotypes = 4.63, SDNo Stereotypes  = 1.34).  Stereotypic 
associations, however, were not related to how participants judged inclusivity of an 
Arab American group toward an American target.   
 This finding was further supported when two separate ANOVAs for each 
group were conducted to address the question about whether or not participants with 
stereotypes judged inclusivity differentially based on the target of inclusion.  Two 2 
(Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 
(Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) " 2 (Target of Inclusion: outgroup 
member with similar interests, ingroup member with different interests) ANOVAs 
with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the Group Inclusion 
judgments for the Arab American group and the American Group.  Disconfirming 
expectations, no effects for Stereotypic Associations were found when judging 
inclusivity of the Arab American group toward either target, indicating that 
stereotypic associations were not influential when making inclusion expectations 
about a cultural outgroup.  However, a Target of Inclusion " Stereotypic Association 





=.03.  This finding showed that inclusion judgments for those with stereotypes 
differed from those without stereotypes when deciding to include an outgroup 
member into their own group, p < .05.  In addition, inclusion judgments for those who 
did not hold stereotypic associations were made based on shared interest in activity 
because this sample of participants was more inclusive toward an Arab American 
who shared the same interest in activities than it was toward an American target who 
did not share the same interests as the group, p < .05 (see Figure 6). 
To test hypotheses pertaining to the role of group norms and how they may 
influence those who hold stereotypes.  Four independent-sample t-tests with 
stereotypic associations as the independent factor were conducted on inclusion 
assessments for the American group for both targets when the group had an exclusive 
norm and when it had an inclusive group norm.  Stereotypic associations proved to 
play a statistically significant role for participants judging inclusion of an Arab 
American into their own American group when the group had an exclusive norm, 
t(86) = 2.52, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .53 (see Figure 7), but not when the group had an 
inclusive norm.  These findings indicate that participants who held stereotypic 
knowledge about Arab people used these stereotypes to make inclusion decisions 
about an Arab American into their own group.  Specifically, stereotypes were most 
influential in the condition where the American group had an exclusive norm but did 
not play a significant role when the group had an inclusive norm. 
Individual Inclusion Versus Group Inclusion: American Group 
  To assess whether participants’ own individual inclusion judgments differed 




two separate 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Gender: females, males) " 2 
(Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Inclusion Judgment: group, individual) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted for judgments 
about including an outgroup target with similar interests and an ingroup target with 
different interests.  When judging inclusion of an outgroup target, participants’ own 
individual inclusion differed from how they perceived their group’s inclusion of the 
outgroup target, F(1,189)= 12.35, p < .001, "p
2 =.06, such that they were more 
inclusive than they perceived their group to be inclusive (see Figure 8).  This was also 
the case for judging inclusion of an ingroup target with different interests, F(1,188)= 
8.17, p < .01, "p
2 =.04.   
  Unlike judgments about an outgroup target when judging an ingroup target an 
Inclusion Judgment " Group Norm effect was found, F(1, 188) = 6.52, p < .05, "p
2 
=.03, showing that participants’ own judgments about including an ingroup member 
differed from how likely they perceived their group to include an ingroup member 
only when their group had an exclusive norm,  p < .001 (Exclusive Norm: MGroup = 
3.50, SDGroup  = 1.57, MIndividual = 4.05, SDIndividual  = 1.56; Inclusive Norm: MGroup = 
4.95, SDGroup  = 1.27, MIndividual = 4.98, SDIndividual  = 1.45).  No age-related differences 
were found, disconfirming expectations that older participants will differentiate 
between individual judgments and group judgments more than younger participants. 
Stereotypes and individual inclusion.  While participants were more 
inclusive than they viewed their group to be, their own individual judgments also 
differed based on their stereotypic associations.  To test hypotheses related to whether 




individual judgments a 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Group Norm: 
inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) " 2 (Target of 
Inclusion: outgroup member with similar interests, ingroup member with different 
interests) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on 
participants individual inclusion judgments.  As in the case of group inclusion 
judgments a Target of Inclusion " Stereotypic Association interaction effect was 
found, F(1, 176) = 4.36, p < .05, "p
2 =.02, showing that in their own inclusion 
judgments about an outgroup target, participants who reported stereotypic 
associations were less likely to include an outgroup target than participants who did 
not, p < .05.  In addition, participants who did not make stereotypic associations were 
more inclusive toward an outgroup target than an ingroup target, providing further 
evidence that participants who did not have stereotypes about Arab people made their 
decisions based on shared interests in activities more so than cultural identity, p < .05 
(see Figure 9).   
Independent-sample t-tests were conducted to test effects of stereotypic 
associations on individual inclusion judgments about an outgroup target separately for 
when the group had an exclusive norm and for when the group had an inclusive norm.  
Although a similar pattern was found as that in the group inclusion assessment such 
that the difference between those who made stereotypic associations and those who 
did not was greater when the group was exclusive than when the group was inclusive, 
the t-test for the exclusive group was not significant but trending toward significance 




Reasoning about individual inclusion judgments.  How did participants 
reason about their own individual rating of how likely they were to include either 
target? Contrary to their group inclusion judgment, participants rarely used cultural 
identity to justify their own inclusion ratings.  Instead they used references to 
personal preferences/personality, thus citing concerns about their own preferences 
matching or not matching that of the target or focusing on the target’s personality 
(e.g., “She could be a nice person”).  Two 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 
(Gender: females, males) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Judgment: 
exclusive, inclusive) " 3 (Reasoning: group functioning, activity preferences, 
personal preference/personality) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor 
were conducted on reasoning about each target (ingroup target and outgroup target).  
These were conducted as a function of whether participants judged whether they were 
likely to include the target (inclusive) or not likely to include the target (exclusive).  
Inclusive or exclusive judgments were based on a midpoint split of 3.5 for responses 
to a Likert scale ranging from 1 = really not likely to 6 = really likely.  Post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons for each significant Reasoning " Judgment effect were also 
conducted.  No statistically significant differences were found for reasoning about an 
ingroup target with different interests.  Participants used approximately the same 
amount of each type of reasoning to justify their own inclusion ratings of an ingroup 
target with different interests (MGroup functioning = .27, SDGroup functioning  = .43;  MActivity = 
.22, SDActivity  = .40; MPersonal = .28, SDPersonal  = .44).   
When participants reasoned about inclusion of an outgroup target with similar 




found, F(2, 360) = 3.47, p < .05, "p
2 = .01, in addition to a Reasoning " Age " 
Judgment interaction effect F(2, 360) = 4.53, p < .05, "p
2= .02 (see Table 7).  The 
differences in reasoning by age and gender showed that, irrespective of the group 
norm, younger females focused on group functioning concerns more so than older 
females, p < .01, while older females reasoned using personal preferences and 
personality traits more so than younger females, p < .05.  Older females were focused 
on personal preferences and personality traits and used them more so than group 
functioning concerns, p < .01.  Younger males were concerned with activity 
preferences statistically significantly more than group functioning, p < .05.   
In addition, differences in reasoning by Age and Judgment showed older 
participants who were likely to exclude an outgroup target reasoned about it using 
personal preferences and personality traits more than older participants who were 
likely to include the outgroup target, p < .01, (see Table 7).  While older participants 
who were inclusive toward the outgroup target focused on shared interest in activities 
more than those who were exclusive, p < .01.  Older participants who were likely to 
exclude used personal preferences more than younger exclusive participants, p < .05, 
and they used this type of reasoning more than any other form of reasoning, ps < .05.  
Older participants who were likely to include, however, used activity preferences 
more than younger inclusive participants, p < .05, and used it more than any other 
form of reasoning, ps < .01.  Thus, adolescents used individual personal preferences 
and personality traits (e.g., “It depends on his personality, he may not be cool.”) to 
justify exclusive evaluations and activity preferences (e.g., “She likes to do the same 




interests.  While gender differences were not expected, the age-related differences 
demonstrating that adolescents focus on individual traits and personal preferences are 
consistent with expectations. 
Forced-choice Group Inclusion 
  When groups were forced to choose only one target (an outgroup target with 
the same interests in activities as the group or an ingroup target with different 
interests), it was expected that participants would make differential choices based on 
the cultural identity of the group, and that their own group would be expected to focus 
on shared interests in activities when making a forced choice.  #2-tests were carried 
out using the Forced-choice Group Inclusion assessment to test whether the 
proportion of participants who chose the ingroup target was significantly different 
from chance for each group.  Findings confirmed this hypothesis, showing that 
participants perceived the American group to be less likely to choose an ingroup 
target over an outgroup target (significantly less than chance), #2(1) = 12.44, p < .001 
(MAmerican group = 0.34, SDAmerican group  = 0.49)., and perceived the Arab American group 
would choose the ingroup target over the outgroup target significantly more than 
chance #2(1) = 15.26, p < .001 (MArab American Group = 0.63, SDArab American Group  = 0.49). 
 To test hypotheses regarding the effects of group norms on each group a 2 
(Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Gender: 
females, males) " 2 (Group Cultural Identity:  Arab American, American) ANOVAs 
with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted.  Findings showed a main 
effect for Group Cultural Identity, F(1,183)= 21.07, p < .001, "p
2 =.10, indicating that 




more often than the they thought their own group would (means and standard 
deviations same as above).  Whether the group had an inclusive norm or exclusive 
norm only mattered for forced judgments about the American group and not for the 
Arab American group.  Thus a Group Cultural Identity " Group Norm interaction 
was found, F(1,183) = 3.88, p = .05, "p
2 =.02, with pairwise comparisons showing 
that when an American group had an exclusive norm participants thought it was 
significantly less likely for their own group to choose an ingroup member with 
different interests than when it had inclusive norm, p = .001 (see Figure 10).  The 
patterns observed in the group inclusion assessment, whereby similarity was defined 
by cultural identity for the Arab American group and defined by shared interest for 
the American group, were also observed in the forced-choice group inclusion 
assessment.  When both groups had an exclusive norm participants judged that the 
Arab American group would choose the ingroup target significantly more than they 
perceived the American group would choose the ingroup target, p < .001 (see Figure 
10). 
 To test expectations related to participants’ stereotypic associations and their 
forced-choice group inclusion assessment, two 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 
(Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) 
univariate ANOVAs were conducted for each cultural group.  No statistically 
significant differences were found in participants’ forced-choice responses based on 
whether they reported stereotypic associations with Arab people or not. 
Reasoning about forced-choice group inclusion.  Analyses for reasoning 




goals.  The first was to understand why children thought the Arab American group 
was more likely to choose an ingroup target over an outgroup target.  The second goal 
was to explain participants’ choices of an ingroup target into their own American 
group and how the participants interpreted their group’s norm (exclusive or inclusive) 
in their forced-choice judgments.  The top three categories of reasoning used for 
forced-choice group inclusion judgments were group functioning, activity 
preferences, and cultural identity.  
Reasoning about the Arab American group’s choices.  To accomplish the 
first goal three paired-sample t-test comparisons were conducted on the proportion of 
group functioning, activity preferences, and cultural identity reasoning used for 
inclusion choices made for the Arab American group compared with the American 
group.  It was found that cultural identity was used significantly more when reasoning 
about choices in the Arab American group than when reasoning about choices in the 
American group, t(188) = 2.42, p < .05, Cohen's d = 0.18 (see Figure 11).  No 
significant differences were found for the use of group functioning reasoning and 
activity preference reasoning between each cultural group. 
 Reasoning about the American group’s choices of an ingroup target.  To 
achieve the second goal of explaining participants’ choices of an ingroup member 
into their own American group and to understand the role of an exclusive or inclusive 
group norm on their choices, only reasoning for those who chose the ingroup target 
was assessed as the dependent variable.  Thus a 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 
(Gender: females, males) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 3 (Reasoning: 




measures on the last factor was conducted for only those participants who chose the 
ingroup target (n = 70).  A main effect for Reasoning was found, F(2,124)= 4.97, p < 
.01, "p
2=.07, showing that participants overall reasoned about including an ingroup 
target with different interests using group functioning reasoning statistically 
significantly more than activity preferences, p < .01, but not significantly more than 
cultural identity (Group functioning : M = .46, SD  = .48; Activity Preferences: M = 
.21, SD  = .40; Cultural Identity : M = .26, SD  = .43).   
A Reasoning " Group Norm interaction effect was found, F(2,124) = 5.26, p < 
.01, "p
2 = .07, indicating that if their group had an inclusive norm of inviting kids who 
were different, participants reasoned about including an ingroup target who had 
different interest using group functioning and activity preferences more so than 
cultural identity, but only statistically significantly more for group functioning, p < 
.01 (see Figure 12).  When the group had an exclusive norm of only inviting similar 
peers, they reasoned about including the American target using group functioning and 
cultural identity significantly more than activity preferences, p < .05 and p < .01 
respectively.  In addition, when their group had an exclusive norm, participants 
reasoned about including an ingroup target based on cultural identity (e.g., “She is 
American just like the group”) more so than when the group had an inclusive norm, p 
< .01, and used activity preferences more so when the group was inclusive than when 
the group was exclusive, p < .05.   
There was also a Reasoning " Group Norm " Age effect, F(2, 124) = 5.00 , p 
< .01, "p
2 = .07.  This showed that the difference in reasoning about choosing an 




groups.  For instance, the use of activity preferences when the group was inclusive 
was driven by adolescents, p < .001 (Activity Preference Reasoning: M12-year-olds = .09, 
SD12-year-olds  = .29; M 16-year-olds = .50, SD 16-year-olds = .50), while the use of group 
functioning reasoning in the same inclusive condition was driven by pre-adolescents, 
p < .01 (Group Functioning Reasoning: M12-year-olds = .65, SD12-year-olds = .47M16-year-olds 
= .28, SD16-year-olds = .45).  Thus indicating that adolescents were explicit about the 
fact that the ingroup target had different interests and this matched the group’s norm 
of liking people who were different.  While younger participants may have realized 
this, they were not very explicit about it and referenced group functioning (e.g., “He’s 
what the group wants”) reasoning more so than older participants and did so more 
than activity preferences p < .001, when the group was inclusive.  In addition, in the 
inclusive group norm condition both younger and older participants used minimal 
references to cultural identity in their reasoning.  Thus cultural identity was used less 
than group functioning (12-year-olds) and activity preferences (16-year-olds), p =.001 
and p <.05, respectively (Cultural Identity Reasoning; M12-year-olds = .13, SD12-year-olds  = 
.34; M16-year-olds = .17, SD16-year-olds = .36).   
When choosing to include an ingroup member with different interests, cultural 
identity was referenced more by both younger and older participants when the group 
was exclusive than when it was inclusive (Cultural Identity Reasoning; Younger: 
MExclusive Norm= .54, SDExclusive Norm  = .50, MInclusive Norm = .13, SD Inclusive Norm  = .34; 
Older: MExclusive Norm= .40, SDExclusive Norm= .52, MInclusive Norm= .17, SDInclusive Norm  = .36 ).  
This difference in use of cultural identity based on the group norm was significant for 




participants to use cultural identity significantly more than activity preferences, p < 
.01 (MCultural Identity= .54, SDCultural Identity= .50, MActivity Preferences = .09, SD Activity Preferences = 
.29) and drove older participants to use group functioning significantly more than 
activity preferences, p < .05 (MGroup functioning= .55, SDGroup functioning= .50, MActivity 
Preferences = .05, SD Activity Preferences = .16).  Thus younger children, who chose to include 
an ingroup target over an outgroup target, were explicit about the cultural similarities.  
Although in the same condition older participants used both cultural identity and 
group functioning, they used higher proportions of group functioning, evidencing a 
more implicit form of cultural ingroup preference.   
Evaluation of the Deviant Act 
Participants were asked to evaluate group members who deviated from an 
inclusive or exclusive group norms by wanted to not invite or invite a target (both 
ingroup and outgroup targets), respectively. Is deviance from an Arab American 
group viewed similarly as deviance from an American group? Was deviance from an 
inclusive group viewed similarly as deviance from an exclusive group? It was 
expected that deviating from a group with an exclusive norm by being inclusive 
would be evaluated positively while deviating from a group with an inclusive norm 
by being exclusive would be evaluated negatively.  To test these expectations two 2 
(Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Gender: females, males)" 2 (Group Norm: 
inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American, American) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted for each target 




An interaction between Group Cultural Identity and Group Norm was found 
for how okay or not okay a deviant was for going against a group’s inclusive or 
exclusive norm for both targets (Outgroup target: F(1, 188) = 194.26, p < .001, "p
2 = 
.50; Ingroup target: F(1, 187) = 218.34, p < .001, "p
2 = .53).  As expected, pairwise 
comparisons showed that for both cultural groups it was more okay to deviate from a 
group’s exclusive norm and invite the target than it was to deviate from a group’s 
inclusive norm and not invite the target, all four ps < .001 (for both targets, see Figure 
13).  Further, pairwise comparisons showed that when evaluating a deviant who did 
not want to invite an outgroup target with similar interests, participants evaluated the 
Arab American group deviant more negatively than the American group deviants, p < 
.001.  No other differences were found based on cultural group.  Thus, participants’ 
evaluations of deviance from an inclusive Arab American (outgroup) were quite 
differently than evaluations of deviance from an inclusive American (ingroup), 
suggesting divergent expectations about the ingroup and outgroup. 
Reasoning about evaluations of the exclusive group deviant. Reasoning 
analyses were conducted to understand why participants evaluated an exclusive Arab 
American deviant more negatively than their own group’s exclusive deviant when 
they each advocated excluding an outgroup target.  Thus three 2 (Age Group: 12 
years, 16 years) " 2 (Gender: females, males) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) 
" 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American, American) ANOVAs were conducted 
using the top three types of reasoning used to justify evaluations of a deviant group 
member in the case when they were challenging their group with respect to inviting or 




categories used were references to social justice/inclusivity, group functioning, and 
autonomy.  Of the three ANOVAs only the one analyzing autonomy produced a 
significant Group Cultural Identity " Group Norm effect, F(1,185) = 4.23, p < .05, 
"p
2 = .02, showing that use of autonomy reasoning varied by whether the group was 
Arab American or American and by group norm.  Pairwise comparisons showed that 
only in the case when the group was inclusive (and when participants were evaluating 
a deviant group member who was being exclusive) did participants attribute more 
autonomy to the American deviant than the Arab American deviant, p < .05 (see 
Figure 14). 
  Further analyses testing hypotheses related to participants’ reasoning as a 
function of their evaluations (not okay or okay) were also conducted, only on 
evaluation of deviants when the target was an outgroup member, to investigate if 
differences existed based on the valence of evaluations and between each type of 
reasoning used.  Two 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Gender: females, males) 
" 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Evaluation: not okay, okay) " 3 
(Reasoning: social justice, group functioning, autonomy) ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the last factor were conducted, one for evaluations of the Arab American 
deviant and one for evaluations of an American deviant.  Okay or not okay 
evaluations were based on a midpoint split of 3.5 for responses to a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = really not okay to 6 = really okay.  This analysis only focused on 
Group Norm " Evaluation " Reasoning effects with planned comparisons to 




related to differences based on evaluation of deviance from exclusive and inclusive 
group norms.  
A Group Norm " Evaluation " Reasoning interaction effect was found only 
for reasoning about the Arab American deviant, F(2, 362) = 7.07, p = .001, "p
2  = .03, 
and not the American deviant.  Planned comparisons showed that in the condition 
where an Arab American was deviating from his or her group’s inclusive norm (by 
not wanting to invite an American target), participants who evaluated this deviant act 
as “not okay” did so by referring to social justice and inclusivity reasoning more so 
than participants who found the act to be “okay”, p < .05 (see Table 8).  Additionally, 
these participants referenced social justice and group functioning more than 
autonomy, p < .001.  Those who thought the deviant’s act was “okay”, however, 
justified their responses using group functioning more than any other type of 
reasoning, ps < .05.  Thus, an exclusive deviant was justified based on concerns for 
group functioning.  On the other hand, in the condition where the Arab American 
deviant went against the group’s exclusive norm (by wanting to invite an American 
target), participants who thought it was “not okay” did so because including the 
outgroup target may threaten group functioning more so than any other type of 
reason, ps < .001.  They also used group functioning more than participants who said 
an inclusive deviant was being “okay”, p < .01.  Lastly, participants who said it was 
acceptable for the Arab American deviant to be inclusive, justified it by referencing 
the deviant’s autonomy, p < .05. 
  Although there was a non-significant Group Norm " Evaluation " Reasoning 




showed that unlike reasoning about the Arab American deviant, participants who 
evaluated the exclusive act of an American deviant to be okay when the target was 
Arab American did so by voicing both concerns about group functioning and the 
deviant’s autonomy more so than social justice/inclusivity reasoning, p < .01 (see 
Table 8).  In addition, those who thought the American exclusive deviant was okay 
used autonomy reasoning more than those who evaluated the act as not okay, p < 
.001.  Thus, showing that autonomy was used to justify exclusive opinions on behalf 
of an American ingroup member but not used for justifying exclusive opinions of an 
Arab American outgroup member. 
Attributions of Group Emotions 
 Analyses for Attributions of Group Emotions in an exclusion context were 
conducted to answer four questions: (a) Do stereotypes effect how participants 
attribute emotions; (b) do participants attribute different emotions to their own group 
than an Arab American group when each group excludes a peer; (c) do participants 
attribute different emotions to a group when it excludes an ingroup target versus 
when it excludes an outgroup target; and (d) do group norms (exclusive and 
inclusive), age, and gender play a role in how participants differentially attribute 
emotions to a group in an exclusion context? To answer the first question, 
correlational analyses were conducted to test whether stereotypic associations were 
related to any type of emotion attributed in an exclusion context.  No statistically 
significant correlations were found between what emotions participants attributed to 
each group for excluding both target and the stereotypic associations they made about 




disconfirming expectations that stereotypic associations about a culturally different 
group would be related to how participants attribute emotions to that group when it 
carries out an exclusion, or when participants’ own group excluded someone from the 
culturally different outgroup. 
Differences based on cultural groups.  To answer the second question, 
paired-sample t-tests were conducted comparing proportions of each emotion (pride, 
gladness, sadness, anger, guilt, apathy, shame) attributed to an Arab American group 
excluding an outgroup/ingroup target, respectively, with emotions attributed to an 
American group excluding an outgroup/ingroup target, respectively.  It was expected 
that more positive emotions would be attributed to an Arab American group for 
excluding an outgroup target with similar interests than an American group.  For 
exclusion of an outgroup target, findings showed that participants attributed more 
sadness, t(195) = -2.04, p < .05, Cohen’s d = -0.18, and guilt, t(195)= -2.49, p = .01, 
Cohen’s d = -0.22 to their own group compared with the Arab American group for, 
but attributed more apathy to the Arab American group than their own group, t(195) = 
3.28, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.27 (see Table 9).  However, when excluding an ingroup 
target participants attributed more sadness, t(191) = -2.54, p < .01, Cohen’s d = -0.24,  
and anger, t(191) = -2.29, p < .05, Cohen’s d = -0.19, to their own American group 
than they did to the Arab American group. 
Differences based on the target of exclusion.  To answer the third question, 
paired-sample t-tests were conducted to test whether more positive emotions were 
attributed to a group excluding an outgroup target compared with excluding an 




excluding an ingroup target versus an outgroup target when the group was American.  
When an Arab American group was carrying out the exclusion, however, attributions 
of emotions differed by the target being excluded.  More pride, t(193) = 2.26, p < .05, 
Cohen’s d = 0.19,  and gladness, t(193) = 2.54, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.20, were 
attributed to the group when excluding an outgroup target than when excluding an 
ingroup target.  Whereas more guilt, t(193) = -2.78, p = .01, Cohen’s d = -0.24, and 
shame, t(193) = -2.39, p < .05, Cohen’s d = -0.18, was attributed to group after it 
excluded their ingroup member versus excluding an outgroup target (see Table 9).  
Overall, variance in the proportion of these emotions used across conditions suggests 
that participants use cultural identity to inform the types of emotions they attribute to 
groups that exclude others. 
Effects of group norms, age, and gender.  The next question was related to 
whether group norms, age, and gender played a role in how participants attributed 
emotions differentially based on the cultural identity of the group and the target of 
exclusion.  To answer this question the emotions that participants saw to differ based 
on the group’s cultural identity and the target’s cultural identity were used.  
Therefore, when attributing emotions to a group that excluded the outgroup target 
three 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Gender: females, males) " 2 (Group 
Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American, American) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the 
proportions of feelings of sadness, guilt, and apathy attributed to each group.  For the 
ingroup target conditions two similar repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted 




already reported and found in the t-tests above only effects of group norms, age, and 
gender will be reported next.   
 For the outgroup target conditions a Group Cultural Identity " Group Norm 
interaction effect was found for attributions of sadness, F(1, 188) = 10.74, p = .01, "p
2 
=.05, and apathy, F(1,188)= 11.75, p = .001, "p
2 =.05, but no effects of group norms 
were found for attributions of guilt.  Thus, when attributing sad emotions to a group 
that excludes an outgroup target, participants attribute the least sadness to an Arab 
American group with an exclusive norm, less than an American group with an 
exclusive norm, and less than an Arab American group with an inclusive norm, ps < 
.001 (Arab American Group: MExclusive = .06, SDExclusive = .24;  MInclusive = .37, SDInclusive  
= .49; American Group: MExclusive = .33, SDExclusive = .47;  MInclusive = .26, SDInclusive  = 
.44).  On the other hand they attribute more apathy to an exclusive Arab American 
group than an exclusive American group or inclusive Arab American group, ps < .001 
(Arab American Group: MExclusive = .60, SDExclusive = .50;  MInclusive = .28, SDInclusive  = 
.45; American Group: MExclusive = .28, SDExclusive = .45;  MInclusive = .33, SDInclusive  = 
.47).   
 Although group norms did not effect how participants attributed guilt to each 
group for excluding an outgroup target, there was a main gender effect, F(1, 188) = 
17.16, p < .001, "2 = .08, showing that females overall attributed more guilt in these 
conditions than males did (MFemales = .63, SDFemales = .40;  MMales = .41, SDMales = .39).  
In the case when exclusion of an ingroup target was taking place, no effects for group 
norm, age, or gender were found for how participants attributed sadness and anger to 




affected the way participants attributed emotions of sadness and apathy when the 
group excluded an outgroup target.  
 To assess the effects of group norm, age, and gender on differential attribution 
of emotions to an Arab American group based on the target’s identity, four 2 (Age 
Group: 12 years, 16 years) " 2 (Gender: females, males) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, 
exclusive) " 2 (Target of Exclusion: outgroup member with similar interests, ingroup 
member with different interests) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor 
were conducted on attributions of pride, gladness, guilt, and shame.  A Target of 
Exclusion " Group Norm interaction effect was found for attributions of pride, 
F(1,186)= 7.54, p < .01, "p
2=.03, and gladness, F(1,186)= 4.88, p < .05, "p
2 =.02, but 
not for guilt and shame.  These effects indicated that more pride was attributed to the 
Arab American group when it excluded an outgroup target compared to when it 
excluded an ingroup target, but only when the group had an exclusive norm, p < .001 
(Outgroup target: MExclusive = .15, SDExclusive = .36;  MInclusive = .06, SDInclusive  = .24; 
Ingroup target: MExclusive = .03, SDExclusive = .18;  MInclusive = .07, SDInclusive  = .26).  
Similarly, only when the group had an exclusive norm, more gladness was attributed 
to the group when it excluded an outgroup target versus an ingroup target (Outgroup 
target: MExclusive = .23, SDExclusive = .42;  MInclusive = .13, SDInclusive  = .34; Ingroup target: 
MExclusive = .11, SDExclusive = .31;  MInclusive = .12, SDInclusive  = .33).  Consequently, 
exclusive group norms held by the Arab American group drove participants to 
attribute more positive emotions of pride and gladness to the group when it excluded 




 A Target of Exclusion " Gender effect was found for both attributions of guilt 
and shame (Guilt: F(1,186)= 4.80, p < .05, "p
2 =.02, Shame: F(1,186)= 7.80, p < .01, 
"p
2 =.04).  These showed that females attributed more guilt and shame than males did 
to an Arab American group when it excluded an outgroup target, ps < .001 for both 
emotions.  Males, however attributed more guilt and shame when the Arab American 
group excluded an ingroup target than when it excluded an outgroup target, ps < .001 
for both emotions (see Table 10). 
 In addition a main effect for Gender was found for attributions of both guilt 
and shame to an Arab American group, (Guilt: F(1,186)= 6.54, p < .05, "p
2 =.03, 
Shame: F(1,186)= 8.07, p < .01, "p
2 =.04) as well as a Gender " Group Norm  
interaction effect (Guilt: F(1,186)= 4.67, p < .05, "p
2 =.02, Shame: F(1,186)= 4.16, p 
< .05, "p
2 =.02).  These effects showed that females attributed more guilt and shame 
to the group than males did, but did so more when the group was inclusive than when 
it was exclusive, ps < .001 (see Table 10).  Thus showing that in this instance girls 
were more attuned to the Arab American group’s inclusive norm than boys were. 
Gender findings related to females attributing more feelings of guilt in exclusion 
contexts are consistent with previous research (Malti et al., 2012). 
Reasoning about attributions of emotions.  Hypotheses about justifications 
for emotions attributed to a group that excludes were based on whether participants 
attributed positive or negative emotions to the group.  It was expected that those who 
attributed negative emotions would reason about it using concerns for social justice, 
fairness, inclusivity, and empathy toward the target of exclusion, but those who 




dynamics, conventions, and functioning.  In order to test these hypotheses it was 
necessary to understand how individual types of emotions attributed (e.g., pride, 
gladness, sadness, anger, guilt, apathy, and shame) would be related to how inclusive 
participants viewed the group to be in each condition.   
 First, a correlational analysis between each type of emotion and participants’ 
group inclusion judgments was conducted. This provided a data-driven and 
theoretically sound grouping of emotions to analyze participants’ reasoning.  Findings 
from the correlational analyses showed that negative emotions, such as sadness, 
anger, guilt, and shame were positively related to participants’ group inclusion 
judgments, suggesting that those who attributed these emotions to a group after it 
excluded a target initially rated the group to be more inclusive toward the target (see 
Table 11).  However, when pre-adolescents and adolescents attributed pride, 
gladness, and apathy, these were negatively related to group inclusion ratings, 
suggesting that participants who attributed these emotions to the group after it 
excluded the target had perceived the group to be less inclusive toward the target.  
Although statistical significance of the correlation varied by condition, the direction 
of the correlation was consistent.   
 Given the findings from the correlational analysis, a new variable was created 
to capture differences between participants’ reasoning about either positive/neutral 
emotions (pride, gladness and apathy) attributed to the group for excluding a target or 
negative emotions attributed (sadness, anger, guilt and shame) but not both.  Based on 
this criteria a Valence of Emotions attributed variable was created for each condition: 




positive/neutral); (b) American group excludes an outgroup target (N = 168, 67% 
negative, 33% positive/neutral); (c) Arab American group excludes an ingroup target 
(N = 161, 65% negative, 35% positive/neutral); and (d) American group excludes an 
ingroup target (N = 161, 68% negative, 32% positive/neutral).  Reasoning in a 
morally relevant way versus reasoning in terms of group dynamics or a socially 
conventional way were the theoretical reasoning categories under consideration for 
the Attribution of Emotions assessment. Therefore, two reasoning categories were 
created, by collapsing the subcategories for reasoning in the moral domain (collapsed 
social justice/inclusivity and psychological harm/empathy), and reasoning in the 
societal domain (group dynamics reasoning collapsed subcategories of group 
functioning, activities, cultural identity, stereotypes, and group diversity).   
 To test hypotheses related to valence of emotions and reasoning used when 
attributing emotions to a group that excludes, four 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) 
" 2 (Gender: females, males) " 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) " 2 (Valence of 
Emotion: negative, positive) " 2 (Reasoning: moral, group dynamics) ANOVAs with 
repeated measures on the last factor were conducted for each condition: (a) Arab 
American group excludes an outgroup target; (b) American group excludes an 
outgroup target; (c) Arab American group excludes an ingroup target; and (d) 
American group excludes an ingroup target.  A main effect for domain of reasoning 
was found for each condition (Condition a: F(1,143) = 18.88, p < .001, "p
2 = .11; 
Condition b: F(1, 145) = 53.47, p < .001, "p
2 = .2; Condition c: F(1, 145) = 43.75, p < 
.001, "p
2 =.23; Condition d: F(1, 143) = 25.49, p < .001, "p
2 =.15).  This showed that 




doesn’t like to do the same things”) was used statistically significantly more than 
moral reasoning (e.g., “They excluded a perfectly good person” or “They made her 
feel left out.”) in all conditions (Condition a: MMoral = .38, SDMoral = .49; MGroup Dynamics 
= .66, SDGroup Dynamics  = .48; Condition b: MMoral = .29, SDMoral = .45;  MGroup Dynamics = 
.70, SDGroup Dynamics  = .46; Condition c: MMoral = .44, SDMoral = .50;  MGroup Dynamics = 
.68, SDGroup Dynamics  = .47; Condition d: MMoral = .33, SDMoral = .47;  MGroup Dynamics = 
.65, SDGroup Dynamics  = .48).   
 In addition a Reasoning " Valence of Emotions interaction effect was found 
for all conditions (Condition a: F(1,143)= 26.82, p < .001, "p
2 =.15; Condition b: 
F(1,145)= 13.67, p < .001, "p
2 =.08; Condition c: F(1,145)= 46.75, p < .001, "p
2 =.24; 
Condition d: F(1,143)= 13.48, p < .001, "p
2 =.08).  These findings confirmed 
expectations that when attributing positive/neutral emotions to a group after it 
excludes a target, participants justified their attributions using significantly more 
group dynamics reasoning than moral reasoning, all ps < .001 (see Figure 15).  
However, when attributing negative emotions, such as sadness and guilt to a group 
that excludes, participants used group dynamics reasoning as much as moral 
reasoning except in the case of the American group excluding an outgroup target.  In 
this condition, group dynamics were referenced more than moral concerns when 
justifying why the group would feel sad, guilty, angry, or ashamed about excluding an 
outgroup member with similar interests, p < .001, perhaps because the Arab 
American that was being excluded shared an interest in activities with the American 




target fit into the group.  Thus, the group would feel bad for excluding an outgroup 
target because that target liked the same things as the group.   
 Pairwise comparisons also showed that participants used statistically 
significantly more moral reasoning when they attributed negative emotions than when 
they attributed positive emotions, all ps < .001 for each condition (see Figure 15).  
References to group dynamics, however, were used significantly more when 
attributing positive emotions than when attributing negative emotions, with ps < .001 
for the Arab American group conditions and ps < .05 for the American group 
conditions.  A Reasoning " Age interaction effect was found for when the Arab 
American group excluded an ingroup target with different interests, F(1,145)= 11.14, 
p = .001, "p
2 = .07.  This effect showed that younger participants referenced moral 
reasoning more than older participants, p <.05, (Younger: MMoral = .55, SDMoral = .50;  
MGroup Dynamics = .56, SDGroup Dynamics  = .50; Older: MMoral = .32, SDMoral = .47;  MGroup 
Dynamics = .81, SDGroup Dynamics  = .39).  Older participants, however, used more group 
dynamics reasoning than younger participants when justifying the emotions they 
attributed to an Arab American group who excluded an ingroup target, p < .01.  While 
younger participants reasoned using similar proportions of each type of reasoning, 
older participants used group dynamics reasoning significantly more than moral 
reasoning, p <.001, thus showing how salient group dynamics concerns are to 
adolescents when thinking about how an outgroup would feel about excluding a 







Chapter 5: Discussion 
Inclusion Judgments: The Group, the Individual, and Forced-choice Decisions 
 Past research on social exclusion has shown that children and adolescents 
most often reject gender- and race-based exclusion (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).  
Less is known about the conditions under which children expect peer groups to 
exclude others, and particularly in cross-cultural encounters.  The findings from this 
study addressed this gap by assessing pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ expectations 
regarding groups’ cross-cultural inclusion decisions.  Consistent with previous 
assessments revealing that children and adolescents find exclusion to be 
unacceptable, pre-adolescents and adolescents in the current study were generally 
optimistic and expected that peer groups would be inclusive toward both cultural 
ingroup and outgroup targets.  There were, however, specific conditions under which 
non-Arab participants, expressed uncertainty in their expectations in the context of 
Arab American and American (non-Arab) peer groups.   
A novel finding from this study identified these conditions to be: (1) when an 
Arab American group was making a decision to include an American outgroup target 
that had similar interests in activities, particularly in the condition in which the group 
had an exclusive norm; and (2) when an exclusive American group was making a 
decision to include an ingroup member who had different interests in activities than 
the group.  In essence, when groups had norms to invite others who were ‘similar’ to 
them, both pre-adolescents and adolescents were less certain that an Arab American 
outgroup would be inclined to invite an American into their group despite having 




American with different interests despite having the same cultural identity.  In 
addition, irrespective of the group norm, participants expected Arab American peers 
to be more inclusive of members of their own cultural group than members of a 
cultural outgroup (American).   
These findings together suggest that non-Arab American participants 
perceived Arab American peers to be less cross-culturally inclusive than they 
perceived their own American peers.  Thus, participants attributed a more positive 
trait of inclusivity to their own group than they did to the Arab American outgroup.  
This finding is in line with the Social Identity theory assumption that individuals seek 
to enhance their ingroup’s positivity to maintain positive self-concepts (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).  However, in this particular case in which the outgroup was associated 
with a cultural outgroup (Arab descent), and the ingroup was American, ingroup 
‘positivity’ was in reference to inclusive behavior.  According to Turner’s (1978) 
Social Categorization theory, such need to enhance ingroup positivity motivates 
individuals to create further distinctions with outgroups.  Therefore, although 
children’s group inclusion responses reflected uncertainty about the Arab American 
group inviting an American peer, further distinctions between an Arab American 
outgroup and an American ingroup might lead to the expectation that Arab peers are 
exclusive.  These expectations may impede possibilities for peers from either cultural 
group to become friends or interact in positive ways that lead to less intergroup bias 
(Tropp & Prenovost, 2008). 
Interestingly, this study revealed that when primed with an exclusive group 




adolescents and adolescents assumed the Arab American group would conceptualize 
‘similarity’ based on a shared cultural identity, but ‘similarity’ for the American 
ingroup was conceptualized in terms of a shared interest in activities.  This finding 
supported expectations drawn from a study by McGlothlin and Killen (2005) that 
measured perceived similarity between Black and White same-race dyads with 
different interests in activities, and found that European American children (6- and 9-
years-old) viewed a same-race Black dyad with different interests in activities to be 
more similar than a White dyad that had different interests in activities.  Their 
findings reflected a phenomenon known as the outgroup homogeneity effect that has 
been found in adults (Ryan et al., 1996) and children in other countries (Barrett et al., 
2003; Nesdale, Maass, Griffiths, & Durkin, 2003).  An outgroup homogeneity effect 
is found when individuals perceive outgroup members to be more similar to one 
another than ingroup members and thus, they perceive more diversity within their 
own group than an outgroup. 
 In the current study, the effect manifests in a unique way, and represents 
expectations or a perception regarding how each cultural group defines similarity.  
Thus, while in McGlothlin and Killen (2005) children perceived outgroup same-race 
dyads that did not share the same interests as similar (based on their race), in the 
current study pre-adolescents and adolescents perceived that an outgroup would judge 
similarity based on matching cultural identity.  Conversely, whereas children in the 
McGlothlin and Killen (2005) study perceived ingroup same-race dyads with 
different interests as different (based on differences in activity preferences), in the 




ingroup member who did not share the same interests in activities (e.g., “He’s more 
different because he likes to do other things”).  Thus pre-adolescents’ and 
adolescents’ manifestation of the outgroup homogeneity effect in the current study 
shows a form of social cognitive sophistication as it reflects judgments about 
concepts of similarities held by groups.  This is evidence of a form of Theory of 
Social Mind (Abrams et al., 2009), in which participants use their knowledge about 
groups having different values and beliefs to make predictions about how groups 
might behave. 
These differential attributions of “similarity” based on cultural group identity 
were robust, as they mapped onto how participants reasoned about group inclusion 
judgments and their forced-choice assessments.  Pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ 
justifications for their inclusion judgments when both groups had exclusive norms 
focused on cultural identity (e.g.  “She’s Arab like them”) when reasoning about the 
Arab American group and on group functioning (e.g., “They’ll get along better”) or 
activity preferences (e.g., “He likes the same things as the group”) when reasoning 
about the American group.  These findings extend findings reported in McGlothlin 
and Killen (2005), in that given an older sample such as the one in the current study; 
cultural identity justifications were captured with much greater frequency than with 
the younger sample (6- and 9-year-olds) in McGlothlin and Killen (2005).  This high 
frequency of cultural identity justifications allowed for analyses of age-related 
differences.   
Age and gender findings.  Notably, age and gender differences were found in 




entry into an exclusive group.  Particularly, when justifying the likelihood of 
inclusion of an ingroup target with different interests, pre-adolescent girls showed the 
highest frequency of references to cultural identity, followed by adolescent boys.  
This finding evidences the salience of cultural identity for young females and older 
males in a context where a cultural ingroup member with different interests seeks 
entry into an exclusive group.  It is possible that the motivation for using cultural 
identity is different for each group (pre-adolescent girls and adolescent boys).  
Females judge intergroup exclusion as more wrong than do males in several studies 
with ethnic majority American children, possibly because of having more experiences 
with exclusion, such as in the area of sports and math (Killen & Stangor, 2001; 
Leman, Ahmed, & Ozarow, 2005).  References to cultural identity may reflect an 
appeal to the similar characteristics that may get an ingroup target invited instead of 
excluded, however; why that might change from pre-adolescence to adolescence for 
girls is not clear.  In contrast, adolescent males have been found to focus on group 
identity when considering intergroup relations, such that they are less favorable in 
their attitudes about outgroup members (Ajdukovic & Biruski, 2008; Leman, Keller, 
Takezawa, & Gummerum, 2009) but more favorable toward ingroup members. 
Therefore they may be making decisions based on mere identity affiliation.  However 
to fully understand these patterns, further research should investigate the motivations 
for gender differences in inclusion decisions based on cultural identity. 
As documented in previous research regarding acceptability of race-based 
exclusion (Brenick et al., 2007; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002), participants in this 




be likely to exclude an Arab American outgroup target.  Group functioning reasoning 
can be used as a proxy for stereotypes and outgroup prejudice, suggesting implicit 
expressions of intergroup bias (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).  For example, when 
justifying why an American group would not include an Arab American target, the 
participants who used group functioning, stating, “they won’t get along” could be 
attending to cultural differences as a barrier for group functionality.  What was 
noteworthy in this study and has not been documented before was that unlike 
reasoning about an American group, group functioning was not the dominant type of 
reasoning when justifying exclusive expectations on behalf of the Arab American 
group.  In those instances, participants used cultural identity, evidencing that 
participants differentiate between justifications for exclusive behavior by their own 
group and a culturally different outgroup. 
Compatible with how participants’ reasoned about including an ingroup 
target, important developmental and gender differences appeared when judging the 
likelihood that a group would include an outgroup target.  These findings showed that 
16-year-olds expected both groups to be less inclusive toward outgroup targets 
despite sharing an interest in activities, and mainly 16-year-old boys drove this 
finding.  Although this pattern existed for both cultural groups, it was stronger for 
inclusion expectations in the American group.  Thus, 16-year-old boys were not as 
certain that their own group would be as inclusive toward an Arab American as it 
would be toward an ingroup American target.  Research on social exclusion has found 
that although both children and adolescents reject exclusion, children (9 to 11-years-




majorities (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).  Other research has also shown that 
adolescent males display more outgroup prejudice (Ajdukovic & Biruski, 2008) and 
are less generous in intergroup resource allocation than females are (Leman et al., 
2009).  Thus, the finding from the current study extends past research to evidence that 
in contexts of Arab American and American groups, adolescent boys who represent 
both ethnic minorities and majorities place much emphasis on group identities and 
expect groups to make inclusion judgments based on cultural identity.   
Individual inclusion likelihood versus group inclusion likelihood.  It is 
important to note that in line with previous research (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012), 
children’s own individual judgments differed from how they expected their American 
group would behave.  Both pre-adolescents and adolescents displayed more 
inclusivity irrespective of the target’s cultural identity.  In addition, their reasoning 
reflected a focus on personal preferences and the target’s personality as opposed to 
cultural identity.  The discrepancy between their own inclusivity and what they 
expected of the group was strongest in the condition when their own group had an 
exclusive norm and was judging inclusion of an ingroup target with different 
interests.   
Recent research has shown children and adolescents distinguish between their 
own preferences and what decisions they expect groups would make, especially in 
instances when a group holds a norm that goes against moral values or socially 
acceptable conventional norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  Findings from this 
previous research indicated that adolescents (13-year-olds) preferred ingroup 




the group would, but children (9-year-olds) did not make this distinction.  Such 
developmental differences between expectations about groups and individual 
preferences were not found in the current study perhaps because the youngest age 
group was 12-year-olds, and by this age, children have acquired the cognitive ability 
to differentiate their own point of view from the group’s point of view in the context 
of Arab and non-Arab American groups.  This ability is equivalent to acquiring 
Theory of Social Mind which has been shown to increase with age in children 6 to 
11-years-old (Abrams et al., 2009). In this current study’s cross-cultural context such 
differentiation between individual opinion and group opinion was shown to extend 
into middle adolescence. 
When expressing individual preferences about an outgroup target, pre-
adolescents and adolescents rarely used cultural identity but instead referenced 
personal preferences and the target’s personality.  This type of reasoning was used 
mostly by adolescents to justify the likelihood that they would exclude the outgroup 
target more so than pre-adolescents and more so than when justifying inclusivity 
likelihood.  This is consistent with previous research that shows personal choice 
reasoning for judgments about exclusion are used more by middle adolescents than 
early adolescents or younger children (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002), but it extends 
such research to show that it is mainly used to justify exclusive judgments and not 
inclusive judgments.  When adolescents justified individual inclusive judgments, they 
referenced activity preferences more so than personal preferences or personality 
considerations.   




shift in how girls reason about inclusivity of outgroup members, showing that pre-
adolescent girls focused on group functioning (e.g., “She could be a good fit”) more 
than older girls, while adolescent girls focused on personal preferences and 
personality issues (e.g., “I like meeting different people” or “We might not get along 
if we have different personalities”).  Younger boys were more concerned with activity 
preferences and focused on the fact that the outgroup target shares the same interests 
as their own group, more so than any other reasons.  These findings provide new 
insights into the factors that pre-adolescents and adolescents consider when giving 
their own opinion about the likelihood that they would include a cultural outgroup 
into their peer group. 
Forced decisions about inclusion into peer groups.  How did pre-
adolescents and adolescents respond to a forced choice between inviting an ingroup 
or outgroup target? This assessment is conceptually different from asking participants 
to assess the likelihood of inclusion. By explicitly stating practical constraints to 
inclusivity (e.g., “There is room to invite only one more person.”), it challenges 
participants to select one target over the other.  The consequence of this decision is 
that one target is, in essence, excluded.  Therefore, the assessment helps identify what 
factors pre-adolescents and adolescence give priority to when including members into 
peer groups at the expense of excluding someone else.   
In the current study, participants overwhelmingly expected the Arab American 
group to choose an ingroup target with different interests irrespective of the group’s 
norm. When choosing to invite someone into their own American group, however, 




particularly so when the group had an exclusive norm.  Thus, participants were more 
sensitive to group norms when assessing their own group than when assessing an 
outgroup.  Previous research has shown that children’s intergroup attitudes are 
affected by their ingroup norms (Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005), and adolescents are 
attuned to both ingroup and outgroup norms when making group decisions (Killen, 
Rutland, et al., 2012).  The current study captures a unique extension to previous 
research by documenting the effects of group norms on pre-adolescents’ and 
adolescents’ inclusion decisions concerning their own group, but also documenting 
the lack of such effects when judging forced inclusion decisions of another cultural 
outgroup.  This may reflect difficulty in taking the perspective of a cultural outgroup, 
perhaps because other factors, such as attributions of cultural exclusivity are 
interfering in participants’ forced judgments about the Arab American group.   
In addition, participants’ forced-choice group inclusion findings provide 
strong evidence that shared interests are salient in making inclusion decisions into 
one’s peer group in this sample of non-Arab American ethnically diverse pre-
adolescents and adolescents.  This also means that individuals who have (or are 
perceived of having) different interests in activities are prone to exclusion irrespective 
of their cultural or ethnic background.  It is often the case in the peer relations 
literature that individual characteristics are confounded with group membership 
(Killen, Mulvey, et al., 2012); therefore, it is not known if peers are rejected based on 
individual characteristics or assumptions made about their cultural/ethnic group.  The 
former finding provides evidence that when making friends, having shared interests in 




discussed in the following section, that stereotypic assumptions about cultures 
influence how willing someone is to interact with an outgroup.   
Given that having shared interests is very salient when making inclusion 
decisions, especially if your group has an exclusive norm, then what motivated 
participants to chose an ingroup target who did not share the same interests as the 
group over an outgroup target who did?  Analyses of participants’ justifications 
demonstrated that participants made this decision citing cultural identity and group 
functioning more so than activity preferences.  The use of cultural identity references 
was predominant in pre-adolescents, while the use of group functioning was found 
mostly in adolescents, thus showing a developmental shift in reasoning about 
inclusion of ingroup members.  Explicit use of cultural identity as a reason to include 
a member of ones cultural ingroup wanes in adolescence, providing support that 
group functioning reasoning in adolescence could be evidence of an implicit bias. 
The Role of Stereotypes on Inclusion Judgments 
Two forms of stereotypes were captured and found to influence decision-
making in peer group contexts that include Arab American and American groups.  
The first was discussed to some extent in the previous section and is in reference to 
pre-adolescents and adolescents’ perceptions that Arab American groups would make 
inclusion decisions based on cultural identity as opposed to shared interests in 
activities.  Thus, participants expected that groups composed of peers of Arab descent 
would behave in exclusive ways toward non-Arab peers.  When compared with 
expectations that their own American group would make decisions based on shared 




misattribution is being made based on a social category (Hewstone, 1990).  However, 
this stereotype was held by an ethnically diverse sample of 12- and 16-year-olds 
irrespective of age, only 33% of which presented factual knowledge about how to 
define an Arab, and only 21% had a vague general concept about the Arab identity 
(e.g., "From a county in Asia, next to Pakistan").  Although those who had knowledge 
about who Arabs were, also reported a higher percentages of stereotypic associations 
than those who did not have factual knowledge, further research must be conducted to 
assess whether the stereotype about cultural exclusivity is specific to the social 
category ‘Arab’ or is generalizable to any other cultural outgroup (e.g., Latin 
American, Asian American).   
 The second form of stereotypes measured in the current study was 
spontaneous trait attributions of someone who was Arab.  Surprisingly, a minority of 
responses referenced negative stereotypes related to aggression and terrorism, despite 
the plethora of media messages that associate Arabs with terrorism or aggressive 
behavior (Shaheen, 2003).  The largest proportion of spontaneous attributions were 
related to physical markers, such as skin tone, hair, and eyes, and these were followed 
by generalizations about an Arab person’s faith or religious affiliations, and then by 
generalizations about cultural customs, such as food and clothing.  Given that past 
research has captured spontaneous stereotypic reasoning responses in children’s and 
adolescents’ reasoning about race and gender exclusion (Brenick et al., 2007; Killen, 
Lee-Kim, et al., 2002), and no research to date assessed the direct relation between 
stereotypic associations made with a social category and inclusion or exclusion 




time, it was found that pre-adolescents and adolescents who readily made stereotypic 
associations perceived groups to be less inclusive to cultural outgroup targets despite 
them sharing the same interest in activities as the groups.  Those who did not make 
stereotypic associations (47%) were more inclusive toward cultural outgroup targets.  
This trend was strongest when reporting expectations about one’s own American 
group.  Therefore, participants who made stereotypic associations about Arab people 
expected their own group to be less inclusive toward an outgroup target than those 
who did not make stereotypic associations.  This finding went beyond expectations 
about how their group would behave, also appearing in their own individual 
judgments about how likely they were personally to include an Arab American into 
their own American group.   
An important finding was that the effects of stereotypic associations on 
expectations about how an American group makes inclusion decisions were strongest 
when the group had an exclusive norm and non-existent when it had an inclusive 
norm.  This finding is important because it has implications for stereotype and 
prejudice reduction interventions.  It implies that inclusive group norms can mitigate 
the effects of stereotypes on children’s inclusion decisions.  The positive effects of 
inclusive group or school norms have also been found in studies assessing children’s 
(7 to 10-years-old) favorability of ingroup and outgroup members (Nesdale & 
Lawson, 2011; Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005).  The current study extends this research 
in two ways: first, by assessing inclusive and exclusive norms in the context of 
intergroup decisions to include others rather than favorability judgments about 




they provide evidence that inclusive group norms moderate the effects of stereotypes 
on inclusion judgment.  Pre-adolescents and adolescents who hold stereotypes about 
an outgroup avoid relying on these stereotypes when their group has an inclusive 
norm.  Therefore, promoting inclusive group norms of ‘inviting other’s who are 
different’ encourages children and adolescents to suppress stereotypic associations 
that they have formed and emboldens them to be more inclusive and have interactions 
with peers from a different culture. 
There were no age-related patterns in how stereotypes affected inclusion 
judgments.  However, in contrast to only 36% of the 12-year-olds, 70% of the 16-
year-olds reported stereotypic associations.  Moreover, 16-year-olds were less 
inclusive toward outgroup targets than were the 12-year-olds; perhaps because the 
stereotypic associations contributed to their exclusive orientations.  Findings from 
research on social identity development show that in late childhood through 
adolescence, concepts about group identities are based on beliefs, values, status 
differences, and stereotypes (Bennett, 2011).  While the current study sheds light on 
these age-related shifts, a direct connection between stereotypic expectations and 
exclusion judgments in adolescents remains to be further investigated.   
Group Dynamics and Deviance from Groups 
 According to the Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics model, children 
make decisions about outgroup members in congruence with what they know about 
group norms adopted by both their ingroup and their outgroup.  Research from this 
perspective showed that by 12 years children focus less on group identity to evaluate 




norms (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003).  Recent findings show that children and 
adolescents are more accepting of deviant group members who challenge norms that 
violate moral values, such as distributing money unequally irrespective of the 
deviant’s identity (i.e., both ingroup deviants and outgroup deviants) than deviants 
who challenge moral norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012).  Extending previous 
findings that addressed deviance from norms about resource distribution, the findings 
from this study show a similar pattern for deviance from norms about being exclusive 
or inclusive.  Thus, irrespective of age and the cultural identity of the group or target, 
pre-adolescents and adolescents were more positive toward a group member who 
challenged his or her exclusive group norm by espousing inclusivity than they were 
toward a deviant member who challenged an inclusive norm.  This overwhelming 
approval of inclusive deviant group members is further evidence that inclusivity is 
viewed as a positive generic norm within this sample and deviance from such a norm 
is not accepted.   
 Ingroup bias was demonstrated in the present study by the findings regarding 
evaluations of deviants who challenged inclusive group norms by being exclusive, 
specifically toward an outgroup target.  It was found that both pre-adolescents and 
adolescents showed less acceptance of an Arab American deviant who advocated 
exclusion of an American target than an American deviant who advocated exclusion 
of an Arab American target.  This suggests that exclusion of outgroup members may 
be tolerated when it comes to one’s own group and less so when it is being suggested 
by a cultural outgroup.  In fact, participants who said it was not okay for an Arab 




inclusivity concerns as well as group functioning concerns given that the outgroup 
target had similar interests in activities as the group.  The few who said it was okay 
did so because they thought that the target would not be a good fit for the Arab 
American group.  On the other hand, when evaluating an American deviant who 
advocated exclusion of an Arab American, those who thought it was okay to exclude 
the Arab American target did so by referencing group functioning and the deviants 
right to his or her opinion within the group.  Thus, recognizing that members of one’s 
own group could have their own opinion and be autonomous; however when it comes 
to deviant members of an outgroup less autonomy is attributed, especially when 
voicing exclusive sentiment toward outgroup targets.   
 This is consistent with findings that documented the outgroup homogeneity 
effect (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005; Nesdale, Griffiths, Durkin, & Maass, 2007), but 
the current finding reflected recognition of heterogeneity of opinion within one’s own 
group and not within an outgroup.  This is a manifestation of the outgroup 
homogeneity effect in the context of deviance from Arab American and American 
peer groups when members were advocating exclusion of outgroup targets, thus 
representing differential understandings of group dynamics based on the cultural 
identity of the group (e.g., “In my culture groups work this way, but in other cultures 
groups work differently”).   
Developmental differences were expected based on previous findings that 
adolescents would be more accepting of deviance from groups because of their focus 
on autonomy (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012), but none were found as it appears in this 




group norm considerations.  Thus, participants’ understanding of group processes 
differed based on the cultural identity of the group.  This is related to previous 
findings that showed children’s evaluations about outgroups, defined by arbitrary 
group assignment or nationality, differed from their evaluations about their ingroup 
(Abrams, 2011; Abrams et al., 2009) with respect to how much they would like 
deviant members who challenged group norms about loyalty.  The current study 
extends previous research by finding that expectations about inclusion and 
evaluations of group members who challenge inclusive norms differ based on the 
cultural identity of the group in question.  Similarly, in the following section, 
differential attributions of emotions to groups based on cultural identity will also be 
discussed. 
Attributing Emotions to Groups that Exclude: Cultural Identity, Group Norms, 
and Reasoning 
In previous research assessing attributions of emotions in intergroup exclusion 
contexts, adolescents were asked to attribute emotions to an individual excluder 
(Malti et al., 2012), however, in the current study, emotions were attributed to a 
group of excluders.  Other research that measures differential attributions of uniquely 
human and non-uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups (Paladino et al., 
2002; Vaes et al., 2003; Vezzali et al., 2012) has shown that children attribute 
uniquely human emotions (e.g., happiness and guilt) more to ingroup members than 
non-uniquely human emotions (e.g., excitement and anger) (Vezzali et al., 2012).   




to attribute more empathic emotions (e.g., sadness and guilt) to their own group for 
excluding a target than they did to the Arab American group.   
 What was novel in the current study was that group norms were 
experimentally manipulated with a design that allowed for the assessment of effects 
of both inclusive and exclusive group norms on children’s interpretations of how a 
group reacts to excluding someone.  For example, groups with inclusive norms that 
choose to exclude a target are violating their group norm, and it was of interest to 
learn what children attended to in such instances when attributing emotion (i.e., the 
violation of a group norm or the injustice to the target caused by the exclusion). It 
was found that group norms did influence how pre-adolescents and adolescents 
attributed emotions, but stereotypic associations did not.  
Children and adolescents judge exclusion to be unacceptable under certain 
conditions because it causes psychological harm to the excluder or is carried out for 
unfair reasons (Killen, Rutland, & Jampol, 2008).  Because of the negative 
consequences of exclusion, it was expected that individuals would perceive a group to 
feel bad (negatively) after excluding someone.  In attributing emotions to others or to 
groups, much perspective-taking must be employed (Harwood & Farrar, 2006), 
especially in intergroup exclusion contexts where group norms and cultural identity 
are salient.  Identification with one’s group has also been shown to moderate 
emotional reactions about group members who undergo bullying behavior (Jones, 
Bombieri, Livingstone, & Manstead, 2012).  Therefore, if one’s own group had a 
group norm to be exclusive, a member may feel good about excluding someone 




the harm in exclusion and can more easily take their own group’s perspective, they 
might think that their own group would feel worse about excluding someone than an 
outgroup. The findings in the current study provided clarity on how pre-adolescents 
and adolescents attribute emotions to groups in an intergroup exclusion context. 
Confirming expectations, the cultural identity of the group, the group’s norm, 
and the cultural identity of the target of exclusion all factored into how pre-
adolescents and adolescents attributed emotions in an exclusion context.  More 
negative emotions (sadness and guilt) were attributed to one’s own American group 
for excluding an outgroup target with similar interests, but more apathy was attributed 
to an Arab American group for excluding the same target.  Attributions of sadness 
and apathy were related to whether the group had an exclusive norm or not and 
therefore, an exclusive Arab American group was attributed the least frequency of 
sadness but the most frequency of apathy when it excluded and outgroup target than 
an inclusive group or an exclusive American group.  Pre-adolescents and adolescents 
reported that their own group would feel sadder and angrier for excluding an ingroup 
target than an Arab American group would, but group norms did not bear on 
attributions in this context. 
Surprisingly, when comparing attributions of emotions for excluding an 
ingroup target versus an outgroup target for each group, no differences by target of 
exclusion were found for the American group, thus indicating that participants did not 
discriminate between how their group would feel about excluding either target.  Thus, 
they indicated their group would feel sad, guilty, ashamed and sometimes apathetic 




participants did differentiate in how they attributed emotions for exclusion of either 
target.  In this case, they expected that the Arab American group would feel more 
pride and gladness for excluding an outgroup target compared with excluding an 
ingroup target but would feel more guilt and shame for excluding an ingroup target.  
This is in line with how children and adolescents expected the group would make 
inclusion decisions (i.e., those that favor inclusion of ingroup target over an outgroup 
target will feel bad about excluding an ingroup target and good about excluding an 
outgroup target).  Group norms factored into how proud and glad the group would 
feel, with the most pride and gladness attributed to the exclusive Arab American 
group for excluding the outgroup target. 
More positive emotions and less negative emotions were attributed to an Arab 
American group for excluding an American, but these were contingent on whether the 
group had an exclusive norm or not.  These findings extend recent research on 
bullying indicating that having competitive norms elicits more pride in an ingroup 
bully than in conditions in which cooperative norms are emphasized (Jones et al., 
2012).  Given that the ability to accurately attribute emotions helps children judge 
whether a moral transgression has occurred or not (Turiel & Killen, 2010), this ability 
may help reduce intergroup prejudice, by reducing misattributions of negative 
intentions in intergroup interactions (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010).  
The current study’s findings indicate that exclusive social norms might encourage 
individuals to misattribute emotions in intergroup exclusion contexts and deter them 




other hand, can help individuals avoid misattributions of emotions and thus improve 
cross-cultural peer interactions. 
Consistent with previous research (Malti et al., 2012) gender differences were 
found revealing that females attributed more guilt and shame to an Arab American 
group for excluding an outgroup target than males did.  However, extending previous 
research and providing the other half of the story, it was found that boys attributed 
more guilt and shame than girls did when the Arab American group excluded an 
ingroup member.  This finding reemphasizes that boys are attuned to group identity 
(Ajdukovic & Biruski, 2008; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Leman et al., 2009) and expect 
groups to base decisions on group identity; therefore, according to the findings in this 
study, boys think an Arab American group would feel better about excluding an 
outgroup target than an ingroup target.  Also extending findings from the Malti, 
Killen & Gasser (2012) study, females attributed more guilt and shame than males 
did, but did so more in contexts when the group was violating its inclusive norm. 
Thus females displayed a higher sensitivity to inclusive group norms than boys did 
specifically when attributing emotions to an inclusive outgroup (Arab American 
group) that excludes someone based on culture. 
Further extending findings from Malti et al. (2011) that found significant 
correlations between exclusion judgments and emotions attributed to individual 
excluders, the current study shows similar patterns for emotions attributed to a group 
that excludes.  Thus, if participants expected the group to be inclusive toward an 




excluded.  Similarly, if they expected the group to be exclusive, they attributed more 
positive or neutral (apathy) emotions to the group when it carried out exclusion.   
Extending past research (Malti et al., 2012), concerns for violations of group 
norms when excluding someone who might have been perceived as a good match 
were also expressed in pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ reasoning.  Assessing 
participants’ reasoning about how they attributed emotions provided an opportunity to 
investigate the interplay of cognition and emotions.  For the first time, participants’ 
reasoning about the emotions attributed in an exclusion context were linked to the 
valence of the emotion attributed.  For example, positive attributions of emotions 
were justified overwhelmingly using references to group dynamics.  Contrary to 
expectations that moral reasoning would be predominantly used when attributing 
negative emotions, pre-adolescent and adolescents used both group dynamics 
reasoning and moral reasoning.  Therefore, they were justifying negative emotions 
attributed to a group by referencing concerns for social justice and harm inflicted onto 
the target as well as concerns for going against group interests in carrying out such an 
exclusion.  However, in the condition in which their own group was excluding an 
Arab American with similar interests, participants attributed negative emotions to 
their group more so because of group dynamics considerations than for moral 
reasons, citing their concerns that the target had similar interests and would have been 
a good fit.  Use of moral reasoning in this context was accompanied by use of group 
dynamics reasoning in an effort to balance salient contextual factors such as empathy 
toward the target, violations of group norms and target characteristics, which are 




the multidimensionality of exclusion (i.e., both moral and societal considerations are 
incorporated) was translated into the way emotions are attributed to groups that 
exclude. 
A novel developmental finding shows that in the context of an Arab American 
group excluding an ingroup target with different interests, pre-adolescents maintained 
the dual use of moral and group dynamics reasoning when attributing emotions, 
whereas adolescents used less moral reasoning and overwhelmingly more group 
dynamics reasoning.  This is contrary to previous research that assessed judgments 
about exclusion and found that, although adolescents reference group functioning 
matters more than younger children, they continued to maintain moral concerns about 
exclusion (Killen et al., 2006).  However, in the current study, when attributions of 
emotions were assessed instead of judgments about exclusion, adolescents 
overwhelmingly relied on concerns about group dynamics to justify either positive or 
negative emotions attributed to an Arab American group excluding an ingroup target.  
Adolescents in the current sample did report more stereotypes than pre-adolescents, 
so it is possible that this may be influencing their reasoning about the outgroup.  
Further investigations must be conducted linking emotional attributions based on 
social categories and the stereotypes associated with them. 
In contrast, the stereotypic associations made in this study were not related to 
participants’ emotional attributions.  This disconfirmed expectations that there would 
be a significant relation because stereotypes associated with Arab people are 
emotionally charged (Dasgupta et al., 2009).  One possible explanation is that few 




could be emotionally salient, which was not enough to influence emotional 
attributions.  Data collected from the pilot for the current study showed a higher 
proportion of negative stereotypes in a slightly higher socioeconomic status 
population. Therefore, further research exploring the connection between the role of 
negative stereotypes and how children attribute emotions in intergroup exclusion 
contexts must be conducted in different populations.  Although no explicit stereotypic 
associations were found to influence participants’ attribution of emotions to a group 
in an exclusion context, participants did make differential attributions based on the 
group’s cultural identity and the identity of the target of exclusion.  These differences 
provide support for the implicit role played by stereotypic assumptions (McGlothlin 
& Killen, 2005) about a cultural outgroup on the ability for an individual to take an 
outgroup’s perspective.   
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 Understanding attitudes about peers of Arab descent is important in the 
context of increasing migration of Arab families into the United States due to conflict 
and civil war in the Arab world.  As non-Arab American children begin to interact 
with Arab peers, the findings in this study provide teachers, counselors, and 
administrators with some guidance on how to best facilitate positive inter-cultural 
relationships.  Authority figures in both the school settings and at home can help 
mitigate false perceptions about cultural outgroups, by providing children with 
accurate information and opportunities for positive interactions (Killen, Rutland, & 




Given the little knowledge about who Arabs are and the infrequent contact 
with peers of Arab descent found in the current sample of pre-adolescents and 
adolescents, it was not clear what sources of information participants were relying on 
to establish a pre-conceived notion that Arab American groups are exclusive and use 
cultural identity as the main criteria for inclusion into their groups.  Further, because 
participants reported little contact with Arab peers, this did not allow for testing of 
expectations related to social experience.  Future research should address these issues 
by investigating children’s and adolescents’ reliance on different forms of media to 
acquire information about cultural outgroups as well as whether having more contact 
and friendships with a cultural outgroup could reduce the effects of stereotypes 
acquired from the media.  In addition, research with other cultural, ethnic, or religious 
categories, such as ‘Latin American’ and ‘Muslim American’ ought to be explored to 
further investigate the role of such identities on peer group inclusion judgments. 
Studies about other cultural groups can also clarify if current findings are specific to 
the Arab social category or are generalizable to other cultural outgroups.  
What was clear, however, was that when thinking about inclusion of outgroup 
targets into their own group independently, both adolescent males and participants 
who reported stereotypic associations were the least inclusive.  The effects of 
stereotypic associations were moderated by inclusive group norms, evidencing that 
schools, classrooms, or groups that foster inclusivity by embracing differences (e.g., 
cultural and those based on interests in activities) and cultural openness can combat 
the influence of stereotypes on children’s and adolescents’ social decision-making in 




multicultural education on pre-adolescents’ intergroup favorability evaluations 
(Verkuyten, 2008).   
A one-dimensional stereotype assessment was used in this study, mainly 
because little was known about the content of the stereotypic associations children 
made with people of Arab descent.  While most stereotypic associations represented 
neutral generalizations rather than negative ones, further research must be carried out 
with different samples to capture negative stereotypes and test their effects on 
inclusion judgments and emotional attributions in exclusion contexts.  Future research 
on stereotypes related to people of Arab descent would benefit from adopting a 
multidimensional approach to measuring stereotypes (i.e., measures of saliency of 
stereotypes or how generalizable stereotypes are to all members of an outgroup 
(Coutant et al., 2011)) to capture the specific components that contribute to exclusive 
attitudes.  In addition, peer relationships are not one-sided, and while this study 
reported on non-Arab American attitudes, future studies should adopt the current 
paradigm with samples of Arab American pre-adolescents and adolescents.  
Comparing these two samples can help identify how misconceptions by both groups 
can be resolved and addressed. 
Despite the misconceptions that existed about an Arab American outgroup, 
12- and 16-year-olds from ethnically diverse backgrounds overall expressed inclusive 
expectations about peer groups in an intercultural context.  The findings extend 
previous developmental research on social exclusion, by identifying misconceptions 
that exist in pre-adolescents and adolescents about expectations that groups would 




stereotypes influence their judgments.  Findings extend developmental group 
dynamics and social identity theories by identifying the factors children consider 
when making expectations about inclusion of ingroup members as well as evaluations 
of ingroup members who challenge group norms.  Extensions to research on 
attributions of emotions in intergroup contexts include differential attributions made 
based on cultural identity and group norms as well as reasoning about negative 
attributions of emotions in terms of concerns for optimizing group dynamics.  
Overall, the findings from the current study reveal the complex ways in which pre-
adolescents and adolescents reason about intergroup exclusion encounters, providing 
further insight into the development of intergroup attitudes.  Most important, this 
information can be used to inform intervention-based research to promote inclusivity 





Table 1  
Main Hypotheses Related to Cultural Identity 
Assessment Hypotheses 
Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes 
Group Inclusion 
 1. Participants will judge their ingroup (American group) to be more inclusive than the Arab American group, irrespective 
of the group norm. 
 2. Participants will judge groups to be more inclusive towards an outgroup target than an ingroup target, except in the case 
when the group has an inclusive norm. 
 3. Adolescents will judge an exclusive group to be less inclusive to either target than pre-adolescents would and pre-
adolescents will focus on shared interests in activities when making group inclusion judgments. 
 4. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will be less inclusive towards an Arab American target 
joining an American group but their judgments may be affected by the type of norm the group has. 
 5. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will judge an Arab American group to be less inclusive 
towards an outgroup target with similar interests than an ingroup target with different interests. 
 6. Participants who report high contact with peers of Arab descent will be more inclusive toward an Arab American target 
than those who report low contact. 
Group Inclusion Reasoning 
 7. Reasoning about the likelihood that a group would include an outgroup target with similar interests will focus on cultural 
identity when the judgment is exclusive and activity preferences or group functioning when the judgment is inclusive. 
 8. Reasoning about the likelihood that a group would include an ingroup target with different interests will focus on 
cultural identity when the judgment is inclusive and activity preferences or group functioning when the judgment is 
exclusive. 
 9. Older participants will make more explicit references to cultural identity, while younger children will focus on shared 





Table 1. Continued 
Main Hypotheses Related to Cultural Identity 
Assessment Hypotheses 
Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes 
Forced-choice Group Inclusion 
 10. It was expected that participants judgments about their own group will be based on shared interests in activities and 
thus will choose to invite an outgroup target with similar interests more often than an ingroup target with different 
interests.  However this will change when the group has an inclusive norm and differential patterns will emerge for 
judgments about whom the Arab American group will include. 
  
11. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will judge that an American group will choose an 
ingroup target with different interests more often than an outgroup target with similar interest, irrespective of the 
group norm.   
Forced-choice Group Inclusion Reasoning 
 12. Participants who choose an ingroup target with different interests will focus on cultural identity when the group is 
exclusive, and focus on group functioning and shared interest, when the group is inclusive. 
Individual Inclusion 
 13. Participants will rate themselves to be more inclusive than their own group would be. 
 14. Adolescents will be able to differentiate more between their own inclusivity and a group’s inclusivity than younger 
participants would. 
 15. Participants who make stereotype associations with Arab people will be less inclusive towards an Arab American 
target joining an American group (outgroup target with similar interest). 
Individual Inclusion Reasoning 
 16. Higher proportions of personal preference will appear in participants’ individual inclusive judgments than in their 
justifications for group inclusion judgments. 





Table 1. Continued 
Main Hypotheses Related to Cultural Identity 
Assessment Hypotheses 
Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes 
 18. Those who are inclusive towards Arab American targets will use higher proportions of activity preference reasoning 
than those who are less inclusive towards Arab American targets. 
Evaluation of the Deviant Act 
19. Participants will rate deviance from an Arab American group differently from deviance from their group (American 
group). 
20. Deviance from an exclusive group norm (inclusive deviant) will be evaluated more positively than deviance from an 
inclusive group norm (exclusive deviant). 
Evaluation of the Deviant Act Reasoning 
21. Across both exclusive and inclusive group norm conditions, higher proportions of autonomy would be used to justify 
positive evaluations of deviant acts, while positive evaluations of an inclusive deviant will also be reasoned with using 
references to social justice and inclusivity, and positive evaluations of an exclusive deviant will also be reasoned with 
using group functioning and autonomy. 
22. Adolescents will make more references to the autonomy of the deviant than pre-adolescents. 
 Attributions of Emotions measures 
Attributions of Group Emotions 
 23. More positive emotions will be attributed to an American or Arab American group excluding an outgroup target with 
similar interests than an ingroup target with different interests. 
 24. Participants who make stereotypes associations with Arab people will attribute more positive emotions to an Arab 
American group when it excludes a target. 
 25. Participants will attribute emotions based on group norms, thus attributing more negative emotions to an inclusive 





Table 1. Continued 
Main Hypotheses Related to Cultural Identity 
Assessment Hypotheses 
 Attributions of Emotions measures 
Attributions of Group Emotions Reasoning 
 26. Those who attribute negative emotions to a group that excludes will reason using fairness, harm caused to the target, 
and appeals to diversity, while those who attribute positive emotions will reference group functioning and dynamics. 
Cultural Knowledge 














Coding Categories for Cultural Knowledge Task and Frequency of Usage 





with Arab People 
(N=187) 
Knowledge level    
Factual Knowledge Accurate statements that describe Arab as a person from the 
Middle East, or from an Arab country or speaks Arabic. 
33% 2% 
 "Someone who is from an Arab Country."   
 "Comes from an Arab family and has Arab parents."   
 "Someone who speaks Arabic."   
General imprecise knowledge Knows that Arabs are of a different culture country but is 
unable to accurately specify which country. 
21% 6% 
 "From a different country."   
 "Is a different culture."   
 "From a county in Asia, next to Pakistan."   
Non-Factual Knowledge Inaccurate and incorrect definitions of Arab people 10% 4% 
 "They are from India."   
 "I think of African American."   
 “From Iran and Pakistan.”   
No Knowledge State that they do not have any knowledge about Arab people 21% 19% 
 "I do not know."   
 "Not sure."   
Stereotypic Associations Generalization about Arabs as a whole group.   
Physical Markers References to skin tone, and hair and eye color 1% 22% 
 "Dark hair, darker skin, brown eyes."   




Table 2. Continued 
Coding Categories for Cultural Knowledge Task and Frequency of Usage 





with Arab People 
(N=187) 
    
Cultural Customs Clothing traditions, music and eating customs: references to 
what they wear or what they eat 
0% 12% 
 "They wear long gowns and have headcover"   
 "Listens to Arabic music."   
 "Eats certain foods."   
Religion Generalizations about religion and beliefs about god. 12% 13% 
 "Is Muslim or from a Muslim country."   
 "Believes in Allah."   
 "Are very spiritual."   
Negative associations Negative descriptions or adjectives 1% 6% 
 "I think of a terrorist."   
 "Osama Bin Laden."   
 "Poor."   
Geography and Language Generalizations related to geographic region and language 2% 5% 
 "Has an accent."   
 "Lives in a desert."   
 "Loves hot weather."   
General differences Generalizations about broad differences and behavioral 
differences 
2% 9% 
 "Different from American."   




Table 2. Continued 
Coding Categories for Cultural Knowledge Task and Frequency of Usage 





with Arab People 
(N=187) 
Positive and Neutral descriptions Attributing positive adjectives, statements about similarities 
to others and ambiguous unclear references. 
  
Positive generalizations Positive descriptions and adjectives 0% 18% 
 "Shy and quiet."   
 "Respectful, friendly."   
 "Rich culture."   
Similarities References to Arabs being just like anyone else 2% 4% 
 "Just like anyone else."   
 "No different from you and me."   
 "Normal people."   
Ambiguous References to descriptions in the stories 5% 6% 
 "They like people who are different so they seem nice."   
 "They like music and arts."   
 
Note: Frequencies add up to more than 100% because the count includes references to categories in double and triple codes and 
frequencies represents the percent of the sample that used that category.  Total number of codeable responses for the knowledge 











Coding Categories for Justifications Used in Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes and Attribution of Emotions Assessments 
Category Definition and examples Examples 
Moral Domain  
Social 
Justice/Inclusivity 
References to prejudice and wrongfulness of 
group exclusion as well as positive statements 
about inclusivity.   
“I don’t like to exclude people.” 
“They just let someone down because of their ethnicity.” 
“It is not fair not to invite him because of his race.” 
“That’s racist.” 
“You should not be prejudice.” 
“They are leaving someone out.” 
    
Psychological 
Harm/Empathy 
References to negative intentions towards 
others (teasing or being mean) or appeals to 
thinking about how other people would feel.  
Could also include references to missed 
friendships and prosocial behavior and 
references to protecting the target, focusing on 
the targets feelings and preferences. 
“It will hurt his feelings.” 
“If he kicked me out I would be upset.” 
“Hanna has nobody around.” 
“It is mean not to invite someone.” 
“Friends should be nice to one another.” 
“Julie would not have fun in the group anyway.” 
 
    
Societal Domain (Group Dynamics)  
Group Functioning Conventions of the group designed to promote 
the group or encourage effective group 
functioning.  Statements about how groups 
work and desire to conform to group norms.   
“He won’t fit in.”, “That’s what the group likes.” 
 “They can talk things over.” 
“He betrayed his friends, went against what they like.” 
“They will get along together.” 
   “They would not care because it does not affect the group.” 




Table 3. Continued 
Coding Categories for Justifications Used in Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes and Attribution of Emotions Assessments 
Category Definition and examples Examples 
Activity Preferences Explicit references to activity preferences of 
the group or target.   
“Hani likes music.” 
“They like tennis.” 
“She likes to do different things.” 
“The group likes different activities.” 
“They like similar things as the group.” 
“He likes tennis just like them.” 
    
Cultural Identity Explicit references to the target’s or group’s 
cultural identity or being ‘American’ or 
‘Arab-American’ or ‘Arab’. 
“He’s American.” 
“She’s not the same race.” 
“He’s American which is different from them.” 
“They are from a different culture.” 
“She’s Arab American and they would like her.” 
“They are American and so is he.” 
   
 
 
Stereotypes References to stereotypic judgments about 
Arab Americans or Americans, even 
references to generalized judgments about 
groups based on their norms or based on 
physical features or cultural generalization. 
“Sally will physically stand out and it’s hard to get past 
that.” 
“No matter how different they like people they are all Arab 
and will mostly likely pick the Arab kid.” 
“Arabs will be uncomfortable, because Henry does not 
meet their racial preferences.” 




Table 3. Continued 
Coding Categories for Justifications Used in Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes and Attribution of Emotions Assessments 
Category Definition and examples Examples 
Group Diversity Diverse perspectives within a group: 
Appeals to having diversity and 
different perspectives within the group 
whether culturally related or related to 
diversity in interests.  Alludes to 
heterogeneity within a group. 
“Diversity doesn’t hurt.” 
“Its good to have different opinions.” 
“Could teach the group new things.” 





Autonomy Individuality and personal choice. “She has a right to her own opinion.” 
“She can say what she wants, its up to her.” 
“He said his opinion.” 
    
Personal Preference/ 
Personality 
Appeals to personal preferences about 
activities or meeting others as well as a focus 
on target’s personality. 
“I like tennis so I would like Julie.” 
“I like different things so I would not get along with him.” 
“I like meeting new people.” 
“I like to try new things.”  
 “She seems nice to me.” 
“I don’t know what her personality will be like.” 






Knowledge about Arab People and Stereotypic Associations by Age, Gender, 
Ethnicity, Religion and Ethnic Composition of Friendships 





Age 12-year-olds   0.15 (0.36) 
a




16-year-olds   0.52 (0.50) 
a
   0.70 (0.46) 
b
  
Gender Female 0.30 (0.46) 0.57 (0.50) 
 
Male 0.37 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50) 
Status Majority 0.34 (0.48) 0.54 (0.50) 
 
Minority 0.34 (0.48) 0.52 (0.50) 
Friendship 
Composition 
<= Half Same 
Ethnicity 0.37 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 
 
> Half Same 
Ethnicity 0.28 (0.45) 0.49 (0.50) 
Religion Christian 0.30 (0.46) 0.54 (0.50) 
 
Jewish 0.45(0.51) 0.47 (0.51) 
 
Muslim 0.00 (0.00) 0.33 (0.58) 
 Other 0.39 (0.49) 0.52 (0.51) 
a
 Age differences for knowledge about Arab people 
b
 Age differences for stereotypes about Arab people 
Note: Knowledge about Arab people 0 = No Knowledge and 1 = Knowledge; 





Table 5   
Knowledge and Stereotypes by Arab/Muslim Confound 
 




Arab/Muslim Confound n Mean (SD) n Mean (SD) 
      All Arabs are Muslim 12 0.08 (0.29) 
b
 12 0.50 (0.52) 
Not sure 82   0.21 (0.41) 
a
 78   0.63 (0.49) 
c
 
Not all Arabs are Muslim 97   0.47 (0.50) 
a b




 post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparison p < 0.001 
  b post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparison p < 0.05 
  c post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparison p < 0.05 





























Proportion of Reasoning Used to Justify Inclusive and Exclusive Judgments  







Arab American group;  
Target: Outgroup, Similar Interests 
 




0.38 (.45) 0.32 (.41) 
 




0.28 (.39)  0.15 (.28)* 
American group;  
Target: Outgroup, Similar Interests 
 




0.47(.48) 0.35 (.44) 
 




0.18 (.35) 0.10 (.26) 
Arab American group;  
Target: Ingroup, Different Interests 
 




0.30 (.43) 0.45 (.48) 
 




0.14 (.27)     0.29 (.42)** 
American group;  
Target: Ingroup, Different Interests 
 




0.48 (.50) 0.41 (.47) 
 
Activity Preferences 0.43 (.48) 0.25 (.40) 
 Cultural Identity   0.02 (.09) 0.14 (.30) 






Individual Inclusion Reasoning about an Outgroup Target with Similar Interests 
    Age 
    12-year-olds 16-year-olds 
Female 
   
 
Group Functioning .29 (.41) .12(.30) 
 
Activity Preferences .25(.37) .33 (.45) 
 
Personal Preferences/Personality .24(.41) .35(.48) 
Male 
   
 
Group Functioning .24(.40) .26(.41) 
 
Activity Preferences .33(.43) .39(.46) 
 
Personal Preferences/Personality .19(.38) .20 (.39) 
Likelihood they would exclude target n = 15 n = 19 
 
Group Functioning .33(.45) .24(.42) 
 
Activity Preferences .30(.41) .08(.25) 
 
Personal Preferences/Personality .20 (.41) .47 (.51) 
Likelihood they would include target n = 86 n = 76 
 
Group Functioning .26(.40) .17(.34) 
 
Activity Preferences .29(.40) .43(.47) 
 Personal Preferences/Personality .22 (.40) .23 (.41) 










Proportion of Reasoning Used to Judge the Acceptability of an Exclusive or Inclusive Group Deviant When the Target is 
an Outgroup Member with Similar Interests 
    Group Exclusive, Deviant Inclusive Group Inclusive, Deviant Exclusive 
    Deviant Not Okay Deviant Okay Deviant Not Okay Deviant Okay 
Arab American Group n = 18 n = 80 n = 84 n = 15 
 
Social Justice .06 (.24) .12 (.32) .26 (.42) .03 (.13) 
 
Group Functioning .53 (.47) .26 (.44) .31 (.44) .43 (.50) 
 
Autonomy .06 (.16) .23 (.41) .04 (.19) .13 (.35) 
American Group n = 22 n = 75 n = 60 n = 36 
 
Social Justice 0.18 (.36) 0.19 (.37) 0.22 (.42) 0.08 (.25) 
 
Group Functioning 0.43 (.47) 0.19 (.37) 0.33 (.46) 0.40 (.48) 







Proportions of Emotions Attributed to Each Group for Excluding an Ingroup and Outgroup Target 
  Target: Outgroup, Same Interests Target: Ingroup, Different Interests 
Emotions Attributed Arab American Group American Group Arab American Group American Group 
Pride 0.10 (.30) 0.08 (.27)    0.05 (.22)
 c
* 0.06 (.24) 
Happiness 0.18 (.38) 0.13 (.34)       0.11 (.32)
 c
** 0.10 (.30) 
Sadness 0.22 (.41)      0.30 (.46)
 a
 * 0.24 (.43)      0.35 (.48)
 b
** 
Anger 0.11 (.32) 0.14 (.35) 0.08 (.27)    0.14 (.35)
 b
* 
Guilt 0.47 (.50)       0.58 (.49)
 a
 **        0.58 (.50)
 c
 ** 0.52 (.50) 
Apathy 0.44 (.50)         0.31 (.46)
 a
 *** 0.38 (.49) 0.35 (.48) 
Shame 0.35 (.48) 0.40 (.49)      0.44 (.50)
 c
 * 0.40 (.49) 
a
 Comparing emotions attributed to Arab American group and American group after excluding an outgroup target 
b 
Comparing emotions attributed to Arab American group and American group after excluding an ingroup target 
c
 Comparing emotions attributed to Arab American group after excluding an outgroup target and an ingroup target 



































Proportion of Guilty and Ashamed Emotions Attributed to an Arab American 
Group by Gender, Group Norm and Target of Exclusion 
   Condition Guilt Shame 
Females 
   
 
Target: Outgroup, Same Interests .58 (.50) .47 (.50) 
 
Target: Ingroup, Different Interests .61 (.49) .46 (.50) 
 
Exclusive Norm .49 (.61) .29 (.50) 
 
Inclusive Norm .69 (.50) .64 (.50) 
Males 
   
 
Target: Outgroup, Same Interests .34 (.47) .21 (.41) 
 
Target: Ingroup, Different Interests .55 (.50) .42 (.50) 
 
Exclusive Norm .47 (.58) .25 (.58) 




Table 11  
Correlations Between Emotions Attributed and Group Inclusion Judgments 














Pride -.219** -.115  -.153* -.174* 
Happiness         -.166* -.097  -.142* -.192** 
Sadness          .108      .235**     .224**           .091 
Anger          .143*    .167*            .095           .147* 
Guilt          .017      .229**     .230**  .191** 
Apathy         -.155*     -.281**    -.276** -.226** 
Shame          .142*    .182*     .252**           .133 


























Note: Given that prejudice drives children to make inclusion decision based on 
cultural membership an inclusive judgment is defined by arrows to an outgroup 
target with similar interests in activities and an exclusive judgment is defined by 
arrows to an ingroup target with similar interests in activities.  Dashed arrows 













































Figure 2.  Design for Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey 
 
 Version 1 Version 2 
Story 1A Arab American Group 
Condition: Outgroup, similar interests 
Arab American Group 
Condition: Ingroup, different interests 
 Group Norm: Exclusive 
Deviant: Inclusive 
Target characteristic: Different 
cultural identity, similar interests 
Group Norm: Inclusive 
Deviant: Exclusive 
Target characteristic: Same cultural 
identity, different interests  
Story 1B Arab American Group 
Condition: Ingroup, different interests 
Arab American Group 
Condition: Outgroup, similar interests 
 Group Norm: Exclusive 
Deviant: Inclusive 
Target characteristic: Same cultural 
identity, different interests 
Group Norm: Inclusive 
Deviant: Exclusive 
Target characteristic: Different cultural 
identity, similar interests  
Story 1C Arab American Group 
Condition: Forced-choice 
Arab American Group 
Condition: Forced-choice 
 Group Norm: Exclusive 
Forced choice Inclusion: 
Target characteristic:  
1) Different cultural identity, 
similar interests (Outgroup, 
similar interests) 
2) Same cultural identity, different 
interests (Ingroup, different 
interests) 
Group Norm: Inclusive 
Forced choice Inclusion: 
Target characteristic:  
1) Same cultural identity, different 
interests (Ingroup, different 
interests) 
2) Different cultural identity, 
similar interests (Outgroup, 
similar interests) 
Story 2A American Group 
Condition: Ingroup, different interests 
American Group 
Condition: Outgroup, similar interests 
 Group Norm: Inclusive 
Deviant: Exclusive 
Target characteristic: Same cultural 
identity, different interests  
Group Norm: Exclusive 
Deviant: Inclusive 
Target characteristic: Different cultural 
identity, similar interests  
Story 2B American Group 
Condition: Outgroup, similar interests 
American Group 
Condition: Ingroup, different interests 
 Group Norm: Inclusive 
Deviant: Exclusive 
Target characteristic: Different 
cultural identity, similar interests  
Group Norm: Exclusive 
Deviant: Inclusive 
Target characteristic: Same cultural 
identity, different interests 




 Group Norm: Inclusive 
Forced choice Inclusion: 
Target characteristic:  
1) Same cultural identity, different 
interests (Ingroup, different 
interests) 
2) Different cultural identity, 
similar interests (Outgroup, 
similar interests) 
Group Norm: Exclusive 
Forced choice Inclusion: 
Target characteristic:  
1) Different cultural identity, 
similar interests (Outgroup, 
similar interests) 
2) Same cultural identity, different 









Figure 3.  Group Inclusion Judgments for Both Targets by Cultural Group Identity 
and Group Norm 
 
Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = 
Really likely.  Error bars represent standard deviations. 
a
 n.s. compared with 3.5 midpoint inclusion judgment 
b
 t(99) = 5.47, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.55 
c
 t(97) = 4.19, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.42 
d
 n.s. compared with 3.5 midpoint inclusion judgment 
e
 t(97) = 3.60, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.36 
f
 t(98) = 5.57, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.56 
g
 t(99) = 9.20, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.92 
h





















































Figure 4.  Group Inclusion Judgments about an Outgroup Target with Similar 
Interests by Age and Gender 
 
Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = 


























































Figure 5.  Proportion of Reasoning Used to Judge Inclusion of Both Targets Into an 
Exclusive Group 
 








































































Figure 6.  Role of Stereotypic Associations on the American Group’s Inclusion 
Judgments about Outgroup and Ingroup Targets 
 
Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = 




















































Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = 
















































Figure 8.  Group Versus Individual Inclusion in an American Group 
 
Note: Both inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 




















































Figure 9. The Role of Stereotypic Associations on Individual Inclusion Judgments for 
Each Target 
 
Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = 
















































Figure 10.  Forced-choice Group Inclusion: Choosing an Ingroup Target Over an 
Outgroup Target 
 
Note: 1 = choosing the ingroup target with different interests, 0 = choosing the 
















































































Figure 11.  Differences in Reasoning about Forced-choice Group Inclusion Based on 
the Cultural Identity of the Group 
 















































Figure 12.  Reasoning about Choosing to Invite an Ingroup Target with Different 
Interests into an Exclusive and Inclusive American Group 
 




















































Figure 13.  Evaluation of an Inclusive or Exclusive Arab American and American 
Deviant for Each Target 
 
Note: Evaluations of the deviant act were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not Okay, 





























































Figure 14.  Reasoning about the Acceptability of a Deviant Group Member who 
Wants to Exclude and Outgroup Target  
 




















































Figure 15.  Proportion of Moral and Group Dynamics Reasoning Used Based on Negative or Positive Attributions of Emotions 
 










































































































Institute for Child Study/Department of Human Development Melanie Killen, Ph.D. 
3304 Benjamin Building  Office: 301.405.3176 
College Park, MD  20742-1131  Email: mkillen@umd.edu 
 
Dear Parents and Guardians,  
 
We are conducting a project on how children and adolescents make decisions about 
inclusion in peer groups.  We would like your permission to survey your child for this 
project because they are in grades 6 through 10. We are interested in studying how 
children and adolescents judge peer groups who include group members based on 
different reasons. We will tell participants short stories about friendship groups that 
have to decide whether to include peers from a different culture into the group. We 
are specifically interested in how expectations about other cultures and 
understandings about how groups function influence decisions about group 
dynamics. These issues are central to how children and adolescents evaluate peer 
relationships and group processes. 
 
Surveys will be administered by trained research assistants from the University of 
Maryland to students who provide assent to participate. The survey will take about 
25 minutes to complete. Students will be asked to evaluate scenarios in which 
individuals are asked to make choices regarding peer inclusion. All information is 
confidential. Please look over the assent form that will be distributed on the 
reverse side of this letter.  If you are not willing to have your child participate 
in the project, please contact us (see contact information on assent form). 
 
The information obtained from this study will help teachers, policy makers, 
counselors and school administrators design curriculum and interventions to promote 
tolerance and mutual respect among children and adolescents. This research has 
been approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland. 
 
We thank you, in advance, for reading this letter, and for your willingness to 
allow your daughter/son to participate. We have found that students enjoy the 
opportunity to express their opinions about their peer relations.  
   
Thank you,  
  
Melanie Killen, Ph.D. and Aline Hitti 








University of Maryland College Park 





Peer relationships, culture, and social groups 
 





This research is being conducted by Dr. Melanie Killen at the University of Maryland, 
College Park.  We are inviting you to participate in this research project because your 




 grade.  The purpose of this research project is to better 
understand how children and adolescents think about how peer groups make inclusion 





The procedure involves a 25 minute Survey. The survey will be conducted in your child’s 
classroom or a specially designated area identified by the school.  Trained research 
assistants from the University of Maryland, College Park, will conduct the Survey and will 
be available to answer any questions. Your child will be told hypothetical stories about 
children faced with decisions to include and exclude peers that have different cultural 
characteristics. Participants will evaluate whether they think these decisions are okay or 
not okay and why they think so.  
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with participating in this research project. 
Potential Benefits  This research is not designed to help your child personally. Instead, research is obtained 
about age-related patterns regarding friendship and peer inclusion and exclusion.  The 
results will help us learn more about what kids and teenagers think about social 
relationships. Educators, counselors, and school professionals will incorporate the 
findings into their curriculum and guidance programs through reports made available by 
us to the participating school districts.  
Confidentiality 
 
We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential.  To help protect 
confidentiality, your child’s name will not be attached to the Survey. S/he will be given an 
ID number. We will not share his/her answers with anyone, including his/her teachers, 
principal, or parents.  
If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected to 
the maximum extent possible.  Your information may be shared with representatives of the 
University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or someone else 
is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.  
Right to Withdraw and 
Questions 
Your child’s participation is strictly voluntary. You can ask any questions at any time, or 
withdraw your child from participation at any time. Your child may decide to stop 
participating at any time and will not be penalized or lose any benefits.  Participation is 
not a school or class requirement. Participation will not affect your child’s grades or 
performance evaluation. 
If you decide to withdraw your child’s participation in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints related to the research, please contact the investigator, Dr. 
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